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The state and citizenship education in England: a curriculum for subjects or citizens?

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This paper evaluates the extent to which the implementation and assessment of the new citizenship curriculum in England treats learners as citizens or subjects by evaluating whether the interests of state or citizen predominate. Philosophical, contextual, and practical perspectives on citizenship education are drawn upon to evaluate mechanisms which mediate state power in young citizens' lives. Current methods of delivering and assessing the citizenship curriculum in schools are challenged and the ideology underpinning citizenship education, as conceptualized in official discourse, is questioned. The view is advanced that citizenship cannot be reduced to what learners know (the informed citizen) or do (the active citizen) as it cannot be divorced from who they are. This paper focuses on citizenship education in the context of English liberal democracy but has a wide application as it addresses issues relevant to the state education of citizens elsewhere.

Keywords: citizenship; citizenship education; curriculum; moral values.

The state and citizenship education in England

The aim of citizenship education in England is to achieve nothing less than a 'change in the political culture' of the country where people 'think of themselves as active citizens' and become 'confident in finding new forms of involvement and acting among themselves' (Qualifications and Curriculum Authority [QCA] 1998: 7–8). If such aims seem far-reaching it should be remembered that, unlike France or the USA, England is not a republic (although citizenship itself might be considered a republican concept), has no written constitution or bill of rights, and is still a constitutional monarchy. Indeed, Professor Sir Bernard Crick (2000: 117), the architect of the new citizenship curriculum, has claimed that 'a liberal education' should 'change our collective mentality from being subjects of the Crown to being both good and active citizens'. This essay considers the philosophical background to, context of, and progress with such a national educational project.

It has been argued by Lister (1998: 254) that citizenship, apart from in the sense of holding a passport, is not a widely understood concept in England which has 'no authoritative and official code to which citizenship

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might be related in terms of rights and responsibilities'. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the European Constitution has not been ratified by a referendum in the UK, although one was scheduled to take place in 2006. Yet, even in countries which do have written constitutions 'we find that some citizenship education, far from seeking to encourage active citizenship, too often takes refuge in the safe haven of learning the articles of the constitutions, federal and state' (Crick 2000: 160). Certainly, the design and implementation of a citizenship curriculum in the English context can inform citizenship education in other nations—especially if they have an historic appreciation of liberty and justice, are characterized by diversity, and experience levels of democratic participation among their younger citizens that give some cause for concern.

The mandatory citizenship curriculum in England does not aim only to foster *skills* and transfer *knowledge* (in relation to such practices as voting for instance), it is designed to influence citizens' *values and actions*. If the beliefs, values, and activities of some citizens (school children) are to be influenced by other citizens (who happen to be employed by the state as teachers) this raises a number of legitimate questions. What happens when the ways in which children are taught to live and exercise their citizenship at school runs counter to the ways in which parents and communities teach their children to live? What role should the state have in inculcating certain commitments, beliefs, and values if these differ from those of the child's family? Does the state have the moral right to be involved in the lives of its citizens in such a way? Beck (1998: 74) reminds us that some theorists in the US believe the limited political consensus can be undermined by the wrong sort of civic education which questions parents' values because 'these kinds of education run the risk of alienating certain religiously conservative communities who do not share the modernist, secular assumptions of the majority of their fellow citizens'.

It is important to consider the nature of the citizenship education a liberal state has the right to impose on children from diverse communities. The extent to which state-sponsored values are promoted might indicate the degree to which students are respected as citizens or treated as subjects. It is important to be realistic, however, and Bloom (1987: 26) has plausibly asserted that a democracy, whether or not it admits it, 'wants and needs to produce men and women who have the tastes, knowledge, and character supportive of a democratic regime'; in other words, it seeks to perpetuate itself by fostering 'citizens who are in accord with its fundamental principle'. Wolterstorff *et al.* (2002: 213) argues that while some politicians believe that children 'must be shaped and formed for the welfare of the entire citizenry' and must 'internalize those rules and convictions that will benefit society'. He goes on to contend that such assumptions can be challenged on the basis that when 'officers of the state have the authority to determine *which* rules and convictions those are' we are moving dangerously close to 'all the ideologically totalitarian regimes with which our world sadly provides us so many examples'. With this in mind, Wolterstorff *et al.* (2002: 212) does not endorse the view that 'the state has the primary right to determine the character of a child's education' nor that 'parents have only a right that is secondary to and derived from that of the state'. Indeed, it has been

recognized by Halstead (1995: 264) that many parents do 'not want parity of treatment with other groups but the freedom to bring up their own children in line with their own religious commitments'. To such parents the claim made in *Jude the Obscure* (Hardy 1957: 283) that 'All the little ones of our time are collectively the children of us adults of the time, and entitled to our general care' is deeply offensive.

