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Immigration and the variety of migrant integration regimes in the European Union
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Migration, social protection and social integration represent subjects of major and critical concern at both the EU and member state levels. This very timely book offers an excellent overview, analysis, and understanding of challenges for the European migration-social policy nexus.
Stein Kuhnle, University of Bergen, Norway, and Hertie School of Governance, Germany

This analytically astute and empirically rich volume focuses on the interaction between policies and migrant integration, a decade after the first volume on Migration and the Welfare State. The research is presented by a nice line-up of scholars and contributes to the policy literature as well as to migration and social policy studies.
Virginie Guiraudon, CERAPS, University of Lille 2

...genuinely enhances the reader's insight into the often complex issues at stake in the field of migration....high quality and genuinely interesting.
Wim van Lancker in Journal of Common Market Studies

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Immigration and the variety of migrant integration regimes in the European Union

Theodoros Papadopoulos

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, to provide an overview of the characteristics and trends of inward migration in the European Union (EU), including preliminary evidence on the impact of the unfolding economic crisis on immigration. Second, to explore the universe of diverse policies that regulate migration and the patterns of differential inclusion in EU member states, by introducing the concept of national migrant integration regimes. The variety of migrant integration regimes in the EU is explored empirically by comparing indicators for integration policies, migrants' employment characteristics and levels of immigration. As such, the chapter also provides a comparative empirical backdrop to the individual case studies and comparisons offered in the second and third parts of the book.

Migration and European social space: a brief historical overview

Migration is not a recent phenomenon in Europe. Much of Europe's history is inexorably linked to migrations, voluntary or forced, which have shaped the continent's social fabric, its historical narratives and national identities, its political economies, labour markets and welfare systems (on the history of migration in Europe, see Castles and Miller, 2009; also Bade, 2003; Moch, 1993, 2007). Major emigrations to the US or the metropolitan centres of Western Europe took place from Ireland, Scandinavia and later from Eastern Europe in the 19th century, and then Southern Europe (especially Italy and Greece) in the early 20th century. These emigrations stemmed from the exigencies of economic depredation as well as political oppression, but there were also migrations both to and from Northern and Western Europe, associated with imperial ambitions and trade. The latter continue to strongly colour immigration policies and patterns in France, the UK, Portugal and Belgium, for example. In Central and South Eastern Europe, processes of nation building in the face of the collapse of the Ottoman and Austro-

Hungarian Empires by the early 20th century involved a rather different set of circumstances than those in most of Western Europe. They were less affected by migration than by the status and political rights that should attach to non-migrant 'national minorities' (for example, Hungarians in Romania), and which today have an effect on migration and migration policies (see Chapter Nine).

It is in the aftermath of the Second World War that the contemporary history of migration in Europe begins. The division between East and West was followed by major population movements – often among the national minorities mentioned above – destined primarily towards Central and Western European countries. In Eastern Europe, from the late 1940s until the collapse of the regimes in 1989/90, population movement in all the 'Warsaw Pact' countries was strictly controlled, although many operated minor contract worker schemes, and educational and work exchange programmes with other communist countries. In Western Europe there were two major developments in the immediate aftermath of the war that had a profound impact on migration up until 1973. First, the enormous pace and intensity of post-war reconstruction, and its demand for labour in a context where women's employment was discouraged; and second, the start – and increasingly rapid pace – of de-colonisation by imperial powers. This trend appeared to slow down towards the beginning of the 1970s, with 1973 as a milestone year. According to Bade (2003, p 231), 'the 1973 "oil-price-shock" was less a trigger than a final chance to stop immigration and [labour] recruitment' in destination countries, as fears of economic stagnation met with rising reservations about the capacity of societies and their welfare states to incorporate the immigrants and their families.

For the next two-and-a-half decades, immigration and especially labour migration remained at relatively low levels in Europe, although it by no means stopped, as rights of settlement for former colonial 'subjects' and for family reunification became established. The situation changed dramatically after 1989/90. The collapse of the Eastern block regimes, the civil wars in the Balkans, intensifying internationalisation of the market economy and the accelerating process of European economic integration had significant – although not uniform – impacts on migration patterns in Europe (Jordan and Düvell, 2003). Many of these are highlighted in our case study chapters in Part II of this volume. During the next two decades the vast majority of European countries experienced substantial rises in inward migration, the trends and characteristics of which we examine in the next section.

Trends and characteristics of migration and immigration in contemporary Europe

A note on the empirical challenges of immigration statistics

Statistical data cannot tell us about the subjective experiences of migrants but they can elucidate the socio-economic context of such experiences and of the

policies aiming at regulating migration. Still, attempts to empirically capture these macro-level phenomena are not immune from difficulties. At least two key challenges are encountered by such attempts. One challenge concerns the difficulties in generating data that enables us to access meaningful information about the reality of migration and of migrants' lives in general. The other challenge concerns the difficulties in constructing data that is accurate and meaningfully *comparable* across countries (for an extensive discussion of the poor comparability of migration statistics, see Kupiszewska and Nowok, 2005; Lemaitre, 2005). This chapter adopts an inclusive approach where difficulties with data are highlighted and then integrated in the narrative of the comparative analysis. The latter is organised in subsections, each exploring a number of key questions. Wherever possible, attention is drawn to definitional problems and operationalisation issues so that the reader can gain a balanced perspective of what the data reveal and their limitations.

Migration trends and projections

Two key questions are addressed in this subsection: how many migrants are there living in the EU countries and what have been the immigration trends in recent years? The most commonly used statistical sources for data on migration in Europe are Eurostat and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Both report measurements of systematically recorded legal or 'regular' migration. However, most Eurostat publications and measurements refer to the concept of *foreign citizen*[1] or foreign population while the OECD refers to the concept, and publishes indicators, of *foreign-born population*. The former concept is considerably narrower as it includes only those who retain the nationality of their country of origin, while the latter – the foreign-born population – is broader as it includes all those who ever migrated from their country of birth to the country where they reside. This section explores data from both sources.

According to Eurostat (2009), at the beginning of 2008 there were 30.8 million foreign citizens living in the EU27, representing six per cent of the total EU27 population. In considering how different member states might be concerned about the volume and pattern of foreign citizens' residence (and what policy or regulatory concerns might result), two further questions arise. First, how many of these were citizens of other EU member states; and, second, what patterns might be observed in terms of the distribution of different national citizens across the different member states.

A simple cross-national observation of migration in the EU shows not only a concentration of foreign citizens in a number of core states, but also a divide between countries that have minimal foreign populations and countries with rather substantial numbers. In addition, it also shows that in terms of numbers of migrants, intra-EU migration is much more significant than migration into the EU. In particular, approximately 37 per cent of foreign citizens residing in the EU27 in 2008 were nationals of another EU member state. Around three quarters

of all foreign citizens lived in the five most populous countries (Germany, Spain, the UK, France and Italy), while those countries with the largest *proportions* of non-national citizens were among the smaller states – including Luxembourg (43 per cent), Latvia (18 per cent), Estonia (17 per cent), Cyprus (16 per cent) and Ireland (13 per cent). Spain is the only country that could be included in both groups – high numbers and high proportions – of resident foreign citizens (12 per cent). The EU countries where non-nationals were less than one per cent of their population were Romania, Poland, Bulgaria and Slovakia (Eurostat, 2009a).

