

Collateral provision



The impact of collateral

- ▶ Collateral are assets that the bank can obtain if the borrower defaults
- ▶ This would be assets in addition to those the bank could obtain as part of the default process
- ▶ Collateral increases the costs of default to borrowers
- ▶ Collateral reduces the losses of default to the bank

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The use of collateral

- ▶ If the risk to banks is reduced, this should reduce the loan rate
- ▶ Borrowers weigh up the reduced loan costs against the potential loss of the collateral in default
- ▶ We will look at the motivation for companies to provide collateral and banks to demand collateral
- ▶ Banks may also use collateral they have obtained to obtain loans themselves and we will look at why borrowers would agree to that

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- ▶ Borrowers weigh up the reduced loan costs against the potential loss of the collateral in default
- ▶ We will look at the **motivation** for companies to provide collateral and banks to demand collateral
- ▶ Banks may also use collateral they have obtained to obtain loans themselves and to sell them on the secondary market

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Providing collateral

- ▶ Not all borrowers provide collateral despite always considering doing so
- ▶ The motivation for borrowers to provide collateral will be explored and how banks can use this decision to their advantage
- ▶ Banks have to offer contracts with and without collateral for borrowers to have a choice and we will see that this is an equilibrium

Providing collateral

- ▶ **Not all** borrowers provide collateral, despite the loan costs being lower
- ▶ The motivation for borrowers to provide collateral will be explored and how banks can use this decision to their advantage
- ▶ Banks have to offer contracts with and without collateral for borrowers to have a choice and so will see that this is an equilibrium

Providing collateral

- ▶ Not all borrowers provide collateral, despite the loan costs being **lower**
- ▶ The motivation for borrowers to provide collateral will be explored in the next slide
- ▶ Banks have to offer contracts with and without collateral for borrowers to have a choice and for the market to be in equilibrium

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- ▶ The motivation for borrowers to **provide collateral** will be explored and how banks can use this decision to their advantage
- ▶ Banks have to offer contracts with and without collateral for borrowers to have a choice and to avoid rationing due to moral hazard

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Chapter 8.2.1
Identifying company types through collateral

Discussion of model results

- ▶ Low-risk companies provide collateral and high-risk companies prefer to not provide collateral
- ▶ Banks will offer contracts that allow them to distinguish the type of borrower
- ◻ If we observe that a borrower does not provide collateral, can we conclude it is high-risk?
- ◻ Collateral can only be provided if it exists - many companies will have no collateral to offer or it is already pledged for other loans

Discussion of model results

- ▶ **Low-risk companies** provide collateral and high-risk companies prefer to not provide collateral
- ▶ Banks will offer contracts that allow them to distinguish the type of borrower
- 7 If we observe that a borrower does not provide collateral, can we conclude it is high-risk?
- 8 Collateral can only be provided if it exists: many companies will have no collateral to offer or it is already pledged for other loans

Discussion of model results

- ▶ Low-risk companies provide collateral and **high-risk companies** prefer to not provide collateral
- ▶ Banks will offer contracts that allow them to distinguish the type of borrower
- ◻ If we observe that a borrower does not provide collateral, can we conclude it is high-risk?
- ◻ Collateral can only be provided if it exists (many companies will have no collateral available and is already pledged for other loans)

Discussion of model results

- ▶ Low-risk companies provide collateral and high-risk companies prefer to not provide collateral
- ▶ Banks will offer contracts that allow them to **distinguish the type of borrower**
- ? If we observe that a borrower does not provide collateral, can we conclude it is high-risk?
- ! Collateral can only be provided if it exists → many companies will have no collateral available even if they are willing to provide collateral for other loans

Discussion of model results

- ▶ Low-risk companies provide collateral and high-risk companies prefer to not provide collateral
- ▶ Banks will offer contracts that allow them to distinguish the type of borrower
- ? If we observe that a borrower **does not provide collateral**, can we conclude it is high-risk?

Collateral can only be provided if it exists

Collateral is not provided if it is not profitable to do so

Discussion of model results

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Collateral can only be provided if it exists

Collateral is not provided if it is too costly

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Re-use of collateral

- ▶ Collateral obtained from a borrower could be used by banks as collateral in their own borrowing
- ▶ This is referred to as rehypothecation
- ▶ Borrowers might lose their collateral if the bank fails to repay its loan and will be liable to go through the process

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
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Chapter 8.3
Rehypothecation

Discussion of model results

- ▶ Banks can make additional profits using the collateral for their purposes – allowing them to offer loans they would otherwise find not profitable
- ▶ Borrowers benefit by gaining access to loans they would otherwise not have
- 7 Why would a company ever not agree to rehypothecation as long as the value of the collateral is below the repayment of the loan?
 - ! The value of the collateral to the company might be higher than the value to the bank, for example essential equipment or patents

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Summary of key results

- ▶ Collateral can be used to distinguish borrowers with different risks, reducing adverse selection
- ▶ Collateral can be more widely used by banks, reducing the impact of moral hazard
- ▶ Collateral affects information asymmetry and incentives, allowing loan markets to be more efficient

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Summary of key results

- ▶ Collateral can be used to distinguish borrowers with different risks, reducing **adverse selection**
- ▶ Collateral can be more widely used by banks, allowing them to lend to riskier borrowers
- ▶ Collateral affects information asymmetry and incentives, allowing loan markets to be more efficient

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