If learners are to be respected as citizens rather than treated as subjects they should be encouraged to critique the beliefs promoted by, and the practices associated with, the new citizenship curriculum they are now required by law to study (which is an ideological intervention in their lives). Crick (2000: 120) is quite explicit about the values underpinning the new curriculum and states that the 'philosophy behind the Report' (produced by his Advisory Group in 1998) is 'what scholars call civic republicanism, and also pluralism'. Civic republicanism regards participation in public affairs as the duty of citizens (as it was in ancient Rome) because this is considered to be the way in which liberty is preserved. As a political perspective, however, civic republicanism does not necessarily invite a challenge to inequality or guarantee justice; citizens should appreciate that democratic governments may 'not have much regard for the wishes of the less influential' (Wringe 1992: 31). Simply thinking of oneself as an 'active citizen' has significant moral limitations and not all groups will endorse pluralism.

Education *for* democratic citizenship is necessarily tied to the values of a specific form of government and 'a democratic society is one in which certain moral and interpersonal values prevail' (Wringe 1992: 32). It is, therefore, vital for young citizens to compare the values underpinning the citizenship curriculum they follow at school with the values they acquire in their communities and homes (Biesta and Lawy 2006). Many from conservative faith communities will not share the civic republican emphasis on political activity (and may regard this as 'secular' or 'worldly' involvement), preferring to direct their energies elsewhere. For instance, it has been asserted by Van Geest (2004: 100, 102) that 'nothing in Scripture directly calls us to be politically active citizens' and the suggestion has been made that, given children's aptitudes and opportunities, 'citizenship responsibilities might be best expressed in areas of social and community service'. Others, such as William Wilberforce (see Vaughan 2002), are well known for expressing faith-based service in political activity.

The context for the mandatory teaching of citizenship is one of cultural and religious diversity; Sachs (2005) has pointed out that England is home to 'a series of sub-cultures each of which has its own priorities, its own agenda' and has reminded us that important thinkers are currently asking 'what is the common good in a society where there are no shared values, where there is no moral consensus?'—and it can even be difficult to talk about national identity given the presence of such 'strong religious and ethnic sub-cultures'. Given this context, potential problems can develop for minority groups when citizenship is closely tied to certain forms of culture (Halstead 2006), and some Muslims, for instance, are campaigning for their primary identity 'to be defined in religious terms rather than in terms of their citizenship or their place of origin' (Halstead and Pike 2006: 9).

The term 'citizenship' is increasingly being employed to signify allegiances which transcend (or do not extend to) the geographical or political boundaries of the nation-state. While some Muslims' primary loyalty may be to the umma (that is, the world-wide community of Islam), it should be pointed out that dual allegiance is not restricted to minority ethnic groups. Many practising Christians consider themselves to be citizens first and foremost of God's kingdom rather than of a temporal, political entity and have a different world-view to that espoused by their secular compatriots. There are, however, particular problems when proposed citizenship tests have been seen as a strategy to impose the values of the West on Muslims and it has been provocatively argued by Winiecki (2002: 5–6) that the West is a threat 'purely by its power of attraction' given that 'there is not one liberal democracy in the Muslim world'. That some British Muslims, educated in state schools in England, took up arms against their country's forces in Iraq or were responsible for the London bombings of 2005 has prompted further reflection about the sort of education the state should provide for its citizens. Some minority groups have certainly reported feelings of oppression in the debates about the failings of multiculturalism.

