

## ***Juntos*: Colombian strategy to eliminate extreme poverty.**

**Diana Morales-Arcila<sup>1</sup>**

### **Abstract:**

The *Juntos* strategy, conceived as a web of 26 agencies of the public sector working together in order to deliver their social programs to the poorest and most vulnerable population in Colombia, appeared to be an innovative and effective solution for extreme poverty. The strategy is transformative in the sense of recognizing poverty as a multidimensional phenomenon, but still rooted in traditional basis when maintaining a centralized design. After 3 years of implementation both, the strategy's name and the agency in charge of the coordination changed. It is not surprising when considering the findings of the *Veeduría Especial del Fondo de Inversion para la Paz* Report. This document qualifies *Juntos* implementation as failed given the poor results in the initial implementation phases.

This paper, based on the findings of the *Veeduría* report, is focused in analyse how the failure of the strategy is determined by its centralized design, which ignored the uneven institutional capacity among municipalities and regions.

**Key words:** multidimensional poverty, decentralization, local authorities, multilevel governance.

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<sup>1</sup> Lawyer with a Master degree in Regional Development Management and Development Studies. PhD student, Centre for Urban and Regional Development Studies CURDS, Newcastle University (UK).

## Glossary

**ANSPE:** Agencia Nacional para la Superación de la Pobreza Extrema. Is the agency from the central government in charge of the social upgrading of the poorest and vulnerable population. It was created in 2011 (*Decreto 4160, 2011*).

**AS:** Agencia Presidencial para la Acción Social y la Cooperación Internacional. It was the national agency head of the Social and Reconciliation sector. It was in charge of conduct the resources and to run all the social programs depending on the Executive. Its name was changed for “Departamento Administrativo para la Prosperidad Social” in 2011 (*Decreto 4155, 2011*).

**CONPES** (for its acronym in Spanish): National Council for Economic and Social Policy Papers.

**Extreme poverty:** Insufficient income to acquire the minimum dietary energy requirements (DANE, n.d.).

**Familias en Acción:** Is a Conditional Cash Transfers program designed to attend poor and vulnerable families with children under 18 years old (DPS, n.d.)

**FIP** (for its acronym in Spanish): Fondo de Inversión para la Paz. Created by the Law 487 (1998), is the primary financing instrument for peace programs and projects, including all of them related with the reduction of poverty and inequality (DPS and FIP, n.d.).

**MERPD** (for its acronym in Spanish): Strategy Design Mission to reduce poverty and inequality.

**RUPD** (for its acronym in Spanish): Unified Registry of Displaced Population.

**SISBEN:** Identification System for Potential Social Programs Beneficiaries, where the population is classified in ranges accordingly with its income, education, social security, public services access and housing quality and equipment. The ranges go from 1 to 6, being the 1 the lowest and 6 the highest.

**Veeduría Especial del Fondo de Inversión para la Paz:** It is an independent body composed by *ad honorem* members and a technical area. Its main function is to monitor the management and progress of the programs financed with FIP resources (DPS and FIP, n.d.)

## I. Introduction

Colombian social policy faces immense challenges. The country is deeply unequal and its social problems embrace an enormous diversity of issues, all the way from extreme poverty to violence victims and social segregation. Acknowledging this situation, the national government commissioned the design of a strategy to reduce extreme poverty with a multidimensional approach. Based in the recommendations given by the MERPD, the CONPES 92 (2005), and 102 (2006), and based in the Peruvian and Chilean experiences, *Juntos* was established as the main strategy to eliminate extreme poverty in the country.

*Juntos*, designed as a web of 26 agencies of the public sector working together in order to deliver their social programs to the poorest and most vulnerable population in Colombia. It is usually presented as an innovative and effective solution for extreme poverty and a significant transformation in the social policy. Indeed, since 2009, the rates of extreme poverty have been constantly decreasing, from a 17.8% in 2008 to 9.1% in 2013 (DANE, n.d.).

However, several problems in the initial stages of the strategy's implementation, invites to analyse deeply how really effective is the strategy. Based on the findings of the *Veeduría Especial del Fondo de Inversión para la Paz* Report, this paper suggests that *Juntos*, in spite of its progressive aims, fails when maintaining a traditional structure. The strategy is excessively centralized and ignores the importance of the local context.

