Chapter 14.1.2 Coordination of deposit withdrawals

S.

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- Banks invest the deposits they obtain into loans that cannot be called in if the banks requires cash reserves.
- Banks would need to raise cash if they needed additional cash reserves, for example if more deposits than expected are withdrawn.
- Selling assets quickly to generate cash or obtaining loans will impose significant costs on banks, which might affect their ability to repay deposits.
- We will look at how depositors might want to withdraw deposits optimally, taking these losses banks make when raising cash reserves into
 account.



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- \rightarrow Banks always face the threat of deposits being withdrawn early and this can impose losses on banks and depositors alike.
 - If banks face the withdrawal of deposits, they face losses; these losses are not only reduced cash reserves, but actual losses.
 - These losses arise from the attempt to raise additional cash reserves to meet the demand for withdrawing deposits.
- While losses are initially borne by the bank in the form of reduced profits, once losses become high, they will affect the ability of the bank to repay the deposits itself as the value of their assets with be depleted to such an extend that they are worth less than the deposits they have to repay.
- If losses affect depositors remaining with the bank, but those withdrawing deposits are not affected or affected to a smaller extend, it can be rational for all depositors to withdraw.
- We then have a bank run where depositors withdraw early only because other withdraw early; there is no fundamental reason for such a withdrawal.
 - If the decisions of depositors can be coordinated such that not all depositors withdraw if some withdraw early, we can prevent such a bank run to emerge.
 - This would benefit all depositors; those withdrawing early would obtain a larger repayment as the bank has to raise less cash reserves at a high cost. The same benefits would also apply to those not withdrawing early as they would obtain a repayment, including interest, at a later point of time.
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Withdrawals of deposits can impose losses on banks

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- These losses can impact depositors if banks are not able to repay their deposits fully

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- Withdrawals of deposits can impose losses on banks as they need to raise additional cash reserves
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- \rightarrow We will firstly look at the amount of loans a bank needs to sell in order to be able to repay deposits that are being withdrawn.
- We consider a situation in which banks face the early withdrawals of deposits.
 - These withdrawn deposits are repaid in the first instance using the cash reserves the bank holds.
 - As a next measure they sell some of the loans to raise additional cash reserves.
 - Given the speed with which loans have to be sold, banks are only able to obtain a fraction of their repayment value.
- ▶ The funds thus raised will match the funds needed to repay the fraction of deposits that are being withdrawn.
- \Rightarrow We can determine how many loans the bank needs to sell in order to repay all deposits.
- \rightarrow Knowing the required sales of loans, we can now determine at what point a bank would fail.



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Banks face withdrawals of deposits

They repay these deposits from their existing cash reserve

$\blacktriangleright R = \gamma D$

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- Banks face withdrawals of deposits
- They repay these deposits from their existing cash reserve and the sale of loans
- $\blacktriangleright R + \pi (1+r_L) \hat{L} = \gamma D$

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- They repay these deposits from their existing cash reserve and the sale of loans, for which they obtain a fraction of their true value
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$$R + \lambda \pi (1 + r_L) \hat{L} = \gamma D$$

$$\Rightarrow \hat{L} = \frac{\gamma D - R}{\lambda \pi (1 + r_L)}$$

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Bank failure


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Bank failure

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- If a bank cannot meet all its obligations it is deemed to fail; here this means that the bank fails if it cannot repay all depositors, those withdrawing intially, but most importantly, those remaining with the bank.
 - The funds available to the bank with which they can repay the remaining deposits are given by the repayment of the loans they have not sold.
 - In addition they have the cash reserved they originally had,
 - from which the early withdrawals have been repaid.
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- The bank would fail if their resources are not sufficient to repay all deposits.
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- A bank fails if the remaining depositors cannot be repaid
- Banks obtain the repayments of the loans not sold

$$\blacktriangleright \pi \left(1+r_L\right) \left(L-\hat{L}\right)$$

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$$\blacktriangleright \pi (1+r_L) \left(L - \hat{L}\right) + R$$

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- We initially look at the possibility of a bank failing if the deposit withdrawals are low. \rightarrow
- ► We first consider the case where deposit withdrawals are so low that the bank has sufficient cash reserves to repay them and hence doe snot need to sell any loans.
- \Rightarrow Using the bank failure condition from above in this case, we can rewrite the condition as the minimum repayment rate for loans that are required to avoid a bank failure. ►
 - If loans are very risky the repayment of loans would not be sufficient to allow the bank the repayment of the remaining deposits.
 - This situation is an insolvency as the bank is not able to meet its obligations not because of the withdrawals of deposits, but because of losses arising from lending.
- For small deposit withdrawals, the bank can become insolvent if the loans are too risky. \rightarrow



