Andreas Krause

Chapter 11.2

# Introduction of innovations

# Outline

- Problem and model assumptions
- Controversial innovations
- Phasing of innovations
- Selling innovations
- Optimal strategy for small banks
- Summary

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

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

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

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

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

- Problem and model assumptions
- Controversial innovations
- Phasing of innovations
- Selling innovations
- Optimal strategy for small banks
- Summary

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Andreas Krause
Department of Economics
University of Bath
Claverton Down
Bath BA2 7AY
United Kingdom

E-mail: mnsak@bath.ac.uk