

Codes, Modalities, and the Process of Cultural Reproduction: A Model

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## Codes, modalities, and the process of cultural reproduction: A model\*

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### INTRODUCTION<sup>1</sup>

“Class relations” will be taken to refer to inequalities in the distribution of power and in principles of control between social groups, which are realized in the creation, distribution, reproduction, and legitimation of physical and symbolic values that have their source in the social division of labor. In terms of the particular problems of the relationships between class and the process of its cultural reproduction, as developed in this thesis, what has to be shown is *how* class regulation of the distribution of power *and* of principles of control generates, distributes, reproduces, and legitimates dominating and dominated principles regulating the relationships within and between social groups and so forms of consciousness. What we are asking here is how the distribution of power and principles of control are transformed, at the level of the subject, into different, invidiously related, organizing principles, in such a way as both to position subjects and to create the possibility of change in such positioning. The broad answer given by this thesis is that class relations generate, distribute, reproduce, and legitimate distinctive forms of communication, which transmit dominating and dominated codes, and that subjects are differentially positioned by these codes in the process of their acquisition. “Positioning” is used here to refer to the establishing of a specific relation to other subjects *and to* the creating of specific relationships within subjects. *In general*, from this point of view, codes are culturally determined positioning devices. More specifically, class regulated codes position subjects with respect to dominating and dominated form of communication *and* to the relationships between them. Ideology is constituted through and in such positioning. From this perspective, ideology inheres in and regulates *modes of relation*. Ideology is not so much a content as a *mode of relation for the realizing of contents*.

The skeleton of the thesis can now be exposed diagrammatically (Figure 1).

#### *Codes – general*

The first step toward filling out the entailed relationships in the diagram is to define codes, and the second step will be to derive from that definition propositions that will facilitate the defining of *specific* codes. In the Postscript to Bernstein, *Class codes and control*, vol. 1 (rev. ed. 1971), there is a series of  
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


FIGURE 1.

definitions of code that represent the evolution of the concept. Basically, there has been a movement from the giving of definitions in terms of linguistic indices to definitions in terms of their underlying semantic. In both cases the underlying semantic was considered to be the regulator of *specific* linguistic realizations. Specific linguistic usages were taken in the earlier definitions as indices of a specific *semantic* organization. The process of giving *explicit primacy* to the semantic systems is continued here. We shall now give the general definition of code.

A code is a regulative principle, tacitly acquired, which selects and integrates:

- |                               |              |
|-------------------------------|--------------|
| a) relevant meanings          | meanings     |
| b) forms of their realization | realizations |
| c) evoking contexts           | contexts     |

(1) It follows from this definition that the unit for the analysis of codes is not an abstracted utterance or a single context, but relationships *between* contexts. Code is a regulator of the relationships *between* contexts and through that relationship a regulator of the relationships *within* contexts. What counts as a context depends not on relationships *within*, but on *relationships between*, contexts. The latter relationships, *between*, create boundary markers whereby specific contexts are distinguished by their specialized meanings and realizations. Thus if code is the regulator of the relationships *between* contexts *and*, through that, the regulator of the relationships *within* contexts, then code must generate principles for *distinguishing* between contexts and principles for the *creation and production* of the specialized relationships within a context. We have previously called these principles, respectively, ground rules and performance rules.<sup>2</sup> However, in order to avoid confusion and irrelevant associations, the names of these two sets of rules will here be changed to *recognition rules* and *realization rules*. Recognition rules create the means of distinguishing between and so *recognizing* the

speciality that constitutes a context, and *realization* rules regulate the creation and production of specialized relationships internal to that context. At the level of the subject, differences in code entail differences in recognition and realization rules. Later in this essay we shall be concerned to explicate *how* code generates recognition and realization rules.

(2) It follows from the definition that, if code selects and integrates relevant meanings, then code presupposes a concept of irrelevant or illegitimate meanings; that if code selects forms of realization, then code presupposes a concept of inappropriate or illegitimate forms of realization; that if code regulates evoking contexts, then again this implies a concept of inappropriate, illegitimate contexts. The concept of code is inseparable from the concepts of legitimate and illegitimate communications, and thus it presupposes a hierarchy in forms of communications and in their demarcation and criteria (see Appendix 1).

### *Specific codes*

The first step toward writing specific codes will require a rewriting of the original definitions so that it is possible to make specific empirical relationships. The rewriting will also make explicit the causal chain of relevant meanings, realizations, context:

*Evoking contexts* (c) will be rewritten as *specialized interactional practices*.  
*Relevant meanings* (a) will be rewritten as *orientations to meanings*.<sup>3</sup>  
*Forms of realization* (b) will be rewritten as *textual productions*.

Thus we now obtain the following causal chain. The features that create the speciality of the interactional practice (i.e., the *form* of the social relationship) regulates orientation to meanings, and the latter generate through *selection* specific textual productions.<sup>4</sup> From this perspective the specific text is but a transformation of the specialized interactional practice; the text is the form of the social relationships made visible, palpable, material. It should be possible to recover the original specialized interactional practice from an analysis of its text(s) in its context. Further, the selective creation, production, and changing of texts is the means whereby the positioning of subjects is revealed, reproduced, and changed.

We can now fill in a little more the inner structure of the thesis, which is shown in Figure 2. What is required is to show the means whereby it is possible to perform the following transformations:

- 1) Class relations and positioning (via power and control)
- 2) Positioning and codes
- 3) Codes and communication

If such transformations can be accomplished, then the invisible can be recovered from the visible.

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


FIGURE 2.

ELABORATED AND RESTRICTED CODES

- a) Orientations
- b) Location
- c) Distribution
- d) Realizations

We shall start by examining "orientations to meanings," remembering that these look backward to specialized interactional practices and look forward to textual productions. Our first approach is to attempt to recover specialized interactional practices from orientations to meaning. We shall then try to account for (b) and (c), the conditions for the *location* and *distribution* of such orientations.

We shall begin with a brief description of an inquiry into the social basis of classifications carried out by the Sociological Research Unit (Holland 1980). The SRU was concerned to create a means whereby it would be possible to discover children's orientation to principles of classification and the means of their change. The sample consisted of thirty middle class boys and girls and thirty lower working class boys and girls aged 8 years and 11 years. We wished to use, as the basis for classification, materials that would be equally familiar to all the children, although we expected the *reading* of the materials in the experimental context to be different, according to the class background of the children. The children were presented with colored pictures of food such as bread, cheese,

bacon, hamburgers, fish fingers, sardines, soup, butter, and several vegetables. Many of these items the children would have eaten in their lunches at school, as the overwhelming majority of primary school children at the time of the experiment ate their lunches at school. Although the *individual food items* are a common experience for all children, clearly their grouping in *specific* dishes is likely to vary between the classes, and the relation between dishes is also likely to vary. Further, the frequency of certain groupings is likely to vary between the social classes, and the social context of the meal would be yet another source of class variation between the children. In the first stages of the experiment we were concerned with the principle the children used when invited to make groups of the food items that they considered to go together. Accordingly the children were asked, "Do you think you could put these together in groups? Do it any way you like. Just put together the ones that seem to go together. You don't have to use all of them if you don't want to."

After the children had made their groups, they were asked why they had made each group. It was possible for the children to give at least two broad principles for their groups. They could give a principle that had a direct relation to a specific local context of their lives and that took its significance from local activities and local meanings. In such a case the classification would relate to everyday life in the family (e.g., "It's what we eat at home," "It's what we have for breakfast," "It's what mum makes"). In this case we propose that the principle of classification has a relatively *direct* relation to a specific local material base (a gloss on "material base" will be given in section [d], "realizations"). However, the children could give a principle of classification that related less to the specific, local context of their everyday experience of food and its attendant social relations and practices (e.g., "These come from the ground," "These come from the sea," "These all have butter in them"). It is not that the latter examples do not relate to a material base, for they do, but the relationship is more indirect and less specific. We found as we expected that the modal principle of classification of the middle class children was relatively independent of a specific context, whereas the modal principle of classification of the lower working class children was relatively dependent upon a specific context.<sup>5</sup> In other words, the crucial difference between the groups of children lay in the relation of the classificatory principle to a material base; in one case the relation was direct and specific; in the other the relation was more indirect and less specific.

The children were then asked, "Can you do it a second time? Can you try to put them together in a different way this time?" This time many middle class children (a statistically significant number) switched their principle of classification and produced principles *similar to those produced by the lower working class children*, whereas the latter continued to use the principle they had used before. (However, almost one-third of the lower working class changed their principle by the end of the experiment.) What is interesting is that the middle class children showed that they held *two* principles *and* that these children held

priority rules with respect to these principles, such that those which had a relatively direct relation to a specific material base were given *second* (i.e., lower) priority. Indeed we would argue that in the first four minutes the middle class children created orientations to meanings based upon a *hierarchy of principles*, each of which had a *different* relation to a material base, such that the principle which related to *a specific, local material base* in the *experimental context* was the dominated (i.e., second) principle.

We have discussed the first section of the experiment in order to prepare the ground for defining the *location* of elaborated and restricted orientations to meaning. In previous papers we have located these orientations in different modes of social solidarity, mechanical and organic, which regulate different interactional practices and we argued that class relations regulated *how* these orientations were made available in formal education and how different class groups were differently placed with respect to their *formal* acquisition in the school. This formulation will now be modified so as to make more explicit the power relationships underpinning the location of these orientations and the distinctive feature of their materiality.

GENERAL DEFINITION OF THE LOCATION OF ELABORATED AND RESTRICTED ORIENTATION

The simpler the social division of labor, and the more *specific and local the relation between an agent and its material base*, then the more direct the relation between meanings and a specific material base *and* the more restricted the coding orientation.

