



Chapter 8.2

Obtaining future investment banking business

Outline

- Problem and model assumptions
- Competitive investment banks
- Optimizing companies
- Summary

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Andreas Krause
Department of Economics
University of Bath
Claverton Down
Bath BA2 7AY
United Kingdom

E-mail: mnsak@bath.ac.uk