Thus, this paper is structured in 3 sections. Section II explains briefly how the strategy was designed and how its implementation was executed. Section III describes the *Veeduría* report main findings. Finally, based on the mentioned report, the last section analyses how the excessive centralism and the lack of multi-level and multi-actor governance scheme, plus the inattention of decentralization policies, had a direct relation with the implementation drawbacks in its first three years.

## II. The strategy: design and implementation

*Juntos* was the main strategy to eliminate extreme poverty in Colombia. Its purpose was to group the existing supply of social programs (from the national, local and private level), providing support and preferential access to the beneficiary families. In 2010 the agency responsible for its implementation and monitoring was AS. Since 2011 the strategy has suffered several changes. The responsible agency is ANSPE, the name, as well as some aspects of its design, were changed. Today, *Juntos* is known as *Unidos*. However, and despite of these changes, the strategy maintains the same aims and its centralized structure. Thus, it is necessary to clarify that this paper is focused in the analysis of *Juntos* emphasizing in its centralist scheme.

Within the Millennium Development Goals context, and following a series of policy recommendations, the *Juntos* strategy was designed to reduce extreme poverty by attacking some of its different dimensions. Based in the recommendations given by the MERPD, the CONPES 92 (2005), and 102 (2006), the strategy attempted to group the existing supply of social programs and set preferential access to *Juntos* beneficiaries. AS accomplished the role of coordinator of all the actors involved, i.e.: Local authorities, AS local representatives, private firms, and national agencies and institutions offering social programs. *Juntos* was funded with resources from FIP, municipalities, departments and other agencies from the private and international sector. In the next lines the main aspects of its design and implementation are described.

### 1. Objectives and goals

*Juntos`* purpose is to “*strengthen families in situations of extreme poverty and forced displacement to manage their own development, to overcome their poverty and improve their living conditions*” (Veeduría, 2010:14 author`s translation). From this general aim, a series of objectives and basic achievements were designed (annex 1).

The objectives correspond to the nine poverty dimensions object of intervention: personal identification, income and work, education, health, nutrition, housing, familiar dynamics, financial and savings services, and access to justice. In turn, the basic achievements are the set of conditions required to improve families life conditions (Veeduría, 2010). Those also were created in order to set a methodology for accomplish the objectives and design a monitoring system.

## 2. *Selection of beneficiaries*

*Juntos* goal was to attend 1.5 million families by the end of 2009. The beneficiaries had to meet one of two requirements: being in extreme poverty or forced displacement condition (or both). The selection process required a complex mechanism given the large number of families meeting those conditions, and the duplicity and inconsistency of the existing databases. Thus, in order to identify the potential beneficiaries, *Juntos* created its own database based on the information collected in RUPD, SISBEN, and the current beneficiaries of *Familias en Acción*. The beneficiaries' families were selected following the next steps:

Firstly, to define the potential beneficiaries, *Juntos* selected the families from the lowest range in SISBEN database until March 2008, and all the families registered in the RUPD, regardless of their location –or if they were not- on the SISBEN database.

Secondly, the following criteria were applied on the initial list:

- *Familias en Acción* beneficiaries,
- non *Familias en Acción* beneficiaries with children under 18 years old but included in the bottom of SISBEN database,
- non *Familias en Acción* beneficiaries without children under 18 years old but located in the bottom of SISBEN database, and
- all the families registered in RUPD.

Once settled this classification, the National Department of Planning [DNP] (for its acronyms in Spanish) built the final 1.5 million families list divided by municipalities.

## 3. *Components*

*Juntos* design included 3 essential components which defined its content: Familiar and communitarian support, social programs supply management and preferential access, and institutional strengthening for the local governments.

### 3.1. Familiar and communitarian support

It was referred to the attention received by each family in their homes and communities. The objective was to recognize families' potentials, strengthen their ties and social interaction and help them to acquire the skills required to overcome extreme poverty. In order to complete this component, each family was accompanied by one *Cogestor* [Cgs] for a

five years period. The Cgs were in charge of provide support to each family, by helping them to identify its needs and the interventions required (based on the list of the 45 basic achievements). Once identified the needs and pertinent social programs, each family elaborates a Familiar Plan, which is monitored by the Cgs. The information collected during this period was also used to build a baseline survey.