Deciding morality by majority vote can be especially problematic for some groups and yet, according to Halstead and Lewicka (1998: 54) 'arguments drawn from liberal educational theory require an acceptance of the view that the moral acceptability of something is dependent solely on whether it does not conflict with democratic principles'. While 'democracy is seen by liberals as the most rational safeguard against tyranny and the best way of guaranteeing the equal right of citizens to determine for themselves what is in their own best interests' (Halstead and Pike 2006: 45), this form of government undoubtedly represents beliefs about ways of living that will not be endorsed or subscribed to by all citizens. If 'the success and stability of liberal politics depends on people's private beliefs and commitments becoming importantly liberalized' (Macedo 1990: 54) and the introduction of citizenship in schools plays a part in such liberalization, we should consider what this teaches children from faith communities about the values of the liberal democracy they live in.

The extent to which education for democratic citizenship can be considered, in some sense, 'Western', or even 'Christian', is an issue that is rarely tackled in a context characterized by ethnic and religious diversity. Despite their failings, 'the democracies of the modern world' have, by and large, remained committed 'to a fundamentally Christian belief in human moral equality' (Skidelsky 2005: 5). It is on this basis that the professor of politics and the cleaner of his office both have one vote; we do not give the professor 10 votes to reflect his superior knowledge. Indeed, it has been suggested by Thompson (2004: 171) that there is 'an almost umbilical link to Christian ways of thinking' today in England and, according to Freathy (2005: 267–268):

> for a considerable proportion of English history and for a considerable proportion of the population, consideration of social and moral responsibilities and community involvement would have been inconceivable without reference to Christian beliefs and ethics.

Yet, citizenship appears to be thoroughly secularized in English schools and the 'historiography of citizenship often neglects to provide a detailed analysis of Christian conceptions of citizenship' which are 'frequently treated as archaic precursors to the "real" secular version' (Freathy 2005: 21), or perhaps the plural and multicultural versions.

Haldane (1986: 176) has suggested that 'the notions of freedom, moral equality and social responsibility which feed into Law and Government through concepts of Justice and Democracy, themselves derive both meaning and justification from Christian doctrines' and that 'Christianity gives content and support to the idea that each person is a moral agent and thereby the bearer of responsibilities and entitlements'. Yet the emphasis in citizenship education on helping children to understand their 'entitlements' or 'rights', in particular, has been challenged by teachers (reported by Hudson 2006) as well as by believers (Van Geest 2004: 118) for whom citizenship 'does not begin with inalienable rights but begins with lives of service'. Clearly, the commitment to lives of service can run counter to a society in which the 'ethic of contract becomes more and more the pervasive ethic of society' (Wolterstorff *et al.* 2004: 91); the Good Samaritan was not *legally* obliged to act as he did. Further, although it is generally accepted that 'the notion of democracy is fed from two sources deep in this religious tradition: first, the dignity of man, as possessor of freedom and reason; and second, his propensity for evil, as inheritor of original sin' (Haldane 1986: 176), citizens who are members of faith communities may view 'freedom' and 'reason' rather differently to those who do not belong to such communities.

Philosophically, liberal democracy can be seen to be founded on the tension between the two core liberal values of liberty and equality. Put simply, 'the more freedom people have, the less they end up equal, and vice versa' (Halstead and Pike 2006: 28); the third core liberal value of consistent rationality is, therefore, intended to mediate between freedom and equality and to ensure that important choices and activity ('active' citizenship) are based on logically consistent rational justification. This is, in part, why citizens belonging to some faith communities may express reservations about democracy and prefer to put their faith in a theocratic alternative. An exclusive emphasis on logical reasoning privileges critical thinking and rules out the acceptance of religious doctrine on the basis of authority or revelation. This has important implications for those who believe that the authority of a tradition, or what is regarded as divine revelation (as revealed in a sacred text, for instance), is authoritative for their lives. Believers from a variety of faith groups are likely to concur with C. S. Lewis (1943: 10) that 'an open mind, in questions that are not ultimate, is useful' but having such a mind 'about ultimate foundations' is only 'idiocy' because such questions are rightly matters of faith.

It might appear that diverse views from a range of groups can be accommodated within a democracy where the emphasis has been upon restraining government and limiting its authority to intervene in our lives. But young citizens need to appreciate *why* it is that their country considers it to be the responsibility of a government to protect the liberty of its citizens. Students need to be helped to appreciate that while the freedom and reason of human

beings makes democratic government a possibility, it is our capacity to inflict injustice and cause harm which makes such government a necessary source of restraint. Consequently, educators and policy-makers must be careful not to impose a highly secularized, liberal ideological agenda on those in a democracy who do not endorse the world-view of the majority.