Bearing this in mind, it is important to make a number of qualifications:

- the category 'foreign citizens' does not necessarily include all migrants, as naturalisations may change this substantially, implying a differential impact on countries with *ius solis* rather than *ius sanguinis* citizenship regulation (see, for example, Eurostat, 2009b);
- not all migrants are foreign citizens;
- migration also includes temporary movements or seasonal mobility;
- statistics based on legal residence cannot account for irregular/undocumented migration; and
- regularisations, which have been used relatively often in Spain, Italy, Greece and Belgium, might affect the relevant numbers from year to year.

Against this background it would be more fruitful to explore statistical data that adopt a broader definition of immigration. Table 2.1 presents statistical data from the OECD covering the period 1985-2005 as well as projections for 2010 and 2030 and own calculations on percentage growth and percentage points increase for the period 1995-2010. Recorded foreign-born population as a percentage of total population is used as a proxy indicator for the level of (regular) in-migration in 18 EU countries. Countries are ranked in descending order according to the percentage growth in recorded foreign-born population for the period 1995-2010.

Most of the 18 EU member states recorded very low levels of foreign-born residents as a percentage of their total population in 1985. During the decade 1995-2005, in all but two countries (Belgium and Poland) the percentage of foreign-born residents increased, with some countries recording exceptional growth. If projections for 2010 are realised, Spain will have seen the percentage of foreign-born residents growing by a remarkable 464 per cent during the period 1995-2010, followed by Italy (185 per cent), Ireland (169 per cent) and Finland (110 per cent), although the latter's will still be comparatively low in terms of the overall share of the population. Greece will have experienced nearly 100 per cent growth during this period while Denmark, Austria, the UK and Sweden will also record high increases. At the other end, France and Belgium record very small growth, 1.9 and 1.1 per cent respectively. If we use 1985 as the base year, growth in the foreign-born populations in many of these countries is even higher. These trends illustrate the point made earlier, namely that, during the last two decades, the vast majority of European countries experienced substantial rises in the size

Table 2.1: Foreign-born residents as % of total population in 18 EU member states, 1985–2005 and projections for 2010 and 2030 (in descending order of % growth)

	1985	1995	2005	2010[a]	2030[a]	1995–2010[a]	
						% growth	% points difference
Spain	1.1	2.5	11.1	14.1	6.2	464.0	11.6
Italy	2.2	2.6	4.3	7.4	5.5	184.6	4.8
Ireland	6.4	7.3	14.1	19.6	9.0	168.5	12.3
Finland	1.0	2.0	3.0	4.2	3.4	110.0	2.2
Greece	3.1	5.1	8.8	10.1	13.0	98.0	5.0
Denmark	3.7	4.8	7.2	8.8	10.0	83.3	4.0
Austria	3.7	8.9	15.1	15.6	15.0	75.3	6.7
Portugal	3.5	5.3	7.3	8.6	11.6	62.3	3.3
UK	6.5	7.3	9.1	10.4	12.4	42.5	3.1
Sweden	7.8	10.3	12.4	14.1	16.6	36.9	3.8
Hungary	3.2	2.8	3.1	3.7	3.4	32.1	0.9
Germany	–	11.1	12.3	13.1	[b]	18.0	2.0
Netherlands	5.3	9.0	10.1	10.5	11.2	16.7	1.5
Slovakia	–	2.1	2.3	2.4	2.8	14.3	0.3
Luxembourg	28.3	33.4	37.4	35.2	30.6	5.4	1.8
France	10.8	10.5	10.7	10.7	14.9	1.9	0.2
Belgium	9.0	9.0	6.9	9.1	14.9	1.1	0.1
Poland	3.5	2.5	1.8	2.2	[b]	–12.0	–0.3

Notes: [a] Projected foreign-born population from major source countries.
[b] No projection available.

Sources: Lowell (2009); UN (2009); OECD (2009a); author's own calculations

of their foreign-born populations. This is especially the case in the countries of Southern Europe that, from being traditionally emigration countries, transformed into countries facing net inward migration. Still, projections for 2030 indicate that for some countries these trends are unlikely to continue. The levels of foreign-born population are expected to decline substantially in Spain, Italy and Ireland and to some degree in Luxembourg (for an explanation of the projection methods, see Lowell, 2009). In France, Belgium, Greece and Portugal and, to a lesser degree, in the UK and Sweden, growth is expected to continue, while for the rest of the EU countries immigration is expected to stabilise. However, the 2008-09 economic crisis might change these trajectories. The next subsection provides a preliminary assessment of its impact.

The impact of economic crisis on EU in-migration

It is now well documented that one of the biggest contributors to increased *labour* migration flows to the EU15 was EU enlargement. However, it appears that migration from Central Eastern European countries was mainly of a temporary

character. Recent evidence shows that migrant workers from Central Eastern Europe may be returning to their countries of origin (Galgóczi et al, 2009; OECD, 2009a).

The unfolding economic crisis may be one of the explanations. There is some evidence that, at least in the short term, the crisis has negatively affected flows of regulated labour migration to EU member states and especially intra-EU free movement migration. For example, during the period 2007-08, Spain and the UK each experienced a decrease of approximately 25 per cent in inward migration from other EU member states, with the UK recording at least a 40 per cent drop during 2008-09 (OECD, 2010). At the same period decreases in regulated migration from non-EU countries were also recorded but much smaller: six per cent in Spain and five per cent in the UK, although in the case of the UK the following year's drop was more substantial (17 per cent for 2008-09). Similar trends were recorded in Ireland, while the Netherlands has experienced a 'levelling off' in the rate of increase of EU free movement migration (OECD, 2009a, p 33). Moreover, assessments of the impact of the crisis on irregular immigration also point to reductions in numbers, as unemployment is expected to rise across the EU (Frontex, 2009).

However, it is as yet unclear how deep and how extensive this impact will be and how it will interact with various policy initiatives. The interrelated financial and labour market dynamics between sending and receiving countries make assessments of the impact of the crisis rather more complicated. Poland is an interesting example here. It has been argued that a combination of labour shortages in key sectors (for example, construction), the introduction of attractive repatriation policy 'packages' by the Polish government in 2007 and unfavourable developments in exchange rates have resulted in a substantial number of Polish migrants returning home during the period immediately before and during the economic crisis (OECD, 2009a, p 60). Further, measures such as restrictions on family reunification (Italy), limits on the renewal of temporary work permits (Spain, Italy) or the provision of incentives to unemployed migrants to return to their home country (Spain, Czech Republic) may also explain current repatriation trends (OECD, 2009a, pp 40-1).