This component was not executed directly by AS. Private or public firms with expertise in social programs, called *Operadores Sociales* [OS], were hired to implement the familiar and communitarian component, including the recruitment and training of the Cgs.

### 3.2. Supply management and preferential access

Its purpose was to manage the social programs supply. Using the information collected by the Cgs, the linked institutions (18 from the national level and 9 from the private sector during 2007, 2008 and 2009) and the local governments (in relation with their local social programs) offered their programs, guarantying preferential access to *Juntos* families.

### 3.3. Institutional Strengthening

Its purpose is to support the local level by strengthening its social protection system through the design and implementation of capacity building actions for municipalities. This component was implemented accordingly with each municipality needs and requirements.

## 4. Implementation

The strategy implementation was conducted in two stages. A Pilot phase, implemented during 2007, where the strategy was executed in 37 municipalities located in 12 departments. Then, an Expansion phase was executed in 2008. This phase sought to implement the strategy in all over the 1098 municipalities attending 1.5 million families. The steps designed to implement the strategy in both phases were the following:

- (a) Defining micro-regions. In order to facilitate the territorial distribution of the OS, *Juntos* defined its own territorial organization. The connectivity and shared interests between municipalities were the criteria used to define a total of 114 micro-regions.
- (b) Preparatory workshops.
- (c) Subscription of formal agreements between AS and each Municipality and Department in order to legalize the social programs supply and the budget appropriation.


- (d) Selection of the OS. Their main task was to manage the Cgs contractual entailment, training, payment and monitoring.
- (e) Cgs recruitment and training.
- (f) Implementation of the Familiar and communitarian support component, starting with the Baseline survey and finalizing with the construction of the Familiar Plan.

### III. *Juntos* in data: the *Veeduría* report

. In order to fulfil this function, the *Veeduría* produced the Monitory Report for *Juntos*, where the achievements, progress and results of the implementation were evaluated.

The report covers the years 2007, 2008 and the first 9 months of 2009, and was published in March of 2010. It is based on the analysis of *Juntos* official reports and fieldwork in municipalities from 5 different departments<sup>2</sup>. From the report the following findings are highlighted:

**Figure 1. Pilot Phase: Results in comparison with the proposed goals.**




Source: *Veeduría*, 2010

Regarding the Pilot Phase, the report highlights the inexistence of a concrete closing date. As consequence, the possible errors, obstacles and the areas requiring special attention were not effectively identified before starting the expansion phase.

<sup>2</sup> The report does not specify the exact number of visited municipalities

**Figure 2. Expansion phase: Results in comparison with the proposed goals**



Source: *Veeduría*, 2010

### *Formal agreements*

One of the most crucial aspects to guarantee a successful implementation is the participation of local authorities. Through Inter-administrative contracts (formal and written agreements between public institutions), AS established a series of arrangements regarding budget and tasks for both parts. However, as the *Veeduría* found, those arrangements were not sufficiently binding, resulting in a lack of commitment from some local authorities.

This lack of commitment could be explained, accordingly with the report, on political will and financial capacity. Its consequences were reflected on the absence or misinformation about the strategy, both for the potential beneficiaries and the local officers; incorrect or dismissive attention to the families, discouraging them to fulfil the requirements; unjustified delays in the procedures and lack of information about the social programs offered at the local level.

### *Selection of the OS*

Neither the Pilot nor the Expansion phases were successful regarding the Cgs goals. The report found several problems related with the OS, affecting the hiring and training of the Cgs, and, in consequence, all the strategy's goals. As pointed, the role of the OS was to lead the Cgs team in the assigned micro-region. In turn, the Cgs were in charge of conduct the



baseline survey, and help each family with the construction, implementation, and monitoring of the Familiar Plan.

The OS were hired after an open invitation to tender. By the end of October 2009, twenty-eight OS were contracted to operate in 96 micro-regions. The total value of those contracts was of 136.000 million COP approximately (around 41 million GBP). However, 26 from those 96 micro-regions were offered again in public tender by 2009, due to the impossibility of the hired OS to accomplish the contractual obligations. As the report highlights, 30% of the micro-regions would be even more delayed in the implementation of *Juntos* given the previous circumstance (the value of the new contracts ascended to 33.000 million COP, around 10 million GBP).

