



## Chapter 15.3

# Misrepresentation of trading outcomes

# Outline

- Problem and model assumptions
- Incentives for traders
- Incentives for managers
- Equilibrium outcome
- Summary

## ■ Problem and model assumptions

■ Incentives for traders

■ Incentives for managers

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# Incentives to misrepresent outcomes



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