The more complex the social division of labor, the less specific and local the relation between an agent and its material base, then the more indirect the relation between meanings and a specific material base and the more elaborated the coding orientation.

It is important to point out that in each case *we are regarding the social division of labor from the specific location of one of its agents*. Let us take the example of a peasant working on a sugarcane plantation. From the point of view of that peasant, he or she would physically see himself or herself as part of a simple division of labor, and such an agent's interactional practices would have as their center of gravity interactions within a simple division of labor regulating practices with respect to a local, specific material base. However, in the case of the patron, he (historically not *she*) would physically see himself as part of a complex division of labor, which would include the total *local* division of labor of the plantation, the local market, and circulation of capital, and which would also include national and international markets with their entailed capital circulations. The patron's center of gravity would lie within a complex division of labor regulating practices with respect to a *generalized* material base.

Thus the most *primitive* condition for *location* of coding orientations is given

## CODES, MODALITIES, AND CULTURAL REPRODUCTION

by the location of agents in the social division of labor. Different locations generate different interactional practices, *which realize different relations to the material base* and so different coding orientations. At this point it is important to point out that we are here stating the *location* of different coding orientations, not their origins.<sup>6</sup>

### *Distribution*

The conditions for the distribution of coding orientations in this model are clear. If agents become specialized categories of the social division of labor, and their location is fixed and so nontransposable, then coding orientations become specialties of position within the social division of labor. The condition for these conditions is the *principle of the social division of labor itself*. The group that dominates the principle of the social division of labor determines the extent to which positions in the social division of labor give access to specialized coding orientations. These coding orientations are in no sense inevitable consequences of any position. Coding orientations are not intrinsic to different positions. Whether they become so depends upon the distribution of power. Thus the distribution of *coding orientations* depends upon the distribution of power created by the principles regulating the social division of labor.

## PERFORMANCE: CLASSIFICATION AND FRAMING

### *Introduction*

In the following sections we shall be concerned to develop a model showing how the distribution of power and principles of control regulate the *realizations* of orientation to meaning. We shall be concerned to make explicit the modes of regulation of specialized interactional practice that define specific recognition and realization rules. For *specific* codes can be determined only if these practices can be defined. We have so far only indicated the location and distribution of elaborated and restricted orientations, which in our model have their origin in the class regulation of the principle of the social division of labor. These create differential access to meanings having different degrees of dependency upon a specific material base. Thus, access to orientations is regulated by the principle constituting the social division of labor of production, which in turn directly transforms and reproduces differential orientations in the family. However, access to elaborated orientations is available through agencies of defense, challenge, opposition (e.g., trade unions, political parties). The institutional availability, distribution, and *realization* of elaborated codes is established through the modality of education.<sup>7</sup> We see education as a fundamental reproducing and producing agency crucial to (but not in a close correspondence relation with) the class regulation of the mode of production and crucial to the class regulation of modes of social control.



We shall develop a model for generating codes regulating the class production of physical resources and class reproduction and production of discursive resources.<sup>8</sup> The difference between physical and discursive resources does not lie in the materiality of one and the nonmateriality of the other. Discourse, as we shall see, has a material base albeit it is less obvious and its relation to its materiality is more opaque. Despite differences in the dissimilarities of the realizations of production and education, the social basis of these realizations is structurally similar. In both cases (physical/discursive resources) we have a social division of labor with specialized categories of agents *and* their interrelations *together* with their social relations. The former consists of the *relations* between social categories (agents), and the latter consists of the *specific realizations* of these categories (*agents*), that is, their specific practices/activities. Thus any production or reproduction has its social basis in *social categories* and *practices*. In the production of physical resources we have sets of differently specialized categories with their sets of differently specialized practices, and in the production/reproduction of discursive resources we have sets of specialized categories (such as teachers) and sets of specialized practices (pedagogy). This can be illustrated with reference to a family, which is a primary discourse reproducing agency. Here the social division of labor is constituted by the category set of the kinship, while the social relations are the specific practices *between* the categories (e.g., between parents, between parents and children, between children, between gender categories). We can apply the same analysis to a school. Here the basic social division of labor is constituted by the set of categories of transmitters (teachers) and the set of categories that constitute acquirers. The social relations refer to practices between transmitters *and* acquirers, practices *between* transmitters and practices *between* acquirers (see Bernstein 1977: Ch. 8).

#### CLASSIFICATION AND SOCIAL DIVISION OF LABOR

Basic to the mode of production and modality of education are categories and practices that are regulated by the principles of a social division of labor and its internal social relations. Practices are the realization of categories. The form taken by these practices – that is, their degree of specificity, the extent to which practices are specialized to categories – depends entirely upon the relation *between* these categories. (*Relation "between" regulates relation "within."*) Once categories are specialized it necessarily follows that their realization, their practices, are also specialized. The practice can be regarded as the "message" of the category and is the *means of its acquisition*. At this stage we shall simply state that specialized categories necessarily entail specialized "voices," but we are as yet in no position to say anything about what is "voiced." We shall disconnect "voice" from "message." For purposes of exposition, we shall disconnect our analysis of the principles regulating the relation between

categories from principles regulating their associated practices. We shall see later that there are also good analytic reasons for making such a separation. If categories of either agents or discourse are specialized, then each category necessarily has its own specific identity and its own specific boundaries. The speciality of each category is created, maintained, and reproduced *only* if the relations *between* the categories of which a given category is a member are preserved. What is to be preserved? *The insulation between the categories*. It is the strength of the insulation that creates a space in which a category can become specific. If a category wishes to increase its specificity, it has to appropriate the *means* to produce the necessary insulation that is the prior condition to its appropriating specificity. The stronger the insulation between categories, the stronger the boundary between one category and another and the more defined the space that any category occupies and to which it is specialized. It follows that as the strength of the insulation between categories varies, so will the categories vary in their relation to each other, and so will their space, their identity, and "voice." Thus the *degree of insulation* is a crucial regulator of the relations between categories and the specificity of their "voices."<sup>9</sup> We can begin to see that the degree of insulation regulates criteria of demarcation between categories and so the *rules of their recognition*.

We are now in a position to state the fundamental principle regulating the relations between categories, that is, the fundamental principle regulating the social division of labor of production/reproduction. Different degrees of insulation between categories create different principles of the relations between categories and so different principles of the social division of labor.<sup>10</sup> If there is strong insulation between categories, then we shall say that there is a principle of strong classification, whereas if there is weak insulation between categories we shall say that this gives rise to a principle of weak classification. (Classification refers to the relations *between* categories, not to *what* is classified.) Any change in the principle of the classification will require a change in the degree of insulation. Alternatively, the maintenance of a given principle depends upon preserving the strength of the insulation. In order for insulations to be maintained there must be insulation maintainers (and a consequent division of labor, of reproducers, repairers, and surveyors) who work at constituting, sharpening, clarifying, repairing, defending boundaries. The principle of the classification is created, maintained, reproduced, and legitimated by insulation maintenance. Any attempt to change the classification necessarily involves a change in the degree of insulation between categories, which in itself will provoke the insulation maintainers (reproducers, repairers, surveyors) to restore the principle of the classification and themselves as the dominating agents. In order for this to be accomplished the insulation maintainers must have power and the conditions to exert it. Thus insulation presupposes *relations of power* for its creation, reproduction, and legitimation.

We have shown, formally, that power relations regulate principles of

classification by preserving or changing degrees of insulations between categories. In terms of our earlier analysis, power relationships establish the "voice" of a category (subject/discourse) but *not* the "message" (the practice). Power relations, in establishing the "voice" of a category, necessarily establish demarcation markers and recognition procedures/rules. *Power relations position subjects through the principles of the classifications they establish.* If power relations are regulated by class relations, then class relations position subjects through the principles of classification they establish.

We can give examples of the relations between power, classification, and "voice" by examining the division of labor according to gender. When this division of labor generates strong classification, then there is a strong insulation between each category, and each category has its own specialized "voice," and necessarily "voice" will be specialized to gender. Further, any attempt to weaken the classification – that is, to reduce the insulation so as to change "voice" (discourse) – will provoke the power relationship to reestablish the relations between gender categories by restoring the insulation.

We can see in this example another implication of insulation. Insulations are intervals, breaks, delocations, which establish categories of similarity and difference: the equal and the unequal; punctuations written by power relations that establish as the order of things distinct subjects through distinct voices. Indeed, insulation is the means whereby the cultural is transformed into the natural, the contingent into the necessary, the past into the present, the present into the future. In Bourdieu's terms, "symbolic violence" is accomplished *not* by communication but by *delocations that regulate differences between voices.* Inasmuch as the insulation of strong classification of gender categories produces an arbitrary (contingent) specialization of gender "voices," it has created imaginary subjects whose voices are experienced as real, as validating and constituting the specialized category (Althusser 1971). Here the insulation attempts to suppress the arbitrariness of the principle of classification by suppressing the contradictions and dilemmas that inhere in the very principle of the classification. We can see that power relations can accomplish their reproduction by establishing a principle of classification that suppresses its own contradictions and dilemmas through the insulation it creates, maintains, and legitimates.