The report calls for a more cautious manage of the budget, when finding that the invested resources were not effectively used, whether for the OS lack of technical and managerial capacities or AS delays in delivering the proper information and tools. Is even more concerning that the former circumstances were common to most of the OS and not only to those whose contract were finished. As the *Veeduría* recalls, several of the formalized contracts were modified while their execution. The most common adjustments were an increase on the contractual value, more flexible disbursements, and a decrease on the initially agreed goals.

In conclusion, by October 2009 the Familiar Plan construction was not started and there were several problems with the information of the Baseline survey. Regarding this issue, the *Veeduría* found that the technological platform used was not properly supported, representing issues particularly on remote municipalities with difficult access. The public order situation in some municipalities represented an additional challenge, given the pressure and threats from illegal groups, obstructing the Cgs work.

#### *Social programs supply*

Despite the positive data regarding the number of public and private agencies involved in the strategy, as well as the number of social programs linked, the report found several problems with the supply:

- The agencies were not committed with specific goals, i.e., they offered the programs but not sufficient quotas to cover all the demand.

- There were not incentives for the agencies to give preferential access to *Juntos* families.
- The paperwork and procedures for the families to accede to all the programs was excessive.
- The design of some of the offered programs was incompatible with the nature of the strategy: they were designed on the basis of a direct request from the beneficiary instead of open to all the *Juntos* families, or were not pertinent for the families' needs. On the other hand, programs financed by international cooperation resources were inflexible in their beneficiaries' selective criteria.
- Most of the efforts were targeted to the national level, losing sight of the Local Government's Planning policies. As consequence, there was not clear information about the social program supply of the local level.

As noted, the *Juntos* panorama by the end of 2009 was not encouraging. Despite its innovative nature regarding the understanding of poverty as a multidimensional concept, it conserves strong traditional roots in the sense of the excessive centralism that characterize Social Policy in Latin America (Franco, 1996). The next segment will explore this aspect.

#### **IV. *Juntos* and the local context**

*"Human geography has a moral duty to engage with public policy issues and debate (...) [however] the fundamental problem is that there is no readily discernible policy research agenda in the discipline"* (Martin 2001:191)

Colombian Social Policy is characterized for its high concentration in the national level. The national agencies are in charge of the design and implementation of the social policies where policies are designed and implemented, and the local actors accomplish the role –in most of the cases- of mere intermediaries between the nation and the beneficiaries (Franco, 1996). It is certain that each municipality can design and implement their own social policies and programs; however, the limited capacity of local authorities to develop their own policies leaves autonomy as a purely formal matter.

In general terms, Colombia has been trying to break the dominant paradigm of poverty as an exclusively economic issue, despite of its eminently neoliberal model of development. Thus, even though the prevalence of neoliberal policies implemented in the last 25 years

(Echavarría, 2001) both, poverty measurement (multidimensional poverty index) and social policies design, include a multidimensional approach.

Accordingly, *Juntos* can be qualified as a progressive strategy firstly, when understanding poverty as a multidimensional concept. Indeed, the design includes goals related with income and job, housing, health, and education, and some others less traditional such as the access to cultural and communitarian activities and support. Secondly, the focus on families instead of individuals recognizes the role played by the social and familiar ties in the construction of common capabilities to fight poverty.


However, the strategy did not give any importance to the role of the social and institutional local context. The unique mention to the geographical aspect of the strategy is found in the creation of micro-regions. As noted, its definition obeyed to accessibility and spatial proximity aspects, but its purpose was not to be aware of the local context but to facilitate the strategy implementation. Thus, amongst the possible encounter points between Human Geography in Social Policy, this paper is focused in analyse the governance scheme in multi-actor and multi-level contexts and the role of the local authorities in the strategy design and implementation.

#### *Governance scheme*

*Juntos* success depends on the participation of the public (local and national government) and private sector (national and international level). The attempt to group most of the social programs supply and address it through one agency is innovative, but its success depends on the design of a multi-level and multi-actor governance system, which allows an effective coordination and decision making.

