

Chapter 3.1 Negotiation costs



Outline

- Problem and model assumptions
- Direct lending only
- Bank lending only
- Direct and bank lending
- Market structure
- Summary

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Cost advantage of banks

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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Participating in the market

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
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
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Feasibility of co-existence of direct and bank loans


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■ Problem and model assumptions

■ Direct lending only

■ Bank lending only

■ Direct and bank lending

■ **Market structure**

■ Summary

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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■ Market structure

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