Andreas Krause



Chapter 10

Regulation of financial analysts

Outline

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- This is maximized at $\gamma = \frac{w_S}{c_I} + \frac{c_P}{c_I}\left(\rho_S - \rho_W\right)\left(P_H - P_L\right)^2$

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- Problem and model assumptions
- Unregulated analysts
- Chinese Walls
- Disclosure of wages
- Summary

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This presentation is based on
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