However, as the economic downturn hits those countries in the EU with the highest numbers of foreign-born residents, the likely reductions in remittances, foreign investment or economic activity (for example, exports) in the countries of origin may heighten and extend the impact of the crisis to these countries as well. In this context, uncertainty over the labour market and the wider economic situation of the country of origin is likely to act as a deterrent factor for repatriation. Remaining in the destination country, where welfare benefits and services or future labour market opportunities are better than in the country of origin, will be the only sensible option for many migrants. In addition, with recent stringent cuts in public sector expenditure and knock-on effects on employment and economic growth in several countries (eg, Greece, Italy, Spain, Ireland, the UK, Latvia, Hungary, Romania), pressures to migrate to other member states

might increase, both for intra-EU migrants and also for the migrants currently resident in these states. Against this background, the capacity of welfare systems in destination countries to respond to the dual challenge of reduced economic resources and increasing socio-political and welfare demands will be seriously tested by the economic crisis. Debates and political pressures surrounding the key issues of acceptable levels of inward migration and migrant integration will intensify as EU countries and their political economies enter a period of economic stagnation, accompanied in some cases by severe austerity measures.

Countries of origin: the kaleidoscope of recorded (regular) immigration and asylum seekers

The next key question is where do migrants come from? Table 2.2a provides Eurostat data for the three largest groups of foreign citizens in 24 EU member states in 2008. To facilitate the comparison of the relative significance of these groups, data are presented both as actual numbers and as percentages of the total foreign citizens' populations residing in the destination country. In addition, data are presented according to geographical proximity to facilitate the exploration of similarities and differences in the regional patterns of immigration. Any comparisons should be made with caution as percentages vary substantially between countries; in some, one of the groups may represent the majority of foreign citizens (for example, Latvia, Slovenia, Greece); in others, a large minority (Germany, Luxembourg, Czech Republic); and in others they may represent only relatively more numerous groups among a larger number of similar size groups (for example, France).

Limitations aside, these data record the largest group of regular migrants in EU27 comprising foreign citizens who came from Turkey (7.9 per cent) followed by Morocco (5.6 per cent) and Romania (5.4 per cent). A clear pattern in their geographical distribution is observable; Turkish citizens predominantly reside in Western European countries and Germany, Romanian citizens reside mainly in Italy, Spain and Hungary, and Moroccan citizens in Italy, Spain and France. When the immigration experience in individual countries is examined, the emerging patterns highlight the importance of geographical proximity and cultural and historical links and networks as explanatory factors for both internal and external EU migration. In Sweden, Finland, Latvia and Lithuania some of the largest groups comprise their own citizens while the latter three also record high percentages of Russian citizens (although in Latvia and Lithuania these are national minorities stemming from the Soviet era). In Western European countries, substantial intra-EU migration is observable, but also the importance of cultural and historical links, especially in France. In Belgium and Luxembourg, citizens of other EU member states predominate while the reverse is true for Germany and the Netherlands, both of which record large numbers of foreign citizens originating from Turkey. The combined importance of geographical proximity and cultural and historical links is not only visible in the UK, where the largest groups comprise citizens

Table 2.2a: Three largest groups of foreign citizens residing in EU member states by citizenship, 2008 (absolute numbers and % of total population of foreign citizens resident in the member states, presented according to geographical proximity)

	Citizens of		%	Citizens of		%	Citizens of		%
EU27	Turkey	2,419,000	7.9	Morocco	1,727,000	5.6	Romania	1,677,000	5.4
Latvia	Recognised non-citizens[b]	371,700	89.5	Russia	28,500	6.9	Lithuania	3,400	0.8
Lithuania	Russia	12,800	29.7	Belarus	4,700	10.9	Stateless	4,200	9.7
Finland	Russia	26,200	19.8	Estonia	20,000	15.1	Sweden	8,300	6.3
Sweden	Finland	80,400	15.3	Iraq	40,000	7.6	Denmark	38,400	7.3
Denmark	Turkey	28,800	9.7	Iraq	18,300	6.1	Germany	18,000	6.0
Netherlands	Turkey	93,700	13.6	Morocco	74,900	10.9	Germany	62,400	9.1
Belgium	Italy	169,000	17.4	France	130,600	13.4	Netherlands	123,500	12.7
Luxembourg	Portugal	76,600	37.2	France	26,600	12.9	Italy	19,100	9.3
France[a]	Portugal	492,000	13.6	Algeria	477,500	13.2	Morocco	461,500	12.7
Germany	Turkey	1,830,100	25.2	Italy	570,200	7.9	Poland	413,000	5.7
Poland	Germany	11,800	20.5	Ukraine	6,100	10.6	Russia	3,700	6.4
Czech Republic	Ukraine	103,400	29.7	Slovakia	67,900	19.5	Vietnam	42,300	12.2
Slovakia	Czech Republic	6,000	14.6	Poland	4,000	9.8	Ukraine	3,700	9.2
Hungary	Romania	65,900	37.3	Ukraine	17,300	9.8	Germany	14,400	8.2
Austria	Serbia and Montenegro	132,600	15.9	Germany	119,800	14.3	Turkey	109,200	13.1
Slovenia	Bosnia and Herzegovina	32,500	47.3	Serbia	13,800	20.1	FYROM[c]	7,400	10.9
Romania	Moldova	5,500	21.0	Turkey	2,200	8.4	China	1,900	7.3
Bulgaria	Russia	9,000	36.7	Ukraine	2,200	8.8	Greece	1,600	6.6
Greece	Albania	577,500	63.7	Ukraine	22,300	2.5	Georgia	17,200	1.9
Malta	UK	4,100	26.5	India	900	6.0	Serbia	800	5.1
Italy	Romania	625,300	18.2	Albania	402,000	11.7	Morocco	365,900	10.7
Spain	Romania	734,800	14.0	Morocco	649,800	12.3	Ecuador	423,500	8.0
Portugal	Brazil	70,100	15.7	Cape Verde	64,700	14.5	Ukraine	39,600	8.9
UK	Poland	392,800	9.9	Ireland	347,900	8.8	India	296,500	7.5

Notes: Detailed data for Estonia, Ireland and Cyprus were not available. Data are rounded to the nearest 100.

[a] 2005 data.

[b] According to Eurostat (2009b), 'a recognised non-citizen is a person who is neither a citizen of the reporting country nor of any other country'.