The state of citizenship education in England

We now move from a comparison of 'subjects' and 'citizens' to an evaluation of 'citizenship' as a new school 'subject' to which all children in state schools in England (whether or not they, their parents, or their communities subscribe to the values underpinning it) are required by law to submit themselves. From September 2002, citizenship became a new statutory foundation subject in English secondary schools (with a minimum of 5% of curriculum time allocated to it) and an essential element of the non-statutory framework for PSHE (Personal, Social and Health Education) in primary (elementary) schools. Further, from 2003 schools have been obliged to report on the attainment of 14-year-olds in citizenship. The mandatory teaching and assessment of citizenship was implemented in England (although the general principles are relevant in the other nations which constitute the UK) following the publication of the report by the Advisory Group on Education for Citizenship and the Teaching of Democracy (the AGC) led by Crick (QCA 1998). This report led to a revision of the National Curriculum to explicitly incorporate citizenship for the very first time in England. Legislating the inclusion of citizenship on the curriculum appears to have been relatively straightforward compared to the complex task of implementing and assessing the new subject.

Her Majesty's Chief Inspector (Bell 2005), the head of Ofsted (the Office for Standards in Education which inspects and publishes reports on schools in England), recently concluded that 'citizenship education is the worst taught subject in secondary schools' and observed that schools 'are seldom judged to deliver very good teaching in this subject'. According to a recent report (Ofsted 2005: 3) 'provision is unsatisfactory' in 'one in four schools' and 'pupils' achievement and the quality of teaching compare unfavourably with established subjects'. The implementation of citizenship in schools has evidently been fraught with difficulty, but the problems are not limited to teaching; the assessment of the citizenship curriculum is also proving to be especially problematic. Many schools are still failing to comply with the requirement to assess pupils' progress and only a 'minority of schools have made a good start at this, using assessed tasks'; it is clear that for many schools 'assessment is as yet at an early stage so that they are not in a position to meet the requirement' (Ofsted 2005: 5). According to Ofsted (2005: 5), teachers of citizenship have yet to establish reliable, systematic assessment procedures and their assessments are often of insufficient quality either to help pupils develop or to measure attainment and progress accurately.

We are told (Ofsted 2004) that student teachers following PGCE (i.e. Postgraduate Certificate in Education) courses in order to gain Qualified

Teacher Status (QTS) to teach citizenship are disadvantaged as they rarely have models of good practice to emulate and are often inadequately prepared. According to Ofsted (2004: 10), it is:

> particularly difficult for trainees to demonstrate that they meet the Standards in monitoring and assessment of pupil progress, in part because most schools have not yet established ways of assessing pupils' progress and attainment in citizenship.

Student teachers also often find it impossible to 'record pupils' progress and achievements systematically' and 'help pupils review their own progress' (TDA 2006: 13, 5.3.2.6) because learning objectives are not defined with sufficient clarity and systems are not in place in schools to involve pupils sufficiently in the assessment of their own work in this area.

The breadth of the aims of citizenship education may account for some of the difficulties currently being encountered. Although at its narrowest the curriculum is designed to produce informed and politically literate citizens (i.e. education *about* citizenship), the broader conception is of a citizenship education to produce active citizens with a commitment to specific public values and behaviours (i.e. education *for* citizenship), and this is especially problematic as far as assessment is concerned. A curriculum designed to ensure that children between the ages of 11 and 16 become 'informed' is much easier to assess than one which is also designed to foster 'active' citizens (QCA/DfEE [Department for Education and the Environment] 1999: 6).

Increasing numbers of students are taking a GCSE (General Certificate in Secondary Education) examination in 'Citizenship studies' at the age of 16 which does not reflect the full statutory programme of study in citizenship for Key Stage 4 (ages 14–16) and is taken by *some* rather than *all* students. Yet Ofsted have promoted the new GCSE and have commended it as a means of improving learning in the subject, claiming that 'participation in GCSE citizenship short courses has been generally associated with greater focus, better teaching and higher standards and achievement'; indeed the setting up of new citizenship departments is singled out for praise where 'some or all pupils are following accredited courses including short course GCSE' (Ofsted 2005: 3).

