Andreas Krause

Chapter 10.3.1
Adverse selection and competition

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Loan rates

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This presentation is based on
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Andreas Krause
Department of Economics
University of Bath
Claverton Down
Bath BA2 7AY
United Kingdom

E-mail: mnsak@bath.ac.uk