Andreas Krause

Chapter 17.1.1

Fixed-price deposit insurance

The effect on deposit rates

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Bank profits without deposit insurance

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Andreas Krause
Department of Economics
University of Bath
Claverton Down
Bath BA2 7AY
United Kingdom

E-mail: mnsak@bath.ac.uk