▶ If reserves are sufficient to cover the early withdrawal, $\gamma \leq \frac{R}{D}$, banks do not sell loans, $\hat{L} = 0$

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If reserves are sufficient to cover the early withdrawal, γ ≤ R/D, banks do not sell loans, L̂ = 0
 ⇒ π < π* = (1+(1-γ)r_D)D-R/((1+r_L)(D-R))

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If loans are very risky the bank does not generate enough profits to repay depositors

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- \Rightarrow Using the bank failure condition from above in this case, we can rewrite the condition as the minimum repayment rate for loans that are required to avoid a bank failure.
 - If loans are very risky the repayment of loans would not be sufficient to allow the bank the repayment of the remaining deposits.
 - This situation is an insolvency as the bank is not able to meet its obligations not because of the withdrawals of deposits, but because of losses arising from lending.
- For small deposit withdrawals, the bank can become insolvent if the loans are too risky. \rightarrow



▶ If reserves are sufficient to cover the early withdrawal, $\gamma \leq \frac{R}{D}$, banks do not sell loans, $\hat{L} = 0$

$$\Rightarrow \pi < \pi^* = \frac{(1+(1-\gamma)r_D)D-R}{(1+r_L)(D-R)}$$

If loans are very risky the bank does not generate enough profits to repay depositors and becomes insolvent

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Chapter 14.1.2: Coordination of deposit withdrawals Theoretical Foundations of Banking Slide 6 of 10

- \rightarrow We now turn to the opposite situation in that deposit withdrawals are very large.
- We assume that the deposit withdrawals are so high that in order to be able to meet this demand, the bank has to sell all loans.
 - The total cash reserves would consist of the money raised from selling all loans,
 - in addition to the initial cash holdings.
 - · If this amount is below the deposit withdrawals, the bank cannot repay all depositors withdrawing early.
- Formula

►

- \Rightarrow We can again solve this equation for the minimum repayment rate that a bank requires to avoid failing in this case.
- In this case, the bank does not fail because the risks they have taken are too high. The reason is that they cannot raise sufficient cash reserves to repay all depositors withdrawing early; thus the bank is illiquid.
- \rightarrow Hence for large deposit withdrawals, banks fail due to illiquidity.

• If withdrawal rates are high, banks may have to sell all loans, $\hat{L} = L$

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- If withdrawal rates are high, banks may have to sell all loans, $\hat{L} = L$
- Banks cannot pay all depositors withdrawing early if the money raised

$\blacktriangleright \qquad \lambda \pi \left(1 + r_L \right) L$

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- Banks cannot pay all depositors withdrawing early if the money raised, plus cash reserves
- $\blacktriangleright R + \lambda \pi \left(1 + r_L\right) L$

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- If withdrawal rates are high, banks may have to sell all loans, $\hat{L} = L$
- Banks cannot pay all depositors withdrawing early if the money raised, plus cash reserves, is below the deposit withdrawals
- $\blacktriangleright R + \lambda \pi \left(1 + r_L\right) L < \gamma D$

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- If withdrawal rates are high, banks may have to sell all loans, $\hat{L} = L$
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$$R + \lambda \pi (1 + r_L) L < \gamma D \Rightarrow \pi < \pi^{**} = \frac{\gamma D - R}{\lambda (1 + r_L) (D - R)}$$

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$$R + \lambda \pi (1 + r_L) L < \gamma D$$

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Bank are failing due to illiquidity

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- \rightarrow We can now consider the intermediate case of deposit withdrawals being such that some of the loans need to be sold by the bank, but not all.
- We assume that banks sell some loans in order to raise cash reserves for the early withdrawal of deposits. ►
- The amount of loans that needs to be raised can be determined from the previous slide by setting the amount raised equal to the deposits withdrawn; this is then inserted into the condition for the bank failing and we obtain the minimum repayment rate of loans to avoid bank failure as indicated in the formula
 - The bank sells loans and this raises sufficient cash reserves to allow the bank repaying all depositors withdrawing early.
 - The losses the bank incurs from selling the loans below their value will prevent the bank from having sufficient funds to repay all the remaining depositors. Hence the bank will fail once the remaining depositors are to be repaid; the bank is insolvent not because the loans in itself are too risky, but because losses from selling loans have been incurred.
- \rightarrow We can now analyse the behaviour of the remaining depositors in more detail. If they know they are not going to be repaid in full, we will analyse whether it is optimal for them to withdraw early as well.