It the light of such developments it would seem to be an appropriate time to reflect upon officially endorsed beliefs about the implementation and assessment of citizenship. I shall attempt to answer the following questions:

- How might children's understanding be influenced differently if citizenship is integrated across the curriculum or taught as a separate and distinct new subject?
- Does the model of implementation advocated by Ofsted (setting up a new externally-assessed subject with specialist teachers in new citizenship departments) promote the curriculum 'coherence' and 'significance' for children which has been shown to be so important (Stables *et al.* 1999).
- Does the current assessment of citizenship promote or militate against the aims of the subject?

- How might a citizen's identity and behaviour (as a voter or a member of society) be influenced if he or she achieves a poor grade or even 'fails' citizenship at school?

Given the asymmetry in the relationship between assessor and assessed, and the power wielded by the former over the latter, summative assessment of citizenship carried out by teachers or examiners may undermine the values of equality the curriculum is intended to promote. If citizenship is an unmistakably ideological intervention in children's lives its assessment is especially so. While the citizenship curriculum is concerned to teach children about differentials of power in society it exemplifies inequality when the child is subjected to an assessment by a teacher or examiner. According to Stables (2003:1), education is an 'interpretive activity, for all participants and at all levels'. Consequently, children can be shaped by the interpretations and values derived from the dominant power structure, value system, and worldview in their society and school (Pike 2004a, 2005, 2007a). When that power structure produces tests or seeks in some other way to monitor children's citizenship it is expedient to evaluate the influence this can have.

Of particular relevance to the present discussion is Foucault's *Discipline and Punish* (1977) which provides an analysis of the examination in relation to the individual's freedom in the West. Foucault's theory about the role of schooling in general, and the examination in particular, casts doubt upon the widely accepted notion that over the past two centuries those in the West have gained greater freedom. Foucault's intellectual project, in so far as the role of schooling in society is concerned, is helpful as the relation of assessment in schools to capitalist economies warrants careful analysis. For Foucault (1977: 194), the effects of power are everywhere; in a disciplinary society 'power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth'. In schools, examinations and assessments wield power over students, and for Foucault the examination provides an example of disciplinary power. In the case of students, we can readily appreciate that disciplinary power produces subjects (not citizens).

In the light of Foucault's theorizing, offering citizenship studies as an examination subject for certification at GCSE would appear to be especially problematic. While this may raise the status of the subject within the school (by contributing to a school's league-table position, which parents as consumers then use to exercise choice in a market economy), there are concerns that an examination, in which students are graded and compared, militates against the egalitarian ethos and spirit of a citizenship curriculum for all. It has been observed by Arthur and Wright (2001: 128) that as soon as 'accrediting citizenship' is undertaken, 'there is a tension between citizenship as an entitlement for *all* and the nature of qualifications, such as GCSE, which differentiate between candidates using grade criteria'. Such an examination weds citizenship to the power and control mechanisms of what Foucault describes as a 'disciplinary society'. For Foucault (1988: 118), power is 'among the best hidden things in the social body' and in schools it is examinations and assessments that wield power over students and provide demonstrations of disciplinary power by yielding 'truths' about them. As Schrag (1999: 377) notes, 'Without power over students, examinations

could not yield "truths" about them and these "truths" could not be used for purposes of "placing" them in social hierarchies and shaping their expectations of themselves and others'.

In citizenship lessons, students learn about living in a 'free' society, but we might reflect upon the 'freedom' children in compulsory state education actually experience. We should certainly consider whether a citizen's freedom can be infringed or curtailed by the assessment of his or her citizenship. There is an inherent tension between the individual's right to liberty and the practice of assessment. Assessment in citizenship that marks out success and failure and discriminates between students would appear to be inappropriate for a subject that seeks to promote inclusion; Schrag's view (1999: 377) is that:

> Whereas, in earlier times, the masses of people remained invisible, now each of us becomes visible as an individual, but only along dimensions that apply to all. Thanks to the exam, each of us can be put in his or her place on a finely graded hierarchy—one that is organized around the concept of the norm.

Foucault's theorizing about the examination focuses attention on the place of learners in a democracy. If apathy towards voting (which is endemic among 18–24 year old citizens in England) is related to disillusion regarding the distribution of power within society, then the introduction of a mandatory assessment of citizenship (an instance of 'disciplinary power') may not be the best way to engage young people in the democratic process.