[c] FYROM: Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

Source: Eurostat (2009b)

Table 2.2b: Three largest groups of asylum applicants in EU member states by citizenship, 2009 (according to geographical proximity)

	Applicants		Citizenships of main groups of asylum applicants					
	2009	Per million inhabitants[a]	First group	%	Second group	%	Third group	%
EU27	260,730	520	Afghanistan	8	Russia	8	Somalia	7
Estonia	40	30	Afghanistan	25	Georgia	13	Russia	13
Latvia	60	25	Afghanistan	33	Uzbekistan	17	Syria	8
Lithuania	450	135	Russia	54	Georgia	17	Sri Lanka	4
Finland	4,915	925	Somalia	23	Iraq	23	Russia	12
Sweden	24,175	2,610	Somalia	24	Iraq	10	Afghanistan	7
Denmark	3,725	675	Afghanistan	28	Syria	10	Russia	9
Netherlands	16,140	980	Somalia	37	Iraq	13	Afghanistan	9
Belgium	21,645	2,015	Russia	13	Kosovo[b]	12	Afghanistan	9
Luxembourg	480	975	Kosovo[b]	27	Iraq	14	Bosnia and Herzegovina	7
France	47,625	740	Kosovo[b]	10	Sri Lanka	8	Russia	8
Germany	31,810	390	Iraq	22	Afghanistan	11	Kosovo[b]	6
Poland	10,595	280	Russia	54	Georgia	39	Armenia	1
Czech Republic	1,240	120	Ukraine	16	Kazakhstan	15	Mongolia	13
Slovakia	810	150	Pakistan	21	Georgia	12	Moldova	9
Hungary	4,665	465	Kosovo[b]	38	Afghanistan	26	Serbia	11
Austria	15,785	1,890	Russia	23	Afghanistan	14	Kosovo[b]	8
Slovenia	200	100	Bosnia and Herzegovina	20	Kosovo[b]	15	Serbia	10
Romania	965	45	Moldova	15	Pakistan	11	Afghanistan	9
Bulgaria	855	110	Iraq	36	Stateless	15	Afghanistan	7
Greece	15,925	1,415	Pakistan	23	Georgia	14	Bangladesh	11
Cyprus[c]	2,665	(3,345)	India	11	Sri Lanka	9	Occupied Palestinian Territories	9
Malta	2,385	(5,765)	Somalia	60	Nigeria	12	Eritrea	11
Italy	17,470	290	Nigeria	23	Somalia	9	Pakistan	8
Spain	3,005	65	Nigeria	15	Ivory Coast	10	Colombia	8
Portugal	140	15	Eritrea	14	Guinea	14	Mauritania	11
Ireland	2,690	605	Nigeria	21	Pakistan	10	China	7
UK[c]	30,290	490	Zimbabwe	25	Afghanistan	12	Iran	7

Notes: [a] Number of applicants registered during the year relative to population as of 1 January 2009. Population data are provisional for Belgium and the UK. Data are rounded to the nearest 5.
[b] Kosovo under UN Security Council Resolution 1244.
[c] According to Eurostat, the data for Cyprus and the UK would be higher if calculated in the same way as for the other countries in the table.
Source: Eurostat (2010)

from Poland, Ireland and India, but also in Central and Eastern Europe, where many of the largest groups comprise citizens of proximate countries, and especially citizens of the Ukraine. An interesting case here is the Czech Republic, where one of the largest groups comprises Vietnamese citizens (originally sent as contract workers or students in the pre-1989 period). Cultural and other links with Brazil and Cape Verde seem to affect the pattern of inward migration in Portugal, while in Greece, Italy and to some extent Spain, proximity seems to be the key factor. Foreign citizens from Albania are by far the predominant group in Greece and the second largest in Italy, while citizens from Morocco are the second largest group in Spain and the third largest in Italy. Still, Spain also records a large number of citizens from Ecuador.

When the data of asylum seekers are compared (see Table 2.2b), the diversity of national experiences is further amplified. We should note, however, that as with Table 2.2a, numbers and percentages vary substantially and due caution should be made in the interpretation of the findings. Agreements on what counts as a 'safe country', migration networks, historical and geographical links, proximity to conflict zones (for example, Kosovo, ex-Soviet territories, occupied Palestine), political prioritisation of some conflicts over others, appear to be among the key reasons for seeking asylum in a particular country. The three largest groups of asylum seekers in the EU27 comprise applicants from Afghanistan, Russia and Somalia, while the three top countries in absolute numbers of asylum applications are, in descending order, France, Germany and the UK. Still, when the volume of applications is measured against the population, Sweden, Austria and Greece experience the highest numbers of asylum applications per million inhabitants among the large EU countries. The same indicator is very high for Malta and Cyprus but in their case, as countries with fewer than one million inhabitants each, the number provided is for indicative purposes only. In Central and Western European countries, applicants from the Kosovo province form large groups of asylum seekers while applicants from Somalia are well represented in Finland, Sweden, the Netherlands and Malta. While applicants from Afghanistan are fairly evenly distributed across the geographical clusters, applicants from Russia seek asylum mostly in the Northern and North Eastern EU countries and those from Iraq mainly in Western and Northern EU states.

Irregular migration: challenge or feature of national political economies?

The picture of migrant populations would be incomplete without taking into account the extent of irregular (undocumented) migration. Statistics and estimates for irregular migration are notoriously difficult to generate and for many years estimates were either very unreliable or missing for many countries. The creation of the European Database on Irregular Migration was a great step forward in addressing this challenge. Based on data generated and analysed for the purposes of this database (Kovacheva and Vogel, 2009), Table 2.3 presents aggregated estimates

of irregular migrant populations for all the EU27. The data provided here are national averages between low and high estimates presented according to geographical proximity. It should be noted that these data are based on national studies and estimations – that is, were not generated using the same methodology – and, although reported in 2008, correspond to different years. They are probably the best estimates currently available but they should be interpreted with considerable caution.

When irregular migrant populations are taken into account, substantial variations emerge between countries. Greece tops the ranking order as the country with the largest estimated number of irregular migrants as a percentage of the population (1.7 per cent). Slightly more than a fifth of the foreign population residing in the country is estimated to be undocumented migrants. Estimates for Cyprus, Malta, Ireland, the UK and Belgium calculate the irregular migrant population at more than one per cent of the population, although as a percentage of foreign population the variation is extensive, from 46.5 per cent in Malta to 10.5 per cent in Ireland. At the other end of the spectrum, estimates for the Nordic countries, Finland, Sweden and Denmark, and for Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Bulgaria, indicate very small numbers of irregular migrants as percentages of the respective total populations. Still, as percentages of the *foreign* population, the irregular migrant populations estimated for Slovakia, Hungary, Lithuania, Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria are considerable, ranging from 11.5 per cent in Slovenia to more than half the foreign population (54.5 per cent) in

Table 2.3: Aggregated estimates of irregular migrant populations in the EU27 reported in 2008 (presented according to geographical proximity)

	% of population	% of foreign population
Estonia	0.56	3.0
Latvia	0.30	2.0
Lithuania	0.30	25.0
Finland	0.19	8.5
Sweden	0.11	2.0
Denmark	0.06	1.0
Netherlands	0.59	14.0
Belgium	1.03	11.5
Luxembourg	0.59	1.5
France	0.46	8.0
Germany	0.40	4.5
Poland	0.46	(91.0)
Czech Republic	0.56	20.0
Slovakia	0.33	54.5
Hungary	0.30	18.0
Austria	0.44	4.5
Slovenia	0.30	11.5
Romania	0.04	34.5
Bulgaria	0.04	12.5
Greece	1.70	21.5
Cyprus	1.58	10.5
Malta	1.58	46.5
Italy	0.62	13.0
Spain	0.70	7.0
Portugal	0.85	20.5
Ireland	1.05	10.5
UK	1.05	17.5
EU27	0.58	10.0

Note: Each value represents the average between minimum and maximum estimations. Data for Poland's percentage of foreign population is the minimum value as the maximum estimated value exceeded by 3.5 times the total foreign population. Individual estimates correspond to different years.

