



Trading with informed investors

Outline

- Informed traders
- Market efficiency
- Market liquidity
- Summary

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- ▶ **Prices** are set such that it reflects the **value** based the information from the total demand over time demand of the **informed traders** and **noise traders**
- ▶ $P_t = E \left[V \mid \sum_{\tau=1}^N Q_\tau + \sum_{\tau=1}^M U_\tau \right]$

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- ▶ Profits from a trade arise from the difference between the **asset value** and the **price** paid, for **each asset traded**, plus any **future profits** the traders will receive
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Measuring market efficiency


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
Market efficiency

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


Market efficiency

Few informed investors




Market efficiency



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Few informed investors and many informed investors



Market efficiency develops over time

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- ▶ Markets become efficient **over time** as information is incorporated into prices

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- ▶ Informed investors trade **strategically**

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- ▶ Informed traders obtain an **informational advantage** over noise traders

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- ▶ The **more informed traders** are in the market, the more they will **compete** with each other

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- ▶ The more informed traders are in the market, the more they will compete with each other
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- ▶ If competition was perfect, markets would be **instantly efficient**

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- ▶ More noise trading allows informed traders to hide their orders better and the market should be come **less efficient** as less information is revealed

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- **Market liquidity**
- Summary

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
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
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


Market liquidity

Few informed investors




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Few informed investors and many informed investors



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