Instead, the strategy has been managed following a traditional framework, where the central government (represented by AS) has a predominant role in designing and implementing the strategy, maintaining vertical relations between the different levels of government and private actors, and with the prevalence of national agencies working as services providers (Filgueira and Lombardi, 1995). The results are a series of disperse institutions and actions where activities, processes and actors are overlapping and duplicating efforts.

Figure 3. *Juntos* governance scheme



As shown in the figure, the governance system is based in vertical relations, being AS the head of the structure. Some of the actors have no interaction, even if their role is highly related or similar, while AS concentrates the relations with the entire system. Three different kinds of relations are identified:

- Co-operation: No compulsory agreements highly dependent of political will and financial capacity.
- Mandate: Based on contractual obligations or hierarchical organization, with coercive force and sanction powers.
- Supervision: Based on contractual obligations acquired for external parts, without coercive force or sanction powers.

Despite the existence of several actors, most of the relations are canalized through one single actor, and there are not evident coordination systems, conciliatory mechanisms or decision making processes.

Without the existence of a proper governance system, the inclusion of OS as intermediaries to implement the strategy's main component adds more complexity for an already intricate structure. It requires a higher invest of financial resources and creates a meso-level between the national and the local authorities where the interaction is unclear: The OS have a contract formalized with AS, which implies that they are responsible for the agreed obligations only with the national level, bypassing the local authorities and AS

representatives, precisely the actors with which the OS have more interaction. The relation between the OS and the local level is based on contractual supervision, however neither the local authorities nor the AS representatives have coercive power and its unique role is to inform the contractual development.

Regarding the relations between the national and AS local representatives, there are not any incentives for the later to accomplish a more active role. Its functions are limited to fulfil obligations based on a hierarchical scheme rather than a real commitment with the strategy. On the other hand, the relations between AS and local authorities are voluntary and, despite the existence of formal agreements, there are no incentives to increase the co-operation will. Instead, as the report highlights, there are serious information and collaboration problems.

This can be explained in the total absence of the local level, both authorities and AS representatives, in the formulation, design, and, in the case of the local authorities, implementation of *Juntos*. The strategy is a top-down policy which underestimates the role of the local level, despite the fact that is precisely the local level the primary receptor of information, beneficiaries and solicitudes. It is certain that the strategy has an institutional strengthening component, aimed to enhance local authorities' capabilities to implement the strategy. However, this is the weakest component of the strategy, it is not specified in any detail on the policy, and there are not concrete actions to implement. This aspect is emphasized in the next segment.

#### *Juntos and Decentralization policies*

Colombia is organized in the form of a unitary and decentralized republic. The territorial organization divides the country in territorial bodies of different size and composition, being the Departments and municipalities the most relevant. The decentralization policies, consolidated through the National Constitution (1991), attempt to deliver higher degrees of autonomy in fiscal, administrative and political terms. Thus, each territorial body is governed by local representatives elected by popular vote for a 4 years period (Governor and Assembly for departments, Mayors and Councils for Municipalities). They have autonomy to administrate their financial resources, to establish local taxes, and participate in the National Income and budget (Ley 388, 1997; Ley 1454, 2011).

This autonomy implies, amongst other aspects, that each Governor and Mayor, following a series of directives from the national level, design the general policies, programs, and

projects to be implemented throughout their government term. This roadmap, contained in a document called “Development Plan”, has to be approved by the respective Assembly or Council within the first year of government, and defines, amongst other aspects, how the budget will be executed and how the social programs will be funded. Thus, Development Plans include both the budget spending and the social aims defined by the local governments.

Nonetheless, the Social Policy remains highly centralized. Firstly, most of the social programs are designed and implemented from the national level. Secondly, the transfer of financial resources from the national to the local level is conditioned to be executed in specific budget items, mainly education and health. As consequence, only the most prosperous regions, in the terms of financial capacities, retain real autonomy to design and implement their own social programs, while the remaining regions (which are the most), still depending on the national social programs (Zapata, 2009).

In the case of *Juntos*, the absence of the local authorities’ participation when designing the strategy brought as a consequence the creation of negative incentives to cooperate. The strategy, which is highly dependent on the cooperative arrangements with the local authorities, had to face a lack of political will during the implementation, without consultation spaces and tools to force the formal agreements compliance.