▶ For intermediate deposit withdrawals, banks sell some of their loans, $0 < \hat{L} < L$

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For intermediate deposit withdrawals, banks sell some of their loans, $0 < \hat{L} < L$ $\Rightarrow \pi < \pi^{***} = \frac{(\lambda(1+(1-\gamma)r_D)+\gamma)D-(1+\lambda)R}{\lambda(1+r_L)(D-R)}$

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Chapter 14.1.2: Coordination of deposit withdrawals Theoretical Foundations of Banking Slide 8 of 10

- The remaining depositors will be repaid as much as the bank can repay, which is the repayment obtained from the loans the bank has not sold.
 - They also make use of their cash reserves.
 - but had to repay the deposits withdrawn early.
- If this amount is less than the remaining deposits, then it would be better for these depositors to withdraw immediately.
- This can again be transformed into the minimum repayment rate that is required to avoid the remaining depositors to also withdraw.
 - If the risk of the bank is higher than this threshold, the remaining depositors would withdraw early as well.
 - As in this case all depositors withdraw, we observe a bank run.
- Avoiding a bank run is beneficial for all depositors, as the bank would not need to sell more loans, which would cause more losses to the bank and reduce the payment to all depositors. The bank and their depositors would benefit from a way to coordinate the behaviour of depositors to avoid this situation of it being individually rational to withdraw deposits, but this causing all depositors to suffer additional losses.
- $\rightarrow~$ We can now analyse the different cases we have discussed graphically.

The remaining depositors obtain from the bank repayments of the loans not sold

$$\blacktriangleright \pi \left(1+r_L\right) \left(L-\hat{L}\right)$$

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The remaining depositors obtain from the bank repayments of the loans not sold, and the cash reserves

$$\blacktriangleright \pi (1+r_L) \left(L-\hat{L}\right) + R$$

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The remaining depositors obtain from the bank repayments of the loans not sold, and the cash reserves, less the amount repaid for early withdrawals

$$\blacktriangleright \pi (1+r_L) \left(L-\hat{L}\right) + R - \gamma D$$

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- The remaining depositors obtain from the bank repayments of the loans not sold, and the cash reserves, less the amount repaid for early withdrawals
- As early withdrawal does not pay any interest, they would be worse off than those depositors if the repayments shared are below the face value of the deposit

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$$\pi (1+r_L) \left(L - \hat{L}\right) + R - \gamma D < (1-\gamma) D$$

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Depositors are better off withdrawing early than remaining with the bank

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- $\Rightarrow \pi < \hat{\pi}^{***} = \frac{(\lambda + \gamma)D (1 + \lambda)R}{\lambda(1 + r_L)(D R)}$
- Depositors are better off withdrawing early than remaining with the bank, causing a bank run

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- Depositors are better off withdrawing early than remaining with the bank, causing a bank run
- Coordinating to not withdraw deposits would benefit all depositors

- The remaining depositors will be repaid as much as the bank can repay, which is the repayment obtained from the loans the bank has not sold.
 - They also make use of their cash reserves.
 - but had to repay the deposits withdrawn early.
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- ▶ This can again be transformed into the minimum repayment rate that is required to avoid the remaining depositors to also withdraw.
 - If the risk of the bank is higher than this threshold, the remaining depositors would withdraw early as well.
 - As in this case all depositors withdraw, we observe a bank run.
- Avoiding a bank run is beneficial for all depositors, as the bank would not need to sell more loans, which would cause more losses to the bank and reduce the payment to all depositors. The bank and their depositors would benefit from a way to coordinate the behaviour of depositors to avoid this situation of it being individually rational to withdraw deposits, but this causing all depositors to suffer additional losses.
- $\rightarrow~$ We can now analyse the different cases we have discussed graphically.

- The remaining depositors obtain from the bank repayments of the loans not sold, and the cash reserves, less the amount repaid for early withdrawals
- As early withdrawal does not pay any interest, they would be worse off than those depositors if the repayments shared are below the face value of the deposit

$$\Rightarrow \pi < \hat{\pi}^{***} = \frac{(\lambda + \gamma)D - (1 + \lambda)R}{\lambda(1 + r_L)(D - R)}$$

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Chapter 14.1.2: Coordination of deposit withdrawals Theoretical Foundations of Banking


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


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




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
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
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
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- We have seen that, not surprisingly, banks taking high risks face insolvency. They may also face illiquidity as the value of their loans is so small that they cannot raise sufficient funds to withstand the early withdrawal of deposits.
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 - The interesting case emerges for banks that might be able to withstand an initial withdrawal of deposits,
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 - This would then be a bank run as all deposits are withdrawn from the bank. ٠
- ► Such bank runs could be avoided if the decisions of the remaining depositors could be coordinated such that they all would retain their deposits: in this case they would receive a higher repayment. It is, however, individually rational to withdraw deposits.
- \rightarrow Bank runs are individually rational, but socially not optimal. The range in which such bank runs can occur is small and hence, bank runs might be rare phenomenon.





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