



## Chapter 3

# Selling information

# Outline

- Problem and model assumptions
- Uninformed investment banks
- Informed investment banks
- Purchase of information
- Summary

## ■ Problem and model assumptions

### ■ Uninformed investment banks

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# Opportunity to sell information

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## Reasons for only selling negative information

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■ Informed investment banks

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■ Summary

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