We can take another example from education. We can regard the social division of labor of a school to be composed of categories of agents (transmitters and acquirers) and categories of discourses ("voices"). If the coding principle is one of strong classification, then there is strong insulation between educational discourse ("voice") and noneducational discourse ("voices"). Discourses are strongly insulated from each other, each with its own specialized "voice" so that transmitters and acquirers become *specialized categories with specialized "voices."* Within the category transmitter there are various "subvoices," and within the category acquirer there are various "subvoices": age, gender, "ability," ethnicity. In the process of acquiring the demarcation markers of

categories (agents/discourse) the acquirer is constituted as a specialized category with variable subsets of voices depending upon age, gender, "ability," ethnicity. In the same way that a strong classification of gender attempts to justify itself in terms of its being a natural, nonarbitrary order, so the strong classification of educational agents/discourse attempts to justify itself in terms of a "natural order" within discourse (logical), a "natural order" of acquisition (biological), a "natural order" of the relation between educational and noneducational discourse (specialized/lay).

It could be argued that, whereas the principle of the classification of gender categories and that of the categories of the mode of production have an arbitrary base, the principle of the classification of discourse ("voices") of education derives from features *intrinsic* to the specialized discourse and is therefore nonarbitrary. This may well be the case. We need, however, to distinguish between the distinctive features of a form of discourse that give it its speciality *and* the social division of labor created for its transmission and reproduction, and it is the *latter* that is the object of our concern.

From the point of view of the social division of labor of reproduction we can distinguish the following classificatory features, each constituted by its own arbitrary insulation features and power relations:

1. *Extra-discourse relations of education*

Educational discourse as a whole, may be strongly or weakly insulated from noneducational discourse.

2. *Intra-discourse relations of education*

*Administrative context*

a. Insulation between agents and insulation between discourse. In this situation agents and discourses are specialized to departments, which are strongly insulated from each other.

b. Insulation between discourses but not between agents. Here agents and discourses are not specialized to departments but share a common administrative context.

3. *Transmission context*

Educational discourses may be related to each other in the process of transmission while retaining their specific distinguishing features. Here discourse is *subordinate to principles of relation* within the total discursive field, and there can be variation in the number of discourses so related.

4. *System context*

Education may be wholly subordinate to the agencies of the state, or it may be accorded a relatively autonomous space with respect to discursive areas and practices.

We can therefore distinguish classificatory principles between the category of educational discourse and the category of noneducational discourse, classificatory principles internal to educational discourse, and classificatory principles regulating the context of the system. In all of the above, (1), (2), (3), and

(4), the question of the definition of discourse in terms of internal criteria is not at issue. What is at issue is the social basis of the insulation, the principle(s) of classification created by the insulation, and the power relations that maintain insulations (whatever their degree) and so the principle of the classification.

It may well be useful to make explicit the language used to discuss reproduction/production. We have earlier argued that production and reproduction have their social basis in categories and practices; that categories are constituted by the social division of labor and that practices are constituted by social relations *within* production/reproduction; that categories constitute "voices" and that practices constitute their "message"; message is dependent upon "voice," and the subject is a dialectical relation between "voice" and message. In this section we have dealt with the relation between the social division of labor, classification, and "voice." Our view is this: the social division of labor is a relation between categories established by a principle of classification. The principle of classification establishes the degree of specificity of the "voices" of the categories through the insulation it establishes. The insulations are the delocations produced by the distribution of power and through which power relations are given their voice. The subject is established by the silence through which power speaks.

CLASSIFICATION, VOICE REPRODUCTION, AND ACQUISITION

We can present in diagrammatic form the structure of the arguments we have so far offered in our explication of the rules for the defining of specific codes (see Figure 3). The sets of relationships shown in Figure 3 are external to the subject and initially position the subject with respect to the social division of labor. The positioning of the subject creates the "voice" of the subject but *not* the specific message. The "voice" sets the *limits* on what can be a legitimate message. To create a message beyond these limits is to change "voice." Such a change entails changing the degree of insulation, which initially was the condition for the speciality of the original "voice." A change in the insulation produces a change




FIGURE 3.

CODES, MODALITIES, AND CULTURAL REPRODUCTION




FIGURE 4.

in the principle of the classification, which in turn indexes a change in the social division of labor, which will then move its dominating categories (agents) to exert their power through the hierarchy(ies) they regulate to induce a return to the original "voice."

We have also argued for a further set of relationships, which are the conditions for the *acquisition* of the "voice" by the subject. We shall give those in diagrammatic form (Figure 4). The principle of the classification generates through its insulations the specialty of the categories *and* the markings of that specialty. The markings of the categories, from the point of view of the acquiring subject, provide a set of demarcation criteria for recognizing the categories in the variety of their presentations. The sets of demarcation criteria provide a basis for the subject to infer recognition rules. The *recognition rules* regulate what goes with what: *what meanings may be legitimately put together*, what referential relations are privileged/privileging. The recognition rules regulate the principles for the generating of legitimate meaning and in so doing create what we have called the *syntax of generation* of meaning. We can now trace a relation between the distribution of power external to the subject and the syntax of generation internal to the subject via the classificatory principle of the social division of labor. The subject creates, maintains, reproduces, and legitimizes the *distribution of power* through the development and establishing of the syntax of generation. This syntax is tacitly acquired in the sense that it develops through inferences the subject makes from the surface features of his or her ongoing everyday interactions. We shall refer to this process as "tacit practice." We can distinguish two modalities of tacit practice generated by two related arbitrary classificatory principles.

1. *The modality of culture.* Every culture specializes principles for the creation of a specific reality through its distinctive classificatory principles and, in so doing, necessarily constructs a set of procedures, practices, and relations from a range of such sets. As a consequence, each modality can be regarded as an arbitrary angling of a potential reality. There may well be features in common to

*modalities of culture* that have their source in general features of the cultural subject (see Appendix 2).

2. *Modalities within culture.* Within each culture there are classificatory principles that are generated by the *specific* form of the social division of labor, produced and reproduced by the distribution of power, regulating the relations between its categories (agents), which establish its distinctive classificatory principles. We are here concerned with classificatory principles regulating the social division of labor for the production and reproduction of material and discursive resources. In this lies the source of a second arbitrary order.

Both modalities (of and within culture) can be, and have been, regarded as ideological representations (Bourdieu & Passeron 1977). The crucial question is the nature of the dynamic relations between them. This question cannot be developed here. We have been here concerned only with *modality within culture*, which, unlike the *modality of culture*, has its source not so much in general features of the cultural subject, except in the last instance, as in a specific distribution of power that creates, maintains, reproduces, and legitimates a specific syntax of generation of meaning. We shall assert that, in its tacit acquisition, not only are dominating and dominated "voices" produced, but equally an oppositional "yet to be voiced," whose syntax is constituted by *insulations* created by the classificatory principle. We have argued that these insulations necessary for the preservation of the classificatory principle and the dominant *or* dominating order it legitimates, suppress potential cleavages, contradictions, and dilemmas. The latter are a source of change in "voice" but, in an important sense, they can be the source of a change in "voice" only if they are already a feature of that "voice." We shall argue that these features are the "unvoiced," "yet to be voiced" components of the "voice" and constitute a stratum of tacit practice.

We do not want to give the impression that the stratum of tacit practice, the "yet to be voiced" and its underlying condensed syntax, necessarily creates in each subject a potential theory of change. It should, however, provide a potential source of the arbitrary nature of the dominating classificatory principles and the power relation that speak through them. From this point of view it could provide the basis for anomie and so could speak to either order or change, or to the tension of their relations. It may well be that for those dominating the power relations it would speak to anomie whereas for those dominated it may well speak to change. The tension between order and change may be the distinguishing feature of the new agents of symbolic control (Bernstein 1977: Ch. 8).

We can extend our diagrammatic illustration of our argument with reference to classification, "voice" production, and acquisition (Figure 5).

It may be useful at this stage to indicate what has been so far proposed. In order to specify specific codes we are required to show how the distribution of power and principle of control are realized in the relationship within and between

CODES, MODALITIES, AND CULTURAL REPRODUCTION




FIGURE 5.

meanings, realization, and contexts. We rewrote the latter as interactional practices, orientation to meanings (privileged and privileging referential relations), and textual productions. Orientation to meanings (privileged and privileging referential relations) are seen as generated by different locations within the social division of labor of the production of physical resources (relations between dominant and dominated locations). *Realization* of these meanings are specified in terms of specialized interactional practices, that is, the categories and social relations *within* production. It was argued that the codes of education consist of elaborated orientations to meanings because of the indirect relation of these meanings to a *specific material base*. The *realization* of these meanings is considered a function of the *specific* form taken by the interactional practices of



education. The next step involved an analysis of interactional practices. Our analysis distinguished two crucial features: a category relation and a message. We considered that the category relation is created by the principle of the relation between categories, a classificatory principle, which in turn, is regulated by the social division of labor constituted by a given distribution of power. We then examined the relation between the classificatory principle and "voice," and in this way we examined interactional practices in terms of "voices." We then made explicit the relations between the classificatory principle, "voice," recognition rules, syntax of generation, and the distribution of power. In other words we specified a relation between *relations between categories* and *that which it is legitimate to mean*. We have as yet not specified the regulation on *the making public of this meaning*. We have not yet analyzed *how* what it is legitimate to mean comes to form a *specific message*. It is essentially through this specific message that the specific code is acquired. The specific message is the form of the socialization into the code.

Briefly, the code regulates the *what* and *how* of meanings: what meanings may legitimately be put together *and* how these meanings may be legitimately realized. We have so far concentrated on the "what," and shown the relationship between the distribution of power and the regulation of the "what" (see Figure 6). We shall now turn to the analysis of the regulation of the "how," that is, to the relationships between principles of control and specific "hows." Here we shall be concerned with social relations and their regulation of "message" and its contextualization. As we are going to discuss "message" with reference to the primary acquisition of discursive resources, we shall be referring to the social relations within reproduction, that is, to pedagogical relations essentially in education. However, we can extend the model to consider the social relations within production and the principles of their realization (i.e., the message). We have in fact carried out such an analysis in Appendix 3, but we suggest that it be read after the completion of the discussion of framing.

