

The background is a complex, abstract digital visualization. It features a dense network of glowing lines in various colors, including bright yellow, cyan, and magenta. These lines appear to be data paths or connections, some of which are thicker and more prominent. The overall aesthetic is futuristic and high-tech, with a strong emphasis on light and motion. The lines are set against a dark, almost black background, which makes the glowing elements stand out sharply. There are also some blurred, out-of-focus light spots scattered throughout, adding to the sense of depth and complexity.

Andreas Krause

Utility theory

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Moral hazard

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