

Chapter 18.2.1

The optimality of deposit insurance limits

Outline

- Problem and model assumptions
- No deposit insurance
- Full deposit coverage
- Partial deposit coverage
- Summary

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■ Problem and model assumptions

■ No deposit insurance

■ Full deposit coverage

■ Partial deposit coverage

■ Summary

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