#### SOCIAL RELATIONS, PRACTICE, AND MESSAGE

In the previous section we discussed the relations between the distribution of power, the social division of labor, the principle of its classification, the degree of specificity of categories, "voice," recognition rules, and the syntax of generation of privileged and privileging relations. We shall now turn to an analysis of social relations, practices, and "message." There are difficulties in this discussion because "message" is dependent on "voice" and yet is the potential instrument of change of voice. "Message" is dependent upon "voice," for the latter limits the range of the legitimate potential of the message. Yet the cleavages, contradictions, and dilemmas, which are latent in the "voice," are a potential of the realization of the message. Put in a less metaphoric way, the principle of the social division of labor necessarily limits the *realization* of its

practices, yet the practices contain the possibility of change in the social division of labor and thus of their own change. The dynamic potential of the relation between "voice" and "message," between social categories and practices, between the social division of labor and its social relations should be borne in mind throughout the subsequent analysis. There is a further difficulty to this analysis. Empirically, it is not possible to separate "voice" from "message." "Voice" (implicitly or explicitly) is always announced, realized in "message." In an important sense the *classificatory principle* is continuously present in every pedagogical relation. All the "voices" are invisibly present in any one "voice." Socialization into *one* "voiced-message" involves socialization into all (i.e., into the principle of the classification).

Crucial to our perspective here is the analytic distinction between power and control, that is, between what is to be reproduced *and* the form of its acquisition. The latter directs our attention to the specific practices between transmitters and acquirers, which create the local context of reproduction. Social relations refer to the specific practices regulating the relationships between transmitters and acquirers, which constitute the context of acquisition. Essentially, the social relations regulate the form of the pedagogic practice, and so the specific category-message. *The fundamental message of a pedagogic practice is the rule for legitimate communication.* Thus, the social relations within reproduction control principles of communication, and in so doing regulate what we shall call the *communicative context*.

*The communicative context*

If the degree of insulation is the crucial feature of the classificatory principle generated by the social division of labor, then the *form* of the communicative context is the crucial feature generated by the social relations *within* production, through the pedagogic practices they regulate. These practices constitute, relate, and regulate the possibilities of *two* communicational principles.

1. *Interactional.* This principle regulates the selection, organization (sequencing), and pacing of communication - oral/written/visual - together with the position, posture, and dress of the communicants.

2. *Locational.* This principle regulates physical location and the form of its realization (i.e., the range of objects and their attributes, their relation to each other, and the space in which they are constituted).

Basically, these two principles represent the spatial and temporal features of the communicative context; the spatial feature is given by the locational principle, and the temporal feature is given by the interactional principle. We may well find that under certain conditions these two features are tied to each other in a one-to-one figure/ground relation (e.g., teacher/school, teacher/class), but this need not necessarily be the case. The interactional features may not be tied to a

particular space. If we consider parents/children, the interactional feature is not necessarily tied to a particular space or subspace. Thus there is a classificatory regulation of the communicative context. The stronger the tie between the temporal (interactional) and spatial (locational) features of the communicative context, the stronger will be its classification. The stronger its classification, the more likely that the array of objects, attributes, and their relation within the communicative context stand in a fixed relation to each other and so are specialized to that context.

We should note also that the possibilities of a communicative context include the marking of the relation between the locational and interactional features. It is possible for a specific practice to mark the locational feature more strongly than the interactional, or vice versa.

The *interactional principle* is the dominating feature of the communicative context, for it is this principle that establishes, relates, regulates, and *changes* the possibilities of the two principles.

We can see how recognition rules and realization rules are features of the communicative context. The classificatory principle, through its insulations, constitutes the degree of specialty of the communicative context and so provides the limits of its legitimate potential. In so doing, the classificatory principle creates *specific recognition rules*. The *interactional principle* within the communicative context creates the specific message, that is, the specific rules for generating what counts as legitimate communication/discourse and so the range of its possible texts. The interactional principle creates the specific realization rules. Thus we can say that the communicative context provides access to both recognition and realization rules, or more explicitly and more generally, social relations, through their regulation of the communicative context, provide access to recognition and realization rules. Realization rules, which establish what counts as a legitimate text, presuppose and are limited by recognition rules. Classificatory principles determine the limits and legitimate potential of communicative principles and are reproduced through them. Yet the message is also the means of change of "voice" and so of itself. In general social relations, although initially dominated by the classificatory principle, are also the means of change of principle.

#### FRAMING

We have so far discussed the interrelations between the social relations *within* reproduction and principles of communication and the communicative context. We now need to distinguish between various forms of those social relations and so various forms of the principles of communication. We shall use the concept of framing to describe these variations. *Framing* stands in the same relation to *principles of communication* as classification stands in relation to the *principles of the relation between categories*. In the same way as relations between

categories can be governed by strong or weak classification, so principles of communication can be governed by strong or weak framing. From this point of view, it does not make sense to talk about weak or strong principles of communication. Principles of communication are to varying degrees acquired, explored, resisted, challenged, and their vicissitudes are particular to a principle. *Control* is always present, *whatever the principle*. What varies is the *form* the control takes. The *form* of control is here described in terms of its framing.

Changes or variations in the classificatory principle produce changes or variations in the "voices" of categories; changes or variations in framing produce changes or variations in *message*. Changes or variations in framing produce variations or changes in *pedagogic practices*, which in turn produce changes or variations in *principles of communication* (temporal and spatial – interactional/locational) and so changes or variations in the communicative context. Variations or changes in framing produce variations or changes in the rules regulating what counts as legitimate communication/discourse and its possible texts. In the same way that the distribution of power regulates the classificatory principle via the social division of labor, so principles of control regulate framing via its social relations.

#### *Definition of framing*

Framing refers to the principle regulating the communicative practices of the social relations within the reproduction of discursive resources, that is, between transmitters and acquirers. Where framing is strong, the transmitter explicitly regulates the *distinguishing features* of the interactional and locational principles, which constitute the communicative context. Where framing is weak, the acquirer has a greater degree of regulation over the distinguishing features of the interactional and locational principles that constitute the communicative context. This may be more apparent than real.

Variations in the degree and change of framing regulate variations and change in realization rules. In order to give a more precise definition of framing, we need to make explicit the phrase "the distinguishing features of the communicative context." These distinguishing features will vary according to whether the communicative context is generating physical or discursive resources (see Appendix 3). If it is the latter, then the distinguishing features would be constituted by the *selection, organization* (sequencing), pacing of the communication and the position, posture, and dress of the communicants, *together with the features of the physical location*.

*Strong framing.* The transmitter controls the selection, organization, pacing and the position, posture, and dress.

*Weak framing.* The acquirer has more control over selection, organization, pacing and the position, posture, and dress.

We can distinguish at a greater level of delicacy between the *internal* values of the strength of framing (F(i)) and the *external* values of the strength of framing

(F(e)). If we consider a school where F(e) is strong, then the transmitter regulates what features of nonschool communication and practice can be realized within the school's specific pedagogic context, such as the classroom or equivalent (F(i)). Where F(e) is weak, then the acquirer has more regulation over what features of *nonschool communication and practice* may be realized within the classroom or equivalent F(i). It is possible for F(e) to be weak and F(i) still to be relatively strong. Further, the relations between F(i) and F(e) may change over the time span of the transmission. When the acquirers are young in age, F(e) may be relatively weak, whereas with advancing age F(e) may increase in strength for one group of acquirers such as the successful, whereas F(e) may be weakened or remain weak for the unsuccessful (social education, community projects, education for work, etc.).

We can summarize our discussion in Figure 6.

In the previous section devoted to classification, "voice" reproduction, and acquisition, we indicated in Figure 5 a level of relation we called the "yet to be voiced," which we argued was a potential of the contradictions, cleavages, and dilemmas generated by the classificatory principle itself. In Figure 6 we have distinguished a level of relation we have called the "yet to be realized," which is a potential message of the "yet to be voiced." It is a matter of some importance to distinguish between the *reactions to, or the challenge of, the realization rule* imposed by a given framing *and* the level we have called the "yet to be realized."

Any framing carries with it the procedures of its disturbance and challenge. Consider an elaborated code with values +C +F (i.e., realized in a communicative context of a secondary school) in which the pedagogical relations are between a teacher and a class of pupils who have been disabled by the code. The strategies for challenging the code are given by the code's principles. If the pupils are to challenge the code effectively, this cannot be done by *one* pupil. It requires changing the basic unit of acquisition, which is that of an isolated, privatized, competitive pupil, to communal, noncompetitive classroom relations. There must be a change in pupils' principles of social integration. Given this change, the new group can substitute its own norm of production for the teacher's norms. The group can now impose its own realization rules. These may well include sabotaging the means of the pedagogy, subverting its rules, assuming aggressive postures. These disturbances and challenges are resistances called out by the specific code; they do not *necessarily* index a move even to declassify let alone to reclassify. Challenge of, or resistance to, the framing of pedagogic practice by transmitters *or* acquirers may be *within* the terms of the classificatory principles.

The level of tacit practice we have called "yet to be realized" operates at a deeper level. It is the "message" of the "yet to be voiced." The "yet to be voiced" is a potential answer to the distribution of power and varies with its principles; the "yet to be realized" is a potential answer to the principles of

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


FIGURE 6.

control and varies with those principles. Just as the classificatory principle may be realized by, and acquired through, different principles of communication ('message'), so the 'yet to be voiced' may be realized through different principles of communication ('message'). Its 'message' is a function of the dominating principle of control acting through a specific framing. What are the realizations of the 'yet to be realized'? The realizations, at this level, are not the product of a process of selection and orderings that can be consciously varied; they are unsolicited and gratuitous and take the form of metaphors of new possibilities. To say this is not to say that they are unregulated, for they are a potential of the *code* and of its change or variation.