In addition, the local administrations terms and policies were ignored. The strategy was implemented without any consideration of the public administration times, especially regarding the year period when budget expenditure is defined and approved (as mentioned, *Juntos* funding relies in the merging of financial resources from the international, national and local level). Finally, the Development Plans were also unnoticed, neglecting the local autonomy to determine its own social goals and priorities.

Local authorities played the role of intermediaries without any voice or vote in the design and implementation of the strategy. Thus, the obstacles and delays identified in the report should not be unexpected.

Decentralization implies the recognition of territorial autonomy that cannot be ignored by the higher levels of government. When recognizing that autonomy and involving the local actors in the design and implementation of social policies, the programs and projects are more likely to be adequate in the sense of attending the real and most urgent needs. Indeed, critiques to centralism are focused in the ineffectiveness of homogeneous policies for

heterogeneous realities, and in the incomplete information with which decisions are made (Franco, 1996).

However, it is certain that a complete decentralization for Social Policy can aggravate regional disparities when totally depending on the local capabilities. Thus, the call is for building an intermediate approach that reconcile top down and bottom up policies, which recognize the local context and disparities as a basis for policies design. In other words, recognize the decentralized structure of the state does not imply that each region, department or municipality must be completely responsible of design, implement and fund its social policies. Due to the unevenness and marked inequality in Colombian regions, the Central government intervention is crucial to guarantee the social policy effectiveness, without ignoring the active role that local authorities must and can perform.

## **V. Conclusions**

*Juntos* is a transformative strategy. The recognition of multidimensional poverty represents a significant advance in social policy. Despite the problems found, it is certain that the rates of extreme poverty in Colombia show a consistent decline of almost the half in a seven years period. However, this paper cannot explain the reason of this behaviour. Whether because of changes in the poverty measures, a constant but cautious rise in the national economic indicators, or positive results in *Juntos* (today *Unidos*) implementation, or all of them together; what is certain is that the preliminary stages of *Juntos* are far from being successful.

Progressive social policy design loses importance if it is not accompanied by innovative structures that break the traditional and distinctive centralism of the country social policies. *Juntos* is a top-down policy, innovative in the sense of recognizing the existence of multidimensional poverty, but traditional in the terms of ignoring the local context and maintaining vertical and hierarchical relations between the involved actors. In other words, the poor results of the implementation process are explained, on the one hand, in the lack of awareness of the local realities, which is materialized in the homogeneity of the objectives and goals. On the other hand, in its traditional centralized structure, the lack of incentives, and the inexistence of consultation and decision making spaces where all the actors can participate.

Context matters. The local level cannot be a simple receptacle of social policies, but an active actor whose participation in the design and implementation is critical. Each municipality and region influence and is influenced by the local context. Colombia is a diverse and multicultural country, with different geographies, natural resources and several indigenous communities. It is also an unequal country, with a high concentration of wealth in few regions and dissimilar institutional capacities amongst the territorial bodies. Within this panorama, homogeneous policies deepen regional disparities.

The connection between Social Policy and Geography goes beyond the uneven distribution of income and wealth, or the disparities between prosperous and impoverished regions. The role of Human Geography in Social Policy research is to contribute to the explanation and understanding of the social disparities, and to address public policies that are appropriate for the context where they will be implemented. Social Policy requires a multidisciplinary approach capable to reconcile top down and bottom up policies. It also require to recognize regions and municipalities as active actors capable to influence policy design and implementation and where the social policy is materialized.



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## Annex 1: JUNTOS objectives and basic achievements or goals

Objective	Basic achievements
<p>1. Identification</p> <p>Each family member has the official identification documents.</p>	Minors between 0 – 7 years old have <i>Registro Civil</i> (Civil Registration)
	Minors between 7 – 18 years old have <i>Tarjeta de Identidad</i> (Id card for minors)
	People older than 18 have <i>Cédula</i> (Id card)
	Men between 18 – 50 years old have <i>Libreta Militar</i> (Military Card)
	The information registered in the SISBEN is consistent with the ID documents
<p>2. Income and work</p> <p>Families have income from different sources (besides JUNTOS)</p>	Adults older than 60 years old have any income source
	At least one member of the family, older than 15 years old, have a paid job (with a formal contract or self-employed)
	Working age family members have access to technical training if required.
	The family has a property or tenure fulfilling all the legal requirements.
<p>3. Education and training</p> <p>Children, youths and adults accumulate human capital.</p>	Children younger than 5 years old attend a comprehensive care program (care, nutrition and early education)
	Children between 5 – 17 years old attend the basic cycle of the formal educational system
	Disabled people younger than 22 years old attend the formal or an alternative education system
	Adults between 18 – 65 years old are literate
	Once concluded the basic cycle of formal education, family

