Andreas Krause

Chapter 17.1

Viability of partnerships

Outline

Characteristics of partnerships

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- Problem and model assumptions
- Associates joining the partnership
- Taking up partnership offers
- Not appointing unskilled partners
- Mentoring of associates
- Summary

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