We have distinguished two levels of tacit practices:

1. A level that is subject to conscious selection and orderings within the possibilities of a given syntax of generation and realization.
2. A level that is not subject to conscious selection and orderings but is derivable from the first level.

These two levels are similar to the distinction between conscious and pre-conscious. It might be possible to show the relation between the levels of tacit practice and that of unconscious practice through the writings of Lacan (1968).

#### SPECIFIC CODES AND THEIR MODALITIES

We began this analysis with the statement that to write specific codes it is necessary to state orientation and specific realization conditions. In class societies *in general* the distribution of orientations (elaborated/restricted) is created and legitimized by the social division of labor of the mode of production and transferred to the family. However, such transfer is not necessarily automatic, as it may be transposed by countervailing (oppositional) agencies arising out of the social matrix of the mode of production (trade unions, political parties) *and* discursive mediations of particular families. While the distribution of power creates the strength of the classification between elaborated and restricted orientations, the principles of control regulate the realizations of these orientations (i.e., the classification and framing values). Principles of control select realizations (C/F values) that will permit the reproduction of the distribution of power. These principles of control are dependent upon the principles of the forces of production (technology) and the principle by which agents relate to these forces so as to constitute practices and interactions. Increasingly the principles creating and legitimizing forces and practices have their origin in education in its productive, not reproductive, levels. Education necessarily is predicated upon elaborated orientations *irrespective* of the dominating principles of a social formation, but the dominating principle of the social formation regulates their realizations, that is, the classification and framing values and so the code/codes (see Appendix 4).

In Figure 7 we have put together the two halves of the model that our exposition separated. The distribution of power and the principle of control are realized in the social division of labor and its social relations, and they establish the classificatory and framing values, which define the mode of transmission/acquisition or practice in basic communicative contexts for the production of discursive *and* physical resources. The classificatory principles regulate recognition rules, what is legitimate to put together and so what we have called the syntax for the generating of legitimate meaning. Framing principles regulate realization rules, how relations may be made public, and so what we have called the syntax of realizations. From this point of view, the distribution of power and principle of control translate into classificatory and framing principles, regulating the structure (organization), interactions, and communicative contexts of agen-




FIGURE 7.



cies for the production and reproduction of discursive and physical resources. The subject acquires classification and framing principles, which create for the subject, and *legitimize*, the specialty of his or her voice and message (see Appendix 5).

The unbroken horizontal lines of the model show the imposition of what is to be reproduced and the process of its acquisition. Codes enable subjects not only to read and create texts that are legitimately available to be so constructed but also to read and create texts that are within the possibilities of the syntax of generation/realization as potential orthodox/heterodox texts. The diagonal lines show the process of resistance, challenge, or opposition. The diagonal shading shows the process shaping the response to the cleavages, contradictions, and dilemmas suppressed by the insulations of the classification. We do not want to give the impression that we are operating with a theory of variation, resistance, opposition, which is based on an isolated individual realization. Of course, variation, resistance, challenge, opposition, struggle arise out of the structural relations produced by class itself. We are concerned to show the regulations of its reading and readings.

We can now write specific codes regulating the reproduction/production of physical and discursive resources in terms of orientation to meanings and their realizations created by specialized interactional practices constituting communicative contexts. Codes can be specified by the following formula:

$$\frac{O}{(\pm) C \quad F (\pm)^{i/e}}$$

where

- O refers to orientation to meanings elaborated/restricted (privileged/privileging referential relations);
- C refers to the principle of classification;
- F refers to the principle of framing;
- (±) refers to the values of C and F with respect to strength (strong/weak);
- i/e *i* refers to the *internal* values of F *within* a communicative context (e.g., family, school, and work);
- e* refers to the *external* values of F, that is, the regulation on communicative relations *between* communicative contexts (e.g., family/community and school; school and work).

We can talk about the *modality* of a code and its change. The modality of a code or its change is given by the values of classification and framing. The values of classification and framing can vary independently of each other. Any *one* set of values for classification and framing constitutes the modality of the code.

#### *Change of code*

A change of code involves a change in the strength of a *basic classification*. We consider that there are two basic classifications that may or may not be interrelated, in the sense that changing the value of one does not necessarily lead to

changing the value of the other. We consider that the basic classificatory principle is created by the distribution of power constituting, reproducing, and legitimizing the social division of labor of physical resources. A change in this classificatory principle from strong to weak involves not a change in, but a change of, class relations. However, we must add immediately that, while not diminishing the significance of such a change, it would not, in itself, necessarily produce a change of institutionalized elaborated codes and therefore a change in the principle of cultural reproduction. In order (in the terms of this paper) for there to be a change in institutionalized elaborated codes and thus in the principles of cultural reproduction, then the classificatory relation between the category "education" and the category "production" must be fundamentally weakened. This is the necessary condition for weakening the second basic classification, that between mental and manual work. In class societies the strengths of these two classifications are causally related. However, in societies dedicated to a change in the mode of production, few indeed have even attempted to institutionalize a weakening of the classificatory relation between education and production. On the contrary, such societies are as preoccupied with the *systemic* relations between education and production as class societies are (Bernstein 1977: Ch. 8).

*Code modalities*

Code modalities are essentially variations in the means and foci of symbolic control on the basis of a *given* distribution of power. Although modalities do not change fundamentally the principles of cultural reproduction or material production, their effects are, on the whole, confined to changes in the process whereby the principle is transmitted/acquired. It would be inappropriate to dismiss variations in modalities as superficial phenomena. It is useful to classify such variations in modalities according to the *location* and *code value* of the modality:

1. *Location*

- a. The variation may regulate an agency/agencies *within* a field (e.g., symbolic control, production, or the various agencies of the state).
- b. The variation may regulate relations *between* agencies in different fields.
- c. The variation may be specific to a dominating or dominated modality or both.

2. *Code value*

The variation may effect only the principle of the classification, or only the framing, or it may effect both.

*Classification*

- a. *Within* a given principle of classification there may be variations in different historical periods in the *number* of categories (the set) regulated by the classification (the social division of labor).

- b. There may be a *substitution* of categories within an existing set (e.g., applied, for pure; more, for less specialized).
- c. The strength of the classification may undergo a change with or without reference to location and code value.

### *Framing*

Variations may affect only the internal values of the framing, *or* it may affect the external values, or both values.

Any variation *within* a code that affects the classification will create a conflict, *not* over the general principle of the distribution of power, but over the distribution *within* the general principles.

We shall use the distinctions just made, based on locations and code values *within and between fields*, to give a more formal and concrete presentation of code modalities:

### *Code modalities*

#### a. *Within agencies/fields*

##### 1. *Variation within a dominating modality*

Examples of such variations would be historical variations in dominating *academic* curricula and practice in the various levels and departments of the educational system, historical variations in the administrative/management/practices of material production (Bourdieu & Boltanski 1978).

##### 2. *Variations within a dominated modality*

Examples of such variation would be historical variations in curricula and practice for nonelite pupils, shop-floor practices of material production.

##### 3. *Opposition within a dominating modality*

Examples of such opposition would be orthodox-heterodox, conservative-progressive practices, with respect to agencies within the field of symbolic control or the field of production – or state agencies.

##### 4. *Opposition between modalities*

A crucial and fundamental opposition here is the opposition between *codes* elaborated and restricted within education and within material production.

#### b. *Between agencies/fields*

##### 1. *Variations in the relation between different agencies*

Framing relations *within* education may be relatively weakened in order to accommodate the requirements for different categories of labor, so as to strengthen the *systematic* or correspondence relation between the output of education and the requirements of work (Bernstein 1977: Ch. 8).

2. The degree of regulation (classification) by agencies of the state, of agencies within the field of symbolic control or material production, or both, may vary. Variation in the strength of this classification regulates the degree of autonomy of the fields with respect to the state.

## CODES, MODALITIES, AND CULTURAL REPRODUCTION

In the process of distinguishing locations of variations and change of elaborated codes we have utilized Bourdieu's concept of field and distinguished three related fields. We would say that code modalities establish and reproduce the practices specific to a field and, again in Bourdieu's terms, create the specificity of a habitus. We have distinguished the field of symbolic control whose ideologies and agencies regulate the means, contexts, and legitimate possibilities of cultural reproduction; the field of production whose ideologies and agencies regulate the social basis for the means, contexts, and possibilities of physical resources; and the field of the state whose various agencies and ideologies define, maintain, vary, and change what counts as legitimate order and the use of legitimate force. The educational system today is a crucial producer and reproducer of discursive resources within the field of symbolic control. What is of interest is the process whereby productions of the educational system, theories, become decontextualized and recontextualized in other fields of practice, including different levels and functions of education. Theories in the natural sciences may alter the forces of production, but code modalities select, vary, or change their social relations. Theories in the social sciences establish an empirical basis for symbolic control, but code modalities regulate their selection, variation, and change. The issue is more complex. The positioning of theories within the intellectual field has itself to do with the relations between the principles of that field and the fields of specialized practice, especially that of the state. It is important to understand the social principles regulating the recontextualizing of theories in the fields of practice. This requires study of both recontextualizing agencies *and* agents (see Appendix 6). In order to understand how it is that theories become dominating, we need to understand dominating code modalities.

### CONCLUSION

We have been concerned in this paper with the following:

1. To systematize developments that have been adumbrated in previous papers.
2. To create a model capable of generating class-regulated modalities of elaborated codes.
3. To show how the model may be used to write specific codes regulating agencies of cultural reproduction or agencies of production.
4. To show the specific principles regulating modes of transmission and acquisition.
5. To enable the possibilities of diachronic and synchronic comparison.

