

#### Outline

- Problem and model assumptions
- No deposit insurance
- Full deposit coverage
- Partial deposit coverage
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## Bank and depositor profits

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- Problem and model assumptions
- No deposit insurance
- Full deposit coverage
- Partial deposit coverage
- Summary

▶ Banks prefer deposit insurance to be limited to smaller deposits

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