

Adverse selection

Asymmetric information

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- ▶ **Companies** know their type

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- ▶ Companies know their type, but banks only know the **fraction** of each type in the market

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Andreas Krause
Department of Economics
University of Bath
Claverton Down
Bath BA2 7AY
United Kingdom

E-mail: mnsak@bath.ac.uk