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#### Outline

- Problem and model assumptions
- Social optimum
- Direct lending
- Direct lending with trading
- Bank lending
- Summary

- Problem and model assumptions

- Bank lending

Problem and model assumptions

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### Market clearing

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This presentation is based on

Andreas Krause: Theoretical Foundations of Banking, 2025

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