



Chapter 7.3.1

Preventing adverse selection

Uninformed investors making losses

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This presentation is based on
Andreas Krause: *Theoretical Foundations of Investment Banking*, Springer Verlag 2024 Copyright © 2024 by Andreas Krause

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