



Chapter 10.1.2  
Exploiting informational advantage

# Accumulating information

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- ▶ Banks provide the loan if they are offering the lower loan rate and they expect the loan to be repaid according to their signal, and repay depositors
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- ▶ Banks make profits in time period 2 due to their **informational advantage**

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