

# Introduction to cybersecurity for Generalists

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- Course is 6 ECTS (12 CATS) credits, in Semester 2
- Available on many MSc (including generalist MSc, and corresponding L7 Degree Apprenticeship), also MComp.
- Been running for many years, but IoC was an opportunity to rethink
- Tried to hire a Teaching Fellow, but failed, so I taught it myself
- Partly based on experience as a Fulbright CyberSecurity Scholar at NYU in 2017

## Aims:

- 1 To develop an understanding of the difficulties of security - everyone wants it but no-one can define it.
- 2 To develop the ability to analyse the security threats to a proposed design.
- 3 To develop the ability to propose realistic counter-measures, where available.

Learning Outcomes: After taking this unit, the student should be able to:

- 1 describe common security models;
- 2 discuss what it means for a given system to be 'secure';
- 3 identify security weaknesses in proposed systems.


# Assessment (inherited format; own exercises)

- 50% Individual coursework on own experience of PCI DSS online. Buy from three different online vendors: capture both the HTML and the wire data, and analyse for weaknesses.
- 30% Group coursework: pick an OWASP weakness and give a 30-minute presentation on it.
  - \* Four self-select groups of five — next time I might force groups; not sure how this one will work with Degree Apprentices.
- 20% Class text (essentially an examination)

- 1 Introduction, resources [And08], CIA triangle. But “In addition, other properties, such as authenticity, accountability, non-repudiation and reliability can also be involved. [ISO18].” Proven security [Pau99] but problems with “Plan B” procedures [Com14, “POODLE”].

# Course Overview (12 teaching weeks) II

## 1b Payment Card System: [UK 19a]. Scale of system. The Adverline attack [Zor19, Kli19]



# Course Overview (12 teaching weeks) III

- 2 Cryptography for Security Engineers. Kerckhoffs' Principle [Ker83]. Don't "roll your own".
- 3 PCI DSS [Pay18b, Pay18a]. Hosted compliance [UK 19b].
- 4 SQL Injection (example of OWASP for CW2). Lack of understanding [TS19]. Students work on capturing their own PCI DSS data for CW1.
- 5 Passwords: attacks, salt [MT79], policies, secure storage. Difficulty of correct implementation [NDTS18]. 2FA. Biometrics: weaknesses in practice [RMR17, BRT<sup>+</sup>17].
- 6 Access controls (Unix permissions, ACL, setuid, etc.). Principle of least privilege.
- 7 Vulnerability Scans versus Penetration Testing. PenTest tools [Gri19]. Guest lecture: automobile security.
- 8 "Consolidation week": no new material.

# Course Overview (12 teaching weeks) IV

- 9 Forensics Principles, ACPO “guidelines” [Ass12]. Importance of ISMS [ISO18] and SIEM. Norsk Hydro as a current example [Clu19, Mun19]. Cyberinsurance, analogy with London Fire Brigade.
- 10 Guest Lecture (a CISO). Also two group presentations.
- 11 CSRF (prevented by Token-Based Mitigation, implemented by frameworks); XSS (destroys TBM protection). See [https://github.com/DWASP/CheatSheetSeries/blob/master/cheatsheets/Cross\\_Site\\_Scripting\\_Prevention\\_Cheat\\_Sheet.md](https://github.com/DWASP/CheatSheetSeries/blob/master/cheatsheets/Cross_Site_Scripting_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.md). Also two group presentations.
- 12 Revision and Class Test.





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