Given the perceived political apathy among future voters (currently being taught citizenship in schools) there is a pressing need to consider the suitability of external, summative, assessment in this area of the curriculum. Although assessing citizenship through a portfolio at the end of Key Stage 3 (when pupils are aged 14) does not entirely alleviate the inherent tension between assessment and citizenship, it would at least appear to respect citizens' ownership of their work. This approach can provide evidence of reflection on active citizenship as well as the development of the learner. Arguably, the portfolio collected over a period of time is a more appropriate location in which to record students' community participation than an examination. For young citizens to be writing about such involvement while isolated in an examination room, and segregated from the community they are describing, seems incongruous at the very least. A portfolio recording a community project, on the other hand, is less likely to be perceived as exclusively 'school' work that is divorced from what takes place outside of school. Ideally, there should not be an exclusive reliance on academic means of communicating knowledge and activity; work such as video diaries or interviews with community members might be utilized as well as other evidence of community projects. An exclusive reliance on traditional academic forms of assessment, such as writing, may undermine efforts elsewhere to promote inclusion by failing to reflect the quality of a child's active citizenship and participation.

If members of the community are included in the assessment of a portfolio of citizenship work and students themselves are also involved in this activity, progress might be made towards the democratization of citizenship assessment. Embedding the assessment of citizenship more relationally

within a community could help students to learn how citizens can co-operate, and might even shift the emphasis away from the competitive and de-contextualized nature of grading on the basis of performance in a written and timed examination. A development of the work at Key Stage 3 (KS3) rather than an expansion of the GCSE in citizenship would appear likely to achieve greater congruence between teaching and assessment so that children learn (from the process of assessment) that their democracy welcomes diversity and does not insist on unnecessary conformity.

This does not, however, appear to be the view of Ofsted (2005: 5) which asserts that formal written work is to be encouraged much more than it is now because 'pupils produce very little written work in citizenship' even though the subject 'has a written requirement' which enables pupils to 'pursue topics in depth'. That writing may not be the most appropriate way of pursuing a topic in depth appears to have eluded Ofsted who seem to see citizenship in a rather narrow way as an academic subject and may have insufficiently appreciated the pertinence of some influential views (Crick 2000):

> Without the experiential, participative side of citizenship learning, some schools could turn (and still might if inspection does not follow the aims as well as the precise language of the order) the brave new subject into safe and dead, dead-safe, old rote-learning civics. So easily examinable. (p. 119)

A recent research report (Davies *et al.* 2005: 103) carried out in the English midlands draws similar conclusions, suggesting that this area of the curriculum 'could not be assessed in a conventional way' while noting a 'reluctance to think about any form of grading' on the part of teachers. Davies *et al.* recorded the view of teachers that 'assessment itself, or at least traditional assessment of individual students, should not be introduced into this area of teaching and learning'; one teacher pointedly remarked, 'at the end of the day the most important assessment is how bothered they are, and whether they do anything with it when they leave school, and you can't measure that, you can't put a number on that when they leave' (pp. 105–106).

It has been claimed by Arthur and Wright (2001: 127) that assessment of citizenship is also of a 'poor quality' if this 'focuses on judging a pupil's attitudes and beliefs or those of their family, community and cultural group, rather than assessing their progress in awareness of and understanding of values'. Here it is asserted that 'progress', 'awareness', and 'understanding' are legitimate areas for assessment within citizenship but that 'judging a pupil's attitudes and beliefs' is inappropriate. Evidently, such judgement does not sit well with the values of multicultural, liberal society. Yet, Cairns and Gardner (2003: 186) have asked if there is 'no instance where aspects of other cultures attract opprobrium, and that the majority of people would reject or at least criticize'. It should be pointed out that there are many aspects of majority culture that will attract the opprobrium of some citizens, and whether or not the majority rejects or criticizes these aspects of its own behaviour is not the end of the matter morally speaking. As differences may be apparent between community and governmental conceptions of citizenship, it is only fitting that members of the community, in addition to teachers and students, should be involved in the assessment of participation. While

Arthur and Wright (2001: 127) note that learners 'will need skills in assessing their own progress in order to improve their performance in citizenship education and in gathering evidence' it is important to recognize that teachers 'will need to share ownership of the assessment process with pupils' and should 'involve others including community partners, learning mentors, other colleagues—as assessors'. When learners and communities are empowered in the evaluation of their own activity and participation this shows respect for citizens.