Source: Author's calculations based on Kovacheva and Vogel (2009)

Slovakia. The fact that these are among the countries which, overall, record the lowest percentages of foreign-born population, leads us to conclude there are at least two types of countries where irregular migration is high: those countries where inward migration is extensive and irregular migration is a significant part of it, and those countries (mainly Central and Eastern European) where inward migration is very limited but, within it, the percentage of irregular migrants is high.

The centrality of irregular migration in understanding current challenges regarding the integration of migrants in the EU is now well documented (Jordan and Düvell, 2003; Berggren et al, 2007; Jordan, 2007; Düvell, 2009). States' ad hoc efforts to contain the 'market' in illegal cross-border mobility are often ineffective, and this has been a significant factor in the emergence of EU migration governance in terms of joint border control and the development of common policies (Lahav and Guiraudon, 2006; Neske and Doomernik, 2006). Discussing in detail the explanations for the diversity of irregular migration goes beyond the scope of this chapter. However, it is important to emphasise that the levels and type of irregular immigration are also directly connected to the level of each country's shadow economy and, consequently, its political economy and its welfare regime.

Indeed, the dramatic growth of both regular and irregular immigration during the last two decades coincided, and to a large extent is associated, with parallel processes of welfare retrenchment, labour recommodification, de-familisation and the subsequent commodification of care experienced by European societies during the same period (Papadopoulos, 2005; Andall, 2006; Menz, 2006; Likić-Brborić, 2007; Schierup, 2007; Slavnić, 2007, 2010; Standing, 2009). According to Standing (2009), the migration currently experienced is more heterogeneous than in the past. Although there are still 'plenty of settler migrants [...] much of the rise in mobility has been circular or temporary, while more has been illegal, unauthorised, undocumented and "without nationality"' (p 68). Together with the needs generated by an ageing population, the substantial increases in the labour force participation of women observed in many EU countries has also given rise to demand for labour to provide childcare or residential care for older people (Yeates, 2009). This has been especially significant for Southern European countries (Sciortino, 2004; Bettio et al, 2006; Caponio and Graziano, Chapter Six), but is also evident in the recruitment of healthcare staff in the UK, for example.

Further, developed nations responded to shortages of high skills – many created due to chronic under-funding of welfare services, education and health sectors, as well as the growing demands of high technology sectors, and in Central and Eastern Europe, by emigration – by recruiting high skilled professionals from other less developed countries, either in the EU or outside it (on Central and Eastern Europe trends and exceptions, see Menz, 2009, pp 232, 267). In low skill sectors like domestic services, agriculture or construction, demand for migrant workers has increased dramatically – undocumented migrants are extensively used in all, but particularly in domestic services and agriculture, and in fact in many sectors migrant workers are over-represented in the respective labour force. These trends can be seen in Table 2.4, which provides comparative data on the sectoral

Table 2.4: Sectoral distribution of foreign-born workers (15- to 64-year-olds), 2007 selected European countries (%)

	AUT	BEL	CHE	DEU	DNK	ESP	FRA	GBR	GRC	HUN	ITA	LUX	NLD	PRT	SWE
Agriculture and fishing	1.3	1.2	1.0	1.1	a	**4.5**	1.1	0.6	4.8	a	3.4	0.7	1.4	a	0.6
Mining	a	a	a	a	a	0.2	a	0.4	a	a	a	a	a	a	a
Manufacturing non-durable food products	**3.0**	2.2	**1.6**	**3.7**	**3.9**	2.4	2.3	**2.9**	**3.0**	a	**1.9**	0.9	**3.0**	a	**1.4**
Manufacturing non-durable other products	**6.2**	4.8	**5.1**	**6.7**	4.0	3.7	3.8	3.9	**5.3**	**8.9**	**7.3**	2.0	**4.7**	4.9	4.1
Manufacturing durable	11.4	6.6	**11.4**	**19.9**	8.3	5.1	7.6	5.8	**6.4**	11.7	**13.4**	**4.6**	**9.8**	5.7	**10.6**
Electricity, gas and water supply	a	0.6	0.4	0.3	a	0.1	0.3	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a
Construction	**10.0**	**8.2**	**8.4**	**6.7**	3.3	**21.0**	**10.1**	5.7	**32.0**	**10.0**	**14.8**	**13.6**	4.8	**15.9**	3.2
Wholesale	15.0	**13.9**	**13.7**	12.4	14.0	13.0	12.1	11.8	10.3	**19.9**	10.8	**11.5**	12.2	14.3	10.7
Hotels and restaurants	12.0	8.0	7.4	**8.4**	**7.8**	**14.7**	**6.9**	**8.6**	10.2	3.6	**8.1**	**6.1**	**6.8**	**8.3**	**7.8**
Transport	**6.3**	6.7	4.5	5.4	**7.7**	4.5	6.3	**7.8**	2.4	4.6	4.6	3.9	**6.9**	**5.0**	**7.0**
Financial intermediation	1.4	2.1	4.6	1.5	1.7	1.0	2.2	**4.9**	a	a	0.7	**12.7**	2.7	1.8	1.1
Real estate, renting and business activities	**11.5**	**13.7**	**12.6**	10.1	**11.6**	7.7	**14.6**	**15.2**	3.8	**8.6**	9.1	**14.3**	**16.1**	**9.4**	14.1
Real estate and renting	**2.1**	**0.9**	1.2	0.8	a	1.1	**1.9**	1.4	a	a	0.7	**0.9**	0.8	**0.9**	1.2
Computer, research and development, other business activities	4.4	**12.8**	9.5	5.2	**10.8**	3.0	**7.3**	**13.9**	1.9	**7.6**	4.8	**10.3**	**10.8**	**4.7**	9.8
Security activities and industrial cleaning	**5.0**	a	**1.9**	**4.1**	a	**3.6**	**5.4**	a	**1.8**	a	**3.6**	**3.1**	**4.4**	**3.9**	**3.1**
Public administration and extra territorial organisations	3.4	**10.9**	3.1	2.5	3.4	1.2	7.0	5.0	1.3	a	1.5	12.6	6.0	6.5	4.2
Education	3.1	5.6	5.9	4.3	**8.0**	2.0	5.5	7.1	1.5	**8.9**	2.3	2.8	5.4	**6.8**	**11.4**
Health and social work	**9.1**	9.8	**13.6**	10.4	**19.5**	4.1	11.2	**14.4**	2.6	**8.4**	4.9	7.8	15.2	**7.3**	**19.3**
Other community services	**5.5**	**4.5**	5.2	**5.7**	4.9	2.7	4.1	4.9	2.1	**5.3**	**5.6**	2.9	4.4	**4.9**	4.3
Private households	a	**1.2**	**1.6**	**1.0**	a	**12.2**	**4.8**	**0.6**	**14.0**	a	**11.4**	**3.4**	a	**5.4**	a
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Notes: Numbers in bold signify over-representation of migrant workers in the respective labour force. Country abbreviations are: AUT – Austria; BEL – Belgium; CZE – the Czech Republic; DEU – Germany; DNK – Denmark; ESP – Spain; FRA – France; GBR – United Kingdom; GRC – Greece; HUN – Hungary; ITA – Italy; LUX – Luxembourg; NLD – the Netherlands; PRT – Portugal; SWE – Sweden.