Our primary distinction is between *power* and *control*. At the most abstract level we have argued that power constitutes relations "between," and control constitutes relations "within"; that power constitutes the principle of the relations between categories, and control constitutes the principle of the realization

of these relations. From this perspective, codes are transformations into specific semiotic principles/grammars of the relations and realizations of categories where category relations represent the paradigmatic, and realizations represent the syntagmatic. Class codes and their modalities are specific semiotic grammars that regulate the acquisition, reproduction, and legitimation of fundamental rules of exclusion, inclusion, and appropriation by which and through which subjects are selectively created, positioned, and oppositioned. These rules, while having their origin in the social division of labor and its social relations of material production, do *not* necessarily have the conditions of their cultural reproduction located in such a division and relations.

There are today, under conditions of advanced capitalism, many different sites of unequal relations between social groups, gender, ethnicity, religion, region, each having its own particular context of reproduction, generating in the language of this paper its specific "voice message." This paper has concentrated on the development of a model for understanding the process whereby what is regarded as a basic classification (class relations) is transmitted and acquired by codes that differentially, invidiously, and oppositionally position subjects with respect to both discursive and physical resources. Whether gender, ethnic, or religious categories (or any combination) are considered, it is held that these, today, speak through class-regulated modes, and it is the manner of the cultural reproduction of the latter that has been the concern of this paper. We would emphasize that despite the abstract language of the model we have proposed, it is not the intention to create a representation of a process ruled by some determination which inexorably fulfills some inner law. On the contrary, variation, opposition, and change inhere in the possibilities of code.

NOTES

\*One of a series of invited papers commemorating a decade of *Language in Society*.

1. This paper follows closely the analyses developed in Part II of *Class, codes, and control, vol. III*, particularly Chapter 8, "Aspects of the Relation between Education and Production." Indeed this paper is a reordering, development, and refinement of a model presented in Note "c" and a further elaboration of Note "a" to that paper. I am very indebted to seminars held in a number of universities for constructive criticism and especially so to the University of Lund (Pedagogical Institute) and New York University (Department of Sociology). I am very grateful to students of the Department of the Sociology of Education, University of London Institute of Education, for lively discussion and debate.

2. "Ground rule" was first used in *Postscript: A brief account of the theory of Codes* in "Social Relationships and Language," Block 3 of the Educational Studies Second Level Course, Language and Learning, The Open University, 1973. Performance rules were distinguished from ground rules in the Foreword to Adlam et al., *Code in context* (1977).

3. Orientations to meaning may be glossed as privileged/privileging referential relations.

4. This formulation of the general definition of code was developed by Antonella Castelnovo, Ph.D., student of the Department of the Sociology of Education, University of London Institute of Education.

5. This formulation follows closely earlier formulations (Bernstein 1971: Introduction) in terms of context dependent and context independent. The latter is independent clearly not in any absolute but in a relative sense.

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6. It is important to make a distinction between the *location* of these orientations and their *origins*. While historically we can locate orientations in different positions of the mode of production, these orientations may not originate in this mode. In nonliterate small-scale societies with a simple division of labor (called "primitive" by nineteenth century anthropologists) elaborate orientations are found less in the social relations of material production but more in the *religious cosmologies*. This is not to say that these religious cosmologies have no relation to a material base; indeed, they often legitimated the categories and social relations of material production. Similarly, restricted orientations are likely to be found in relations of intimacy and close proximity. Elaborated orientations (where there is an indirect relation to a specific material base) are, however, always subject to strong regulation and surveillance; for these orientations have the potential of creating alternative realities, possibilities, and practices. Elaborated orientations are potentially dangerous, and those acquiring them have to be made safe.
7. Historically, the institutionalizing of, access to, and distribution of elaborated codes were regulated by the Church's control of formal education (see Durkheim 1977 [1938], original title, *Evolution of pedagogy in France*). We do not wish to transpose the technical term "mode," as in the concept "mode of production," to education. However, we wish to distinguish between the various possibilities of a given elaborated code institutionalized as a dominant code in education. Modality refers to the specific values of a given elaborated code (its classification and framing values). See later discussion.
8. There is a problem in making a distinction between physical and discursive resources. For it implies that the latter is qualitatively different from the former. We do not take this view. On the contrary, we would hold that discursive resources/practices are a condition for and are constituted in physical resources. We are using these terms simply as low-level descriptions.
9. Silverman and Torode, in their impressive book *The material word*, first drew my attention to the possibilities of "voice." I have, however, with apologies put the concept to a rather different use.
10. From now on we shall use "social division of labor" to refer to both production and agencies of cultural reproduction, in particular the agencies of education and the family.

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## APPENDIX I

### CODE, COMPETENCE, AND DIALECT

Although we have distinguished between the above concepts (Bernstein 1971), it is unfortunately necessary to repeat the basis of the distinctions.

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*Code and competence.* Theories that operate with a concept of competence (linguistic or cognitive) are theories in which the conditions for acquisition of the given competence require some innate facility *together* with interaction with a culturally *nonspecific* other who also possesses the competency. In other words, the crucial communication necessary for the acquisition of the competence is with a culturally nonspecific other. Of course, no other who possesses a given competence can be culturally nonspecific. There is no way of being a cultural subject without being culturally specific. Be that as it may, and it inevitably is, theories of competence necessarily abstract the non-culturally specific from the culturally specific. Code is transmitted and acquired in interactions that are *culturally specific*. Codes therefore presuppose *specialized* others. It is crucial to distinguish between theories that differ in the location of their problematic. The concept code presupposes competencies (linguistic/cognitive) that all acquire and share; therefore it is not possible to discuss code with reference to cognitive/linguistic deficiencies located at the level of competence. Code refers to a specific cultural regulation of the realization of commonly shared competencies. Code refers to specific semiotic grammars regulated by specialized distributions of power and principles of control. Such grammars will have, among other realizations, specific linguistic realizations.

*Code and dialect.* The term "dialect" refers to a variety of language that can be marked off from other varieties by phonological, syntactic, morphological, lexical features. The term is descriptive. It should give the demarcation rules for a specialized usage of a language and the special rules of its internal orderings. In the same way that every language carries the same potential for generating codes as defined in this thesis, language varieties, dialects, have the same potential. There is no reason to believe that in our terms any language variety can generate only one code. It is therefore highly misleading and inaccurate to equate a standard variety with an elaborated code and a nonstandard variety with a restricted code, even though there may well be a class distribution of language varieties. Codes and dialects belong to different theoretical discourses, to different theories, and address fundamentally different problematics.


APPENDIX 2

MODALITY OF CULTURE AND GENDER

Perhaps we can give an example of modality of culture and what we mean by general features of the cultural subject through a consideration of gender relations. Cultural subjects are generated by a distinct and highly specialized reproductive device. This device consists of reproducers (R) and reproduced (r). Reproducers may consist of a large set of categories (kinship) or a very small set. Three distinctive features of this device are culturally nonspecific:

1. The communicative principle, language, consists of an arbitrary finite rule system capable of generating "N" number of other rule systems.
2. Communication principles between similars are different from communication principles between dissimilars as a consequence of the recognition of similarity and difference.
3. Sex markers are read off, usually and normally with the birth of "r" by "R."

If we now apply the above to the relations between "R" and "r" we obtain the following model shown in Figure 8:



Categories

- Where M refers to Reproducer Male
- Where m refers to reproduced male
- Where F refers to Reproducer Female
- Where f refers to reproduced female

Communication

- Where s refers to communication between similars
- Where d refers to communication between dissimilars

FIGURE 8.

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Communication principles between RM and rm are different from communicative principles between Rm and rf, and similarly from RF and rm and RF and rf. Gender marking by communication is a feature intrinsic to the reproductive device. However – and it is a crucial however – the form the markings take, that is, *their realizations, are always culturally specific*. In our model we have given ‘‘R’’ as a male and a female and ‘‘r’’ as a male and a female, but the same argument would hold if we limited the model to ‘‘R’’ Male and ‘‘r’’ male or ‘‘R’’ Female or ‘‘r’’ female. It is also not necessary for ‘‘R’’ to be biologically responsible for ‘‘r.’’

### APPENDIX 3

#### CLASSIFICATION AND FRAMING OF THE CODES OF PRODUCTION

We can use the concepts of classification and framing to write the codes for the production of physical resources. We can consider the social relationships constituted by the mode of production in terms of classification and framing. We can ask what are the relationships between the various categories of production, that is, the relationships between the various agents: unskilled laborers, technologists, managers, administrators, and so forth. The relationships between these categories can be strongly or weakly classified. If the former, then the relationships are stable and sharply distinguished, the functions well insulated from each other, and the agents not interchangeable. If the latter, then the relationships between agents are less sharply distinguished, there is reduced insulation between functions, and agents are more interchangeable between categories. In the same way, we can consider the framing of the mode of production. This refers to the regulation on the realization of the categories, that is, to the form of communication constituted by the category system of the mode of production. If the primary unit of production is a repetitive, individually performed, strongly paced, explicitly sequenced, divisive act, we can say that this is strong framing. If the primary unit of production is relatively cooperative, group based, where there is opportunity to vary the conditions and perhaps sequencing and pacing, where the outcome is less a fraction of the total object of production but bears a more direct relation to it, we can say that this represents weak framing.

