

Chapter 6.2
Accepting merger offers

ed fees Conditional fee

### Outline

- Problem and model assumptions
- Fixed fee contract
- Conditional fee contract
- Contingent fee contract
- Summary

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# Investment banking advice

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Problem and assumptions  $00 \bullet 0$ 

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Problem and model assumption

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Theoretical Foundations of Investment Banking

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