



Andreas Krause

Moral hazard in capital structure decisions

Outline

- Introduction
- Optimal effort levels
- Risk shifting
- Summary

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Managerial decisions on investments

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Sharing benefits of efforts with outside equity

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- Introduction
- Optimal effort levels
- Risk shifting
- **Summary**

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