We shall consider the basic unit of production, the basic social relations of production, the level of the shop floor. We have distinguished between the form of the productive act – what is made, what a worker produces – and the form of the relation between agents of production (workers). We distinguish between what is made and the relationships between those who are involved in making it. We call what is made, what is produced – that is, the social act of production – a realization of an agent. We examine the act in terms of the degree of fragmentation or divisiveness it entails. The degree of fragmentation or divisiveness refers to the relationship between the act and the final product. The more fragmented or divisive the act(s), the less like the final product is its (their) realization. The more integrated the act, the more like the final product is its realization, that is, its consequence. The act is a socially regulated realization of a category (agent). The act of production is a communicative consequence of an agent. We can therefore consider the regulation of the act in terms of framing. The more fragmented or divisive the act, the stronger the framing; the less fragmented or divisive, the weaker the framing.

The form of the social relationship between agents of the basic unit of production can be referred to the concept classification, because here we are considering the principle of the relationships between the categories (agents) of the social division of labor. The relationships between agents have two features, horizontal and vertical. The horizontal feature refers to the relationship between agents who share membership of a common category (e.g., unskilled, skilled, supervisory, managerial). The vertical feature refers to the relationship between agents who are members of different categories. The vertical feature may, but not necessarily always, create a hierarchical ordering of the relationships between the categories. We can generate the following relationships between the primary agents of production in terms of the principle of their classification:

*Very strong classification* (++C)

The primary act of the result of an isolated agent.

The unit is an isolated agent.

*Strong classification* (+C)



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The primary act is the result of related agents within a category (e.g., a group of workers who are members of a common category).

The unit is a group.

*Less strong classification (C)*

The primary act is the result of related agents between adjacent categories.

The unit is a team of workers: skilled, semiskilled, variously skilled.

*Weak classification (-C)*

The primary act is the result of integrated agents across categories.

The unit entails an integration of workers of various skills and levels of supervision/management in policy and practice of production.

Now if we put together the nature of the primary act in terms of its framing (divisive/integrated) and the form of the relation between agents in terms of the principle of their classification (isolated/integrated), we can obtain at least five forms of regulation of the basic unit of production:

### *Codes of production*

- |  |        |
|--|--------|
| 1. Isolated agents; divisive act.                              | ++C++F |
| 2. Related agents within a category; divisive act.             | +C +F  |
| 3. Related agents between adjacent categories; integrated act. | C -F   |
| 4. Integrated agents across categories; divisive act.          | -C +F  |
| 5. Integrated agents across categories; integrated act.        | -C -F  |

We can now identify four forms of ideological control over the mode of production in class societies.

We can identify a historical process in the development of these production codes, from entrepreneurial to corporate capitalism, from code 1 to code 3. We would argue that codes 4 and 5 would constitute a qualitative change in the production code were they to be fully implemented and generalized throughout the system of production. A necessary condition for this would be a change in the dominant cultural category - that is, a change in class structure.

We could link theories of control, which both legitimize and provide a scientific basis for exploitation of production, to the codes:

1. We might connect Taylorism with (1)
2. We might connect the Human Relation School with (2)
3. We might connect the Socio-Technical System theory with (3)
- 4/5. We might connect industrial democracy as a worker-based theory in opposition to the others.

As we move from (1) to (5) there is an important qualitative change occurring in the code value regulating the primary unit of production. Codes (1), (2), and (3) are variations of a restricted code, the capitalist relation of production, whereas codes (4) and (5) are variations of an elaborated code, realizing collective relations of production.

## APPENDIX 4

### CLASS ASSUMPTION OF PEDAGOGIC CODES

We shall give here a brief analysis of the class assumptions of a dominating modality of an elaborated code with strong classification and strong framing values (+C/+F). Such a code is transmitted through what we have called a visible pedagogy, whereas where there is a major weakening of classification and framing (-C/~F) the code is transmitted through what we have called an Invisible Pedagogy (see Bernstein 1977: Ch. 6).

We shall here be concerned with modes of transmission at the level of the primary/secondary school. The secondary school in our terms may well contain a dominating code in which the values of C and F are strong and dominated codes where the values are weaker.

We distinguish between modes of transmission/acquisition in terms of rules regulating hierarchy, rules regulating sequence and pacing, and rules regulating criteria:

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1. *Hierarchical rules*
  - a. *Explicit*. Where such rules are explicit, the power basis of the social relation is undisguised and visible.
  - b. *Implicit*. Where such rules are implicit, the power basis of the social relation is masked, hidden, obscured by strategies of communication.
2. *Sequential rules and pacing*
  - a. *Explicit*. Where such rules are explicit, the principles and signs of the progression of the transmission are explicit and made public. The educand has some awareness of his or her future state of expected legitimate consciousness and practice.
  - b. *Implicit*. Where such rules are implicit, the principles and signs of the progression are known only to the transmitter. The educand can have no knowledge (at least for some period of time) of the principles of his or her progression.

(*Pacing* refers to the rate of expected acquisition of the sequencing rules.)
3. *Criteria/rules*
  - a. *Explicit*. Where rules are explicit, criteria to be transmitted are explicit and specific.
  - b. *Implicit*. Where rules are implicit, criteria to be transmitted are implicit, multiple, and diffuse.

Visible pedagogies can be defined as transmissions regulated by explicit hierarchy, explicit sequencing rules, strong pacing, and explicit criteria. There are a variety of such pedagogies. We can distinguish two main forms with respect to their autonomy of, or dependency upon, recruitment, selection, training for relations of production.

We will now give a *brief* analysis of the class assumptions and consequences of visible pedagogies at the school level (primary/secondary). Visible pedagogies are forms of transmission/acquisition of elaborated codes with values of +C +F:

1. *Context of reproduction* (ideal)
  - a. A group homogeneous with respect to the following attributes: age, sex, ability.
  - b. The act of acquisition will be solitary, privatized, and competitive.
2. *Progression*
  - a. It is crucial to read early in order to acquire the written code, for beyond the book is the textbook, which is the crucial pedagogical medium and social relation.
  - b. Strong pacing regulates acquisition of sequencing rules; failures to acquire sequencing rules are difficult to redeem. Usually visible pedagogies have to create a vast, often inadequate repair system for those who cannot meet the sequencing rules.
  - c. The sequencing rules regulate the temporal ordering of the content such that initial stages are concerned with the concrete and the learning of rote operations and relationships, and later stages are concerned with the abstract and the learning of principles. Thus visible pedagogies separate "concrete" and "abstract" in time, which becomes the basis for the separation (strong classification) of manual and mental labor. Visible pedagogies create and distribute different forms of consciousness.

*Criteria*. The pedagogical intention is to show the child what is *missing* in his or her product; as a consequence, the criteria are explicit and specific. The latter create the possibility of "objective" assessment and measurement and so facilitate the ideology of pedagogic neutrality.

*Sites of reproduction*:

- a. Visible pedagogies usually require two sites of acquisition: the school and the home. Two sites are possible because the medium of the textbook enables their transfer. Not all homes can operate as second sites, and inasmuch as this does not occur, failure is highly likely.
- b. The relation between the two sites is regulated by strong framing, that is, the school is selective of communications, practices, events, and objects, which may pass from the home into the pedagogical context.

*Communication*. Communication between transmitters and acquirers is specially constituted by the strong classification and strong framing (especially with respect to sequencing rules and pacing). Time is scarce, and discourses are strongly bounded. These affect the rules regulating spoken and written texts, question and answer format, their contexts and social relations.

*Economics*. Although the cost of the building is higher for a visible than an invisible pedagogy, the cost of the transmission is relatively low. The space occupied by the learner is relatively small; the

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spacing is such that often as much time must be spent in the home as in the school. The hidden costs of visible pedagogies are the attributes of the home, physical, discursive, and interactional, which enable children to manage or fail to manage the class assumptions of the *context* and *sites of reproduction, progression, and communication*.

Modes of transmission ideologically create and position subjects.

## APPENDIX 5

### CODE VALUES AND EXPERIMENTAL CONTEXTS

The model we have developed may be used to generate relations between agencies and relationships within agencies whether these be at so-called "macro" or "micro" levels. The latter would refer to what we have called the communicative context. This context is regulated by framing values on the basis of a given classificatory value. The classificatory principle is often invisibly present in the sense that it is presupposed. If we examine the communicative context established in the food experiment we discussed in the main text, from the perspective of our model we may be able to suggest an explanation of the differences between the middle class and the lower working class children. We shall begin by indicating the apparent opposition between the implicit dominant code values constituting the communicative context and the spoken text or apparently explicit code values. The implicit dominant code values in our terms would be  $\frac{E}{+C/+F^{+v}}$ , which we will now elaborate:

#### *Classification*

##### *Recognition rule*

- i. This context is a subcontext of a specialized context; school (+C).
- ii. This subcontext is specialized adult, instructional evaluative, *elaborate orientation*.

#### *Framing*

##### *Realization rule*

- i. Select interactional practice and text in accordance with recognition rule; (+F).
- ii. Create specialized text; exhaustive principle, no narrative, no isolated situational exemplars or lists.

There are, of course, many other features of the communicative context regulated by framing values, but on the whole these resulted in practices shared by the children (sex, class).

However, when we look at the spoken text, the code values are in apparent opposition. The instructions to elicit groupings and principles were of the order -C/-F: "Group the pictures any way you want" (-C), with no indication of the spoken text required (-F). The middle class children, in the *first* request to group, ignored the -C/-F instruction and transposed it into its opposite +C/+F, whereas the lower working class children read the instruction at its surface value and read it as the dominant code value. There can be little doubt that the lower working class children were aware of the classifying principles used by the middle class children, and indeed, toward the end of the experiment, some lower working class children used these principles as dominating principles. The difference between the children is therefore not a difference in cognitive facility, but a difference in the recognition and realization rules used by the children to read the context and to create their texts - a code difference (see also Adlam, Turner, & Lineker 1977: Foreword).

