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Chapter 7.2.2

Underwriting syndicates

Outline

- Problem and model assumptions
- Optimal syndicate size for issuers
- Co-underwriters
- Lead underwriter
- Summary

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- As $0 \leq \eta \leq 1$, the syndicate size generally will be small

- Problem and model assumptions
- Optimal syndicate size for issuers
- Co-underwriters
- Lead underwriter
- Summary

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