[a] No data available.

Source: OECD (2009)

distribution of employment among foreign-born workers. This suggests that if we are to explain integration and inclusion, we not only need to assess which categories of migrants are integrated via which domains – labour market, welfare system, political inclusion (see also Chapter One, this volume). We also need to evaluate the further differentiation of inclusion produced by the variability of the terms and conditions under which 'integration' in particular domains (in this case, the labour market) is experienced by different migrants (as workers in different labour market sectors, informal/formal, service/industry), with different skills, and facing different conditions (see also Clark and Drinkwater, 2008).

Further, the link between increasing immigration, the increasing 'precariatisation' of labour forces across Europe and the chronic undermining of organised labour in EU members states in its capacity to defend hard-won employment and social rights, should be highlighted here. Aside the various differences between national welfare and employment regimes in the EU, it remains the case that cross-border mobility, temporary or otherwise, directly alters the power dynamics between key social actors associated with post-war political settlements in welfare and labour rights (Schierup, 2007). Unintentionally or not:

> [m]igrants are the light infantry of global capitalism. Unattached to local customs of solidarity and class identity, they weaken the effect of protective regulations and the bargaining power of local groups, particularly when the migration is temporary or illegal. (Standing, 2009, pp 68-9)

Indeed, often, the employers' implicit perspective is that '[m]igrant and immigrant workers are valuable because they are vulnerable' (Bauder, 2006, p 22). Against this background, policies towards the social integration of migrants become crucial elements in the restructuring of power dynamics between labour and capital in the post-industrial societies of Europe. Migrants as social and economic actors, but crucially the policies that govern their mobility and differential integration, become the new elements in the process of the institutional redesign of national political economies in the new Europe (see also Slavnić, 2010).

The integration of migrants: from policies to regimes

The previous section provided an overview of immigration trajectories, discussed how they are likely to be affected by the unfolding economic crisis and compared key aspects of national immigration experiences across the EU. Beyond the general trend of growing inward migration, the kaleidoscope of recorded regular in-migration, asylum seekers and estimated irregular migration revealed a number of strong affinities in terms of regional and historico-cultural patterns, but also important differences in the individual EU member states' experience of migration. Public feeling, attitudes and political discourse are shaped by these

diverse experiences that, in turn, have an impact on patterns of differential inclusion, as we can observe in the case studies presented in Part II of the book. Of key importance here is the predominance of EU or non-EU migration, especially in the case of neighbouring countries and countries at the borders of the EU, feelings of apparent or assumed linguistic and cultural affinities between migrants and resident populations and the extent and role of irregular migration in national political economies.

This diverse and complex picture can be understood as both a product of, and a contributor to, European and national immigration policies and politics, illustrating both the extent and complexity of socio-economic transformation underway in European societies and their political economies. At the heart of this transformation lies the process of the social integration of migrants (Morawska, 2001). To explore it, I employ an analytical framework developed in a previous work (Papadopoulos, 2005), where social processes are perceived as power dynamics between social agents unfolding in three dimensions: relational, institutional and discursive.

In the case of the social integration of migrants, the relational dimension involves a multiplicity of practices in the economic, political, cultural and inter-personal domains that, at the micro-level, establish the multiple relationships between the migrant and the destination society (for an exploration of this dimension see Chapter Eleven). Further, these relationships are, to a large degree, *institutionally* regulated by a dense web of policy interactions between interpenetrating levels of governance (local, national, cross-national, supra-national) across different policy domains (rights to resident, citizenship and welfare, employment, health, education etc). At the same time as these institutional arrangements maintain the historically specific form of political economy in which migrants find themselves, migrants are, of course, themselves actors, and their presence and actions may reproduce or alter the character of these arrangements. Finally, through these micro-level practices and institutional regulations, different *discursive* constructions of the '*integrated* migrant' are actualised: some migrants are institutionally 'recognised' as members of society in the country of destination, who can be 'different but equal to us' (multiculturalism) or 'similar and equal to us' (assimilation). Some are granted partial institutional 'recognition', others temporary institutional 'recognition' and still others are excluded entirely.

Embarking from this analytical approach, this chapter focuses on the institutional dimension of social integration processes,[2] as it is articulated at the national level of governance. In particular, the plethora of policies concerning migrants at this governance level are incorporated under the concept of *national migrant integration regime*. Figure 2.1 provides the analytical schema of the embeddedness of a national migrant integration regime, its key elements and their interactions. The main elements taken into account are: social welfare policies, citizenship and immigration policies, and labour market policies and practices shaping the formal/informal employment mix. In turn a national migrant integration regime is embedded in its corresponding national political economy, and is influenced by

Figure 2.1: The embeddedness of a national migrant integration regime in the EU



its interaction with other national political economies and migrant integration regimes within, and beyond, the EU as well as its interaction with the EU's politico-economic integration process. Consequently, an emerging EU migrant integration regime can be understood as comprising a variety of national migrant integration regimes and *competing* supra-national modes of governance, the latter being attempts at EU level to govern and steer the variety of national regimes.

In the remainder of this chapter, I bring together selected indicators that will be used as empirical proxies to explore comparatively the various components of national migrant integration regimes in the EU.

Towards a new typology?

Various works have highlighted the inadequacies and limitation of the most influential typologies to date (that is, varieties of capitalism and the variations and revisions of Esping-Andersen's [1990] welfare regime typology) to accommodate

the reality of migration, immigration policies and its interactions with welfare, production and employment regimes (Menz, 2006; Sainsbury, 2006; Doomernik and Jandl, 2008). In addition, various attempts have been made to provide alternative typologies. Some, like Sainsbury, tried to accommodate earlier work on immigration *policy* regimes,[3] and offered a typology based on the interaction between welfare regimes and immigration regimes by using ideal-typical case studies (Sainsbury, 2006). Other authors developed typologies on the basis of countries' experience of immigration *flows* more generally (Triandafyllidou and Gropas, 2007), while Düvell has constructed a more sophisticated six-category typology on the basis of the interactions between institutional tolerance towards regular migration, irregular migration and irregular work (Düvell, 2009).

