

Collateral use

- ▶ Banks do not always know the risks companies are taking, but companies might be more aware of their own risks
- ➤ Setting loan rates too high to account for high-risk companies, might crowd out low-risk companies due to the lower return they obtain from their investment
- Collateral can be used to distinguish between the two types of companies, allowing for loan rates to be set according to the risk of the company

Company profits

- Companies obtain their investment return and repay the loan if they are successful, if they are unsuccessful they lose their collateral
- $\Pi_C^i = \pi_i \left((1+R) L \left(1 + r_L^i \right) L \right) (1 \pi_i) C_i$
- ▶ The isoprofit curve of companies is given by $d\Pi_C^i = -\pi_i L dr_L^i (1-\pi_i) dC_i = 0$
- $\Rightarrow \frac{dr_L^i}{dC_i} = -\frac{1-\pi_i}{\pi_i L}$
- We find a negative trade-off between the loan rate and the size of the collateral

Bank profits

- lacktriangle Banks obtain collateral, but they can only sell this with a discount λ
- ▶ If the investment of the company is successful, the loan is repaid, if the investment is not successful, the bank obtains the value of the collateral
- Loans are fully financed by deposits
- $\Pi_B^i = \pi_i (1 + r_L^i) L + (1 \pi_i) \lambda C_i (1 + r_D) L$
- ▶ The isoprofit curve of banks is given by $d\Pi_B^i = \pi_i L dr_L^i + \lambda \left(1 \pi_i\right) dC_i = 0$
- $\Rightarrow \frac{dr_L^i}{dC_i} = -\lambda \frac{1-\pi_i}{\pi_i L}$
- ▶ The slope is negative, but flatter than the isoprofit curve for companies



Bank offering a single contract only

▶ Banks know the composition of low-risk and high-risk companies, the average success rate is $\pi = p\pi_H + (1-p)\pi_L$

$$\Rightarrow \Pi_B^P = \pi (1 + r_L) L + (1 - \pi) \lambda C - (1 + r_D) L$$


$$\Rightarrow \frac{dr_L}{dC} = -\lambda \frac{1-\pi}{\pi L}$$

- ▶ This slope is between banks only lending to high-risk and low-risk companies
- ▶ If this bank is competitive then we require $\Pi_B^P = 0$

$$\Rightarrow$$
 $1 + r_L = \frac{1+r_D}{\pi} - \frac{1-\pi}{\pi} \frac{C}{L}$



Separating equilibrium with collateral



Banks offering distinct contracts

- ▶ If banks are competitive, they make zero profits as long as they follow the same strategy: all offer two contracts (separating) or all offer one contract (pooling)
- ▶ If a bank offers a single contract, another bank can offer a marginally better contract near P
- This bank would obtain all low-risk companies, but no high-risk companies

$$\Rightarrow \Pi_B^* = \pi_H (1 + r_L) L - (1 + r_D) L = (1 - p) \frac{\pi_H - \pi_L}{\pi} (1 + r_D) L$$

▶ The other bank would be left with high-risk companies only

$$\Rightarrow \Pi_B^{**} = \pi_L (1 + r_L) L - (1 + r_D) L = -p \frac{\pi_H - \pi_L}{\pi} (1 + r_D) L$$



Strategic choice of loan contracts

		Bank 1	
		pooling	separating
Bank 2	pooling	0, 0	Π_B^* , Π_B^{**}
	separating	Π_B^{**} , Π_B^*	0, 0
$\Pi_B^* > 0 > \Pi_B^{**} \Pi_B^* > 0 > \Pi_B^{**}$			

Summary

- Collateral can be used to separate companies taking different risks
- Low-risk companies will offer collateral in exchange for a lower loan rate
- ▶ High-risk companies will not offer collateral, but pay a higher loan rate
- Banks will offer contracts with and without collateral for companies to choose



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