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Chapter 4.1

Maturity transformation of deposits

Outline

- Problem and model assumptions
- Social optimum
- Direct lending
- Direct lending with trading
- Bank lending
- Summary

Maturity mismatch

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- An alternative equilibrium with bank runs exists
- Bank runs cause banks to fail and impose high costs on economies
- This reduces the benefits of banks

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