I argue that such typologies, although useful as starting points, can obstruct our attempt to understand and explain what is a very rich diversity of national experiences and political economies, especially as the latter are also interlinked in complementary, if unequal, positions in the emerging social and politico-economic *European* space of EU27. It is one of the conclusions following research for this chapter that when it comes to their individual national migrant integration regimes, each of the EU member states is indeed 'different', reflecting unique combinations of geography and borders, individual regime elements and national immigration experiences, all of which are mediated by EU participation and often in tension with EU economic and policy imperatives. Thus, this chapter will spend its final part reflecting on this rich diversity, by means of indicators, but avoid the understandable temptation to reduce this diversity into a new typology. Still, to avoid lengthy descriptions of each country, the discussion that follows uses, heuristically, a five-fold division of welfare regimes in Europe to reflect on the data, thus also roughly corresponding to the case studies in Part II of the book.

Presented in Table 2.5 are two sets of indicators representing proxies for (a) the national migrant integration regime elements and (b) the immigration experience for each country. The former is captured by the following indicators:

- The 'type of social welfare model' was used as a proxy for the character of the welfare system.
- The MIPEX composite indicator was used as a proxy for citizenship and immigration policies (the individual components of this index and their scores are provided in Table 2.6 in the Appendix to this chapter).
- The labour market access MIPEX index, extent of employment of migrants (% of total), low skilled migrants (% of migrant employment) and irregular migration (% of total population) are used as proxies for labour market characteristics and the formal/informal mix.
- 'Foreign-born' (% of total population) is used as the proxy for the national immigration 'experience'.

With regard to what have traditionally been considered as comprehensive (Nordic) welfare systems we observe substantial differences between their citizenship and

immigration policies, with Denmark being the most exclusive. However, the immigration policies of Sweden score the highest in the MIPEX index, making Sweden a unique case that combines a relatively open attitude to migration with very high levels of formal integration, although there are debates about its de facto inclusion when one includes labour market participation (see below). Migration in Finland is comparatively very low but has grown dramatically, and as Koikkalainen et al show in Chapter Eight, the shortcoming here is really having access to the Finnish labour market and being integrated in the welfare

Table 2.5: Characteristics of migrant integration regimes and immigration experience in 23 EU member states

	1. Social welfare model[a]	2. Citizenship and immigration policies composite index	3. Labour market access index	4. Employment of migrants (% of total)	5. Low skilled (% of migrant employment)	6. Irregular migrants (% total population)	7. Foreign-born population (% total population)
Sweden	1	88	100	12.8	25.1	0.11	14.1
Finland	1	67	70	2.8	4.3	0.19	4.2
Denmark	1	44	40	6.6	13.1	0.06	8.8
Netherlands	2	68	70	10.7	24.3	0.59	10.5
Belgium	2	69	75	10.3	16.2	1.03	9.1
Luxembourg	2	55	45	45.4	71.9	0.59	35.2
France	2	55	50	11.2	21.2	0.46	10.7
Germany	2	53	50	12.8	27.5	0.40	13.1
Austria	2	39	45	16.1	36.2	0.44	15.6
UK	3	63	60	11.1	14.4	1.05	10.4
Ireland	3	53	50	14.8	23.0	1.05	19.6
Portugal	4	79	90	8.0	11.8	0.85	8.6
Italy	4	65	85	9.0	23.2	0.62	7.4
Spain	4	61	90	15.9	33.6	0.70	14.1
Greece	4	40	40	8.7	38.4	1.70	10.1
Poland	5	44	25	0.3	0.2	0.46	2.2
Czech Republic	5	48	50	1.9	3.2	0.56	–
Hungary	5	48	40	1.8	1.8	0.30	3.7
Slovenia	5	55	60	–	–	0.30	–
Estonia	6	46	75	–	–	0.56	–
Latvia	6	30	20	–	–	0.30	–
Lithuania	6	45	55	–	–	0.30	4.0
Slovakia	6	40	55	0.6	0.5	0.33	–

Notes: [a] Social welfare systems: 1: comprehensive; 2: conservative/corporatist; 3: liberal; 4: conservative/familistic; 5: post-communist/conservative; 6: post-communist/ rudimentary.

Sources: 1: author's typology based on Fegner (2007); 2 and 3: based on MIPEX indicators (see Appendix, Table 2.6); 4 and 5: OECD (2009a); 6: author's calculations based on Kovacheva and Vogel (2009); 7: projections for 2010 (UN, 2009)

state. For Düvell (2009), these countries are intolerant to regular and irregular migration and intolerant to irregular work, and to some extent this is supported by the data. These results, with the Finnish case study, provide a confirmation of, and a counter-point to, Koopmans' (2010) argument that generous welfare systems, combined with relatively closed labour markets, perform rather badly on integration and well-being of migrants. It seems to confirm the importance of the *combination* of labour market and welfare system, so that good benefits for migrants do not of themselves improve their welfare. However, as Carmel and Cerami argue in Chapter One, what our case studies also show is that different migrant groups, whether deliberately or by default, are integrated through different domains, and under different conditions in the same country, with consequently variable effects for the stratification of their rights and for their welfare.

With regard to what have traditionally been considered as conservative (continental) welfare regimes, the Bismarckian tradition meets a large variety of integration policies, ranging from highly integrative (Belgium) to deeply exclusionary (Austria). The numbers and origins of migrants and the recent experience or high growth in migration can at least partly explain this diversity, but it should be analysed alongside the labour market composition. Luxembourg aside, Austria has the highest percentage of foreign-born in both employment and low-skilled employment among the countries in this group. Low-skilled migrant employment in all the countries is very high, which can partly be explained by population ageing and processes of de-familisation resulting in commodification of care, but perhaps, as our German case suggests, may also require close attention to 'chains' of inclusion and exclusion which are constructed by specific policy interactions (see Chapter Seven). For Düvell (2009), these countries are tolerant of regular migration but intolerant of irregular migration and to irregular work, which appears to be, at least partly, supported by the data.

For those traditionally considered as liberal welfare regimes (Ireland and the UK), the easy access to the labour market indicated by high levels of participation in the labour force is accompanied by high exposure to old and new social risks in the flexible labour market (see Chapter Ten). Ireland's reverse experience from an emigration to immigration country is highlighted by the remarkable growth in immigration and the rather modest integration policies. For Düvell (2009), these countries are tolerant to regular migration, intolerant to irregular migration and tolerant to irregular work – at least until 2004 for the UK – which appears to be supported by the data.

In respect of countries associated with the familistic welfare regime, these are 'quasi' new immigration countries (see Chapter Six), with insecurity as a key characteristic. Goís and Marques (2009) argue for Portugal, although this might be extended to Greece and parts of both Spain and Italy, that the migration system is a result of its semi-peripheral position in the global economy – within, but on the margins of, the core European economy – which affects both immigration and emigration patterns. In all four Southern European countries, migrants clearly and disproportionately work in low-skill sectors, and in all countries, but especially

in Spain, irregular migrants as a percentage of the total migrant ('foreign-born') population is relatively high. These are regimes where precariousness, and lack of social protection, is evident for all workers in low-skill sectors – and this is compounded for migrant workers, especially for the undocumented and those working illegally (Lawrence, 2007). Greece, similarly to Austria for the conservative welfare regime group, stands out as especially exclusionary. Of all the countries traditionally characterised by familistic welfare regime, Portugal appears to have a much more coherent set of policies and approach in dealing with migrants and their social and labour market integration, as indicated by the MIPEX index, and it is noticeable that unlike the other countries in this group, Portugal also has the lowest percentage of irregular migration and the lowest percentage increase in inward migration overall, suggesting a more 'managed' migrant integration regime.