It is possible from this analysis to make explicit a variety of sources of difference in children's contextual practices:

1. Inappropriate recognition rules, therefore inappropriate realization rules.
2. Appropriate recognition rules but inadequacy of realization rules either in creating the specific text or in the social relations of the performance, or both.

We can give other examples of the selective effect of the formal setting upon the recognition and realization rules used by seven-year-old children from middle class and lower working class family backgrounds matched for "intelligence" (I.Q.) (see Adlam, Turner, & Lineker 1977: Chapters 2, 3, 4).

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Children were given reproductions about the size of a postcard of a Belgian naive painter, Trotin, and asked to talk about the cards. The probe(s) was:

“What is going on in the picture?”

“What are the people doing?”

“What is the picture all about?” (Last probe after the children had finished talking about the card.)

Such probe(s) could be understood as a request for (a) narrative or, (b) a description of persons, objects, events, relationships depicted in the card, i.e., a verbal demography.

We found that in general the focus of the child's speech was more a function of the child's class background than the child's "I.Q." The middle class child, irrespective of gender, produced a text similar to, or approximating (b) whereas the lower working class child produced a text *either* oriented to (b), or although oriented to (a), imbedded in the context in the sense that it was less likely to be understood without the original picture card. Other researchers or critics have interpreted this finding as indicating only that the lower working class children were aware that both the researcher and the researched were looking at the picture card, and as a consequence, there was no need to make verbally explicit a context which was shared. This "explanation" is both ad hoc and selective as it signally fails to explain:

1. Why the middle class children produced little narrative. (Only 6 out of a total of 64 children did so.)
2. Why the lower working class produced narrative.
3. Why it was the girls in the lower working class who were mainly responsible for narrative texts.
4. Why the lower working class children's speech orientation was similar in *other* situations presented to the child in which the presumption of a shared perspective between researcher and researched could not be postulated. (Instructional and Control situations.)

Another situation offered to the children in the same interview required them to explain the rules of a game (Hide-and-Seek) to a child who did not know how to play, after first indicating to the researcher knowledge of the rules. We again found that social class family background was more important than the child's "I.Q." in accounting for the orientation of the child's speech and referential relations. In general (but not uniformly), middle class children created a relatively context-independent text, in the sense that the text was not imbedded in a local context/practice. The text created by the lower working class children was generally (but not uniformly) relatively context-dependent *compared* with the text of the middle class children in that it was more imbedded in a local context/practice and assumed knowledge of that context/practice. It does not necessarily follow that the middle class child's text was a more effective instruction. Indeed, there may well be grounds to believe otherwise.

The children were given a third situation based upon one created for their mothers two years earlier. The mothers were given six hypothetical situations in which their own child had done something wrong and they were asked what they would do or say. These same situations were presented to the children as if they (the children) were the mothers and were faced with *their* child who had done something wrong. In general (independent of "I.Q."), there were marked differences in the focus of the control used by the children in terms of their family class background. While all the children tended to give imperative forms of control and forms which announced simple rules, the middle class children used these forms less and gave forms which allowed for more options and contingencies.

Basically, the opening question to the children in all the above situations had the same general form as the opening question in the "food" inquiry referred to earlier. It did not stipulate any particular relation between categories of referential relation nor did the question explicitly direct the children to realize a *particular* text. We can account for the texts by the following recognition and realization rules.

### *Middle class children: Recognition rule*

In all three situations (Trocin picture card, Hide-and-Seek, and mother-child control) the same rule would hold.

- i. This context is a subcontext of a specialized context; school.
- ii. The subcontext is specialized adult, instructional, evaluative; *elaborated orientation*.

Thus the *modal* orientation of the middle class children across the three contexts was elaborated whereas the modal orientation of the lower working class children was restricted, which does not mean that there was *no* variation. (Indeed, lower working class *girls* produced more variation than lower working class boys.)

### 1. Trotin picture card text

#### *Middle class children: Realization rules*

i. Use criteria of True/False. Given this rule there could be *no* narrative and *very few* middle class children gave any narrative. Further, given the True/False criteria, there would be a need to use modals (might be, could be) and other forms indicating uncertainty. More middle class children used such forms.

ii. Make all referential relations explicit and specific. The rules (i) and (ii) are sufficient to generate the structure of the modal middle class text.

#### *Lower working class children: Recognition rule*

Relative to the middle class children, the lower working class children did not mark the context with the same speciality, therefore their modal orientation across the three contexts was restricted. In other words, the context was for the middle class child *relative* to the lower working class child *strongly classified* (+C) whereas for the lower working class child relative to the middle class child it was weakly classified (-C).

#### *Lower working class children: Realization rule*

Given that the *context was weakly classified* we could expect a range of texts all selected from informal everyday practices and modes.

- i. Narrative
- ii. Implicit referential relations

### 2. Hide-and-Seek text

#### *Middle class children: Realization rules*

- i. Make all sequencing rules, reference sets, and criteria explicit and specific.

#### *Lower working class children: Realization rule*

- i. Similar to Trotin realization rule.

In both the Trotin and the Hide-and-Seek situations the middle class children transformed an open question generated by apparent -C -F rules to +C +F. The lower working class children carried out this transformation significantly less frequently.

### 3. Mother-child control

Here we have a situation very different from the previous two situations. The child is taking on the role of the mother and what we expect here are differences in recognition rules and realization rules, which are less a function of the *particular formal interview setting* but more a function of the recognition and realization rules used by the child's major controller in the family. Indeed we know this to be the case (see J. Cook-Gumperz 1973).

Middle class children's recognition and realization rules were of the form +C -F relative to the lower working class children's +C +F. The difference between the children at seven years of age showed in the strength of the framing, i.e., middle class children accorded more options or contingencies to the controlled than did the lower working class children.

We have extended our analysis to show how classification and framing values act selectively on recognition and realization rules which we *infer* are used by middle class and lower working class children in the production of texts in a formal interview setting *and* in the *reproduction* of familial texts (of control) in that setting.

## APPENDIX 6

### PRIMARY, RECONTEXTUALIZING, AND SECONDARY CONTEXTS

We shall here make rather more explicit the importance of the recontextualizing field, and of its agents, in the selective movement of texts from the intellectual field created by the educational system, to that system's fields of reproduction.

## CODES, MODALITIES, AND CULTURAL REPRODUCTION

*Primary context: Production of discourse.* We shall distinguish three crucial interdependent contexts of educational discourse, practice, and organization. The first of these we shall call the *primary* context. The process whereby a text is developed and positioned in this context we shall call primary contextualization. The latter refers to the process whereby new ideas are selectively created, modified, and changed and where specialized discourses are developed, modified, or changed. This context creates, appropriating Bourdieu, the "intellectual field" of the educational system. This field and its history are created by the positions, relations, and practices arising out of the *production* rather than the reproduction of educational discourse and its practices. Its texts, today, are dependent partly, *but by no means wholly*, on the circulation of private and state public funds to research groups and individuals.

*Secondary context: Reproduction of discourse.* This context, its various levels, agencies, positions, and practices, refers to the selective *reproduction* of educational discourse. We shall distinguish four levels: tertiary, secondary, primary, and pre-school. Within each level there may be some degree of specialization of agencies. We shall call these levels and their interrelations, together with any specialization of agencies within a level, the secondary context of the reproduction of discourse. This context structures the *field of reproduction*. We can ask here questions referring to the classificatory and framing principles regulating the relations between and within levels and regulating the circulation and location of codes and their modalities (Bernstein 1977: 30-32).

*Recontextualizing context: Relocation of discourse.* From these two fundamental contexts and the fields they structure we shall distinguish a third context which structures a field or subset of fields, whose positions, agents, and practices are concerned with the movements of texts/practices from the primary context of discursive production to the secondary context of discursive reproduction. The function of the position, agents, and practices within this field and its subsets, is to regulate the circulation of texts between the primary and secondary contexts. Accordingly, we shall call the field and the subset structured by this context the *recontextualizing field*.

The *recontextualizing context* will entail a number of fields:

1. It will include specialized departments and sub-agencies (School Council) of the state and local educational authorities together with their research and system of inspectors.
2. It will include university and polytechnic departments of education, and colleges of education together with their research.
3. It will include specialized media of education, weeklies, journals, etc., and publishing houses together with their readers and advisors.
4. It may extend to fields *not* specialized in educational discourse and its practices but which are able to exert influence both on the state and its various arrangements *and/or* upon special sites, agents, and practices within education.

When a text is appropriated by recontextualizing agents, operating in positions of this field, the text usually undergoes a transformation prior to its relocation. The form of this transformation is regulated by a *principle of decontextualizing*. This process refers to the change in the text as it is first *delocated* and then *relocated*. This process ensures that the text is no longer the same text:

1. The text has changed its position in relation to other texts, practices, and positions.
2. The text itself has been modified by selection, simplification, condensation, and elaboration.
3. The text has been repositioned and refocused.

The decontextualizing principle regulates the new ideological positioning of the text in its process of relocation in one or more of the levels of the field of reproduction. Once in that field, the text undergoes a *further* transformation or repositioning as it becomes active in the pedagogic process within an agency within a level. It is crucial to distinguish between, and analyze, the relations between the two transformations (at least) of a text. The first is the transformation of the text within the *recontextualizing field*, and the second is the transformation of the *transformed* text in the pedagogic process as it becomes active in the process of the reproduction of acquirers. *It is the recontextualizing field which generates the positions and oppositions of pedagogic theory, research, and practice.* It is a matter of some importance to analyze the role of departments of the state in the relations and movements within and between the various contexts and their structuring fields.