	members continue its training in a technological institution or an university, if they wish to
	Any children under 15 years old are working
<p>4. Health</p> <p>All family members receive and attend the health services and programs</p>	All family members are affiliated to the National Health System
	The family have Access to Health Promotion programs
	Teenagers and adults are familiarized with family planning methods.
	1 year old children have DPT, HB and Hib vaccine.
	Children between 1 – 2 years old have the SRP vaccine.
	6 years old children have the Polio and SRP enforcement vaccine
	Expectant mothers receive prenatal care and delivery attention.
	Children under 10 years old attend consultations for early detection of growth and development abnormalities
<p>5. Nutrition</p> <p>All family members have an adequate nutrition and correct habits in food handling</p>	Men and women attend screening programs for cervical, breast and prostate cancer
	Disabled people attend rehabilitation programs
	The family consume healthy food in proper quantities, practicing healthy habits for handling, preparation and consumption.
	Children under 5 years old, expectant and nursing mothers, accede and consume proper food in sufficient quantities, accordingly with their nutritional needs
	Children under six months are exclusively breastfed.

<p>6. Housing</p> <p>Families live in safe and consistent with their cultural context houses</p>	Houses have drinking water and drainage system
	Families have access to safe garbage disposal system
	Housing has a conventional or alternative energy
	Houses have bathroom, kitchen, laundry and bedrooms in different spaces
	Each bedroom is occupied by no more than 3 persons, being the children separated from the adults
	Housing does not have dirt floors
	Family members have sleeping and eating implements
	Family has access to a communications system
	House is built with adequate materials that enable physical security and health
	Housing has lighting, natural ventilation and privacy
<p>7. Familiar dynamics</p> <p>Strengthened and healthy familiar dynamics and existence of mechanisms of expression and affection</p>	Family prepares and monitors their Family Plan
	Family access to information and services for early detection, treatment and recovery for domestic and sexual violence
	Family members recognize the spaces and opportunities to accede to the local programs and services (e.g. communitarian organizations, sports, cultural activities)
	Family with children under 6 years know and apply humane breeding patterns
	Families count with dialogue and conflict resolution spaces
	The whole family is involved in the care and social inclusion of the person with disabilities
8. Financial and saving	The family defines a share savings, handled through

services	financial mechanisms and used as needed.
Families access the financial system and use it as a mean to facilitate working opportunities, income and security	Family recognizes the different financial services available for them, and can access them when needed fulfilling all the requirements
	Family access to credit with fair interests rates
9. Access to Justice	Family knows its legal needs, identify the appropriate conflict resolution alternative and know their rights and duties.
Families accede to formal justice services and alternative conflict resolution services. Recognize their rights and encourage values	When needed, the justice services are prompt and timely, including formal or alternative mechanisms
	Forced displaced families receive support and monitoring of the “effective enjoyment of rights” indicators

## Annex 2. *Juntos* Components

Components		
<p>1. Familiar and communitarian support</p> <p>Attention to each family in their homes and communities, in order to recognize their potential, strengthen their ties and social interaction and help them acquire or strengthen skills which allow them to leave extreme poverty</p>	Familiar support	
	Communitarian support	
	<i>Cogestor Social</i> as the main familiar and communitarian supporter	
	Familiar support phases	Familiar base line survey
		Familiar plan construction
		Monitoring and management of the basic achievements
<p>2. Supply management and preferential access to social programs</p> <p>The purpose is to manage the social programs supply (from the national and local level), allowing JUNTOS families to access preferentially to the programs they require</p>	Stages	Programs supply identification
		Supply analysis and clasification
		Supply and services implementation
		Advances reports and coverage evaluation
		Identification of supply`s issues
3. Institutional	Strengthening Municipal	

Strengthening	Social Protection Systems	
Strengthen the social protection system at the local level, through the design and implementation of capacity building actions for the municipalities, if required	Community participation and social control	