Finally, in the case of Central and Eastern European countries, migration is really a new phenomenon as many, although not all, of these countries are countries of emigration. When it comes to integrating new migrants (such as Chinese nationals or nationals coming from neighbouring countries), ethnic tensions, political conflicts and the communist heritage still play a role, so that in the case of Hungary (as described by Rusu in Chapter Nine), the inclusion of ethnic Hungarians is privileged to other forms of inclusion to migrants. It is not clear how far this case can be extrapolated to other countries (see Woolfson, 2007, on Estonia; Menz, 2009, pp 228-32, on Poland). The MIPEX indicator results certainly suggest that many of these countries do not have policies in place for the integration of non-national migrants in the labour market or social protection. Nonetheless the numbers of in-migrants are (unlike in Greece or Austria), as yet, relatively small, which will tend to reduce the social and political pressure for policy change in this respect, however problematic the experience of individual migrants may be.

Conclusion

This chapter presented an overview of key recent and current trends in migration in Europe, exploring the diversity and variety of immigration experience among EU member states, and the impact this has on how we can evaluate the interaction of migration, migration policies and social protection policies across Europe. It was argued that together, the interaction of welfare regime, informal and formal labour markets (and their relationship), and immigration and citizenship regimes combine to form distinct national migrant integration regimes. Rather than construct a specified typology, the chapter used the well-recognised welfare regime categorisation as a starting point for considering the variety of interactions between welfare, political economy and immigration regimes across the EU member states, forming a comparative backdrop to many of the contributions to this book.

More broadly, central to this analysis is the importance of the political economy of welfare and the changing political economy of labour. With increased informalisation of economies, migrants become economically tolerated, indeed

necessary, participants in the re-ordering of the political economy of Europe. While specific groups of migrants are considered necessary for sustaining welfare capitalism (especially in relation to ageing populations) and high-skill growth, migrant workers in general also play a role in further undermining the problematic co-existence of the post-war welfare settlement with reliance on post-Fordist and post-industrial economic growth (Slavnić, 2010). Not only does the encouragement of migration for utilitarian purposes sit uneasily with strong anti-immigration currents in policymaking, but it has other possible political and social consequences as well. The decision, on the one hand, to include (some) migrants, to offer policies which permit their social, political and economic integration, or on the other, the decision to tolerate (other) migrants' segregation and/or insist on their exclusion, become decisions which can affect the changing power dynamics in Europe. Migrants are social and economic actors, and the migration, welfare and labour market policies which structure the conditions of possibility for their integration and their recognition as political actors are emerging as very significant significant factors in shaping the institutional redesign of European political economies.

Notes

[1] Eurostat (2009a) defines citizenship as 'the particular legal bond between an individual and his or her State, acquired by birth or naturalisation, whether by declaration, choice, marriage or other means under national legislation. Foreign citizens refer to persons who are not citizens of the country in which they reside. They also include persons of unknown citizenship and stateless persons'.

[2] Here I take a functional view of integration, rather than a normative one. Migrants are 'integrated' into a labour market, in a particular place, which might leave them marginalised or in a 'subordinate' position to other migrants, or to non-migrants, but they are integrated, by playing a specific role in relation to a society or specific form of political economy (Bauder, (2006, p 9).

[3] The notion of immigration policy regime (Faist, 1995), and also the related 'incorporation regime' (Soysal, 1994) refers to policies aiming at regulating immigrants' inclusion in or exclusion from society. According to Sainsbury (2006): 'The immigration regime consists of rules and norms that govern immigrants' possibilities to become a citizen, to acquire residence and work permits, and to participate in economic, cultural and political life'.

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Appendix

Table 2.6: Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX): individual component indicators

Anti-discrimination		Access to nationality		Political participation		Long-term residence		Family reunion		Labour market access	
Sweden	94	Sweden	71	Sweden	93	Sweden	76	Sweden	92	Sweden	100
Portugal	87	Belgium	71	Luxembourg	84	Belgium	74	Portugal	84	Spain	90
Hungary	85	Portugal	69	Finland	81	Spain	70	Italy	79	Portugal	90
UK	81	UK	62	Netherlands	80	UK	67	Slovenia	71	Italy	85
Netherlands	81	Ireland	62	Portugal	79	Portugal	67	Lithuania	68	Estonia	75
France	81	France	54	Germany	66	Poland	67	Finland	68	Belgium	75
Slovenia	79	Netherlands	51	Ireland	59	Italy	67	Spain	66	Netherlands	70
Finland	75					Denmark	67	Poland	66	Finland	70
Belgium	75	Czech Republic	50	Belgium	57	Netherlands	66	Malta	66		
		Poland	45	Italy	55	Malta	65			UK	60
Italy	69	Luxembourg	45	Denmark	55	Finland	65	UK	61	Slovenia	60
Cyprus	60	Finland	44	France	52			Germany	61	Slovakia	55
Ireland	58	Slovenia	41	Spain	50	Slovenia	63	Estonia	61	Lithuania	55
Greece	58	Spain	41	UK	46	Czech Republic	63	Belgium	61	Germany	50
Luxembourg	56	Slovakia	40			Estonia	61	Netherlands	59	Ireland	50
Spain	50	Lithuania	38	Czech Republic	41	Greece	60	Czech Republic	58	France	50
Germany	50	Germany	38	Austria	34	Austria	55	Luxembourg	50	Czech Republic	50
				Estonia	30			Ireland	50		
Lithuania	48	Hungary	36	Hungary	29	Germany	53	Hungary	50	Austria	45
Poland	46	Cyprus	36	Malta	19	Slovakia	51			Luxembourg	45
Slovakia	44	Italy	33	Cyprus	18	Latvia	51	France	45	Hungary	40
Austria	42	Denmark	33	Slovenia	15	Hungary	50	Latvia	42	Greece	40
Malta	38	Malta	29	Slovakia	14	Luxembourg	48	Greece	41	Denmark	40
Latvia	33	Estonia	26	Poland	14	France	48	Slovakia	38	Cyprus	40
Denmark	33	Latvia	25	Greece	14	Cyprus	47	Denmark	36	Malta	30
Czech Republic	27	Greece	25	Lithuania	12	Lithuania	47	Austria	34	Poland	25
Estonia	23	Austria	22	Latvia	11	Ireland	39	Cyprus	32	Latvia	20
EU25	58.9		43.5		44.3		59.4		57.6		56.4
standard deviation	20.7		14.6		26.3		10.0		15.7		21.0
0.5 SD > mean	69.2		50.8		57.5		64.4		65.4		66.9
0.5 SD < mean	48.6		36.2		31.2		54.4		49.7		45.9

Note: Shaded areas represent scores within ± 0.5 standard deviations from the mean.
Source: MIPEX database, available from www.integrationindex.eu/ and author's own calculations