The officially sanctioned model of implementing the citizenship curriculum would also appear to emphasize segregation rather than integration. Broadly, schools can either timetable 'citizenship' (usually once a week), a period that often includes the introduction of GCSE citizenship studies (thereby separating it from learning in other areas of the curriculum) or integrate the teaching of citizenship across the curriculum. Integrating citizenship is certainly the most complex and challenging method of implementation but may well be the most worthwhile (Pike 2007b). Where citizenship has been 'judged unsatisfactory' it is asserted in official discourse (Ofsted 2005: 4) that this is usually where 'citizenship is provided entirely through other subjects but not distinctively' so that the 'subject is insubstantial or invisible'; it appears that Ofsted are judging success by rather limited criteria and, for this reason, do not actively encourage the 'cross-curricular route'. Indeed, according to Her Majesty's Chief Inspector (Bell 2005) 'evidence suggests that, so far, pupils are confused by cross-curricular approaches' and we are led to believe that it is problematic when students are 'not aware that they have had a citizenship programme' which provides the key to understanding how the implementation of the citizenship curriculum is being judged. Visibility has become a criteria of successful implementation even though its converse, invisibility, could be the mark of a highly integrated programme that has been embedded across the curriculum with some degree of sophistication. As I have noted, schools are increasingly (and with Ofsted's blessing) entering children as candidates for GCSE citizenship studies which is one of its most 'visible' forms while 'invisible' forms of citizenship seem to be eschewed (Pike 2007b).

We are even told by Bell (2005) that 'citizenship is not about the way a school goes about its business, or its ethos', although many would regard hidden aspects of school life such as ethos and relationships to be rather important in learning what it is to be a citizen. The Chief Inspector's observation may be entirely valid when the aim is to produce *informed* citizens—children need to be taught in a coherent and systematic way about how the criminal justice system works, for instance—but makes much less sense if the other aims of citizenship education (to foster active, committed, autonomous, and critically reflective citizens) are to be achieved. Contrary to the official view, it is my contention that less visible forms of citizenship education should be encouraged across the whole curriculum. Integrating citizenship within the arts and humanities is especially important if moral reasoning as well as political literacy is to be fostered (see Halstead and Pike 2006), although even such partial curriculum integration may be problematic if citizenship then becomes associated with these areas of learning rather than

others which are then be perceived as having little relevance to children's lives as citizens.

While one might expect to see citizenship integrated in English, drama, history, and geography, it is equally important that it should be addressed in subjects such as science, ICT, modern foreign languages, or art. In segregating citizenship from other subjects, insufficient heed is paid to the important conclusions drawn by Stables *et al.* (1999) that a holistic rather than atomistic perspective of the curriculum is needed to bring 'significance' as well as 'coherence' to children's lives. It is somewhat surprising that while 'young people are growing up as global citizens with social responsibilities beyond the boundaries of their own nations' (Stables 2003: 39), their citizenship lessons may not even be encouraging them to see the relevance of citizenship across subject boundaries within the school.

Reading, citizenship and moral education across the curriculum

Stables *et al.* (1999: 449) suggested that the work of 'transformation' and 'publication' serves to 'confirm the individual as moral agent'. Consequently, treating the curriculum as a text offers young citizens the opportunity to develop as sophisticated intertextual readers rather than as 'specialists' with GCSE certificates in citizenship studies. The observation of Stables *et al.* (1999: 451) that Harre's 'identity project' takes account of the child 'as evolving social and civic agent' may be especially applicable in relation to the implementation of citizenship across the curriculum. One advantage of a curriculum model for citizenship education informed by such theorizing is that it has the potential to facilitate the development of 'active' as well as 'informed' citizens; learners are encouraged to assimilate the knowledge and skills they gain across the curriculum within their lives as citizens rather than seeing their citizenship in a separate domain.

An advantage of an integrated approach to citizenship education is that children can 'transform' the specialized knowledge or skills they acquire in other subjects and 'publish' it in forms that are relevant to their citizenship. It has been suggested by Pinar and Reynolds (1992: 7) that to 'understand curriculum as a deconstructed (and deconstructing) text is to tell stories that never end, stories in which the listener, the "narratee", may become a character or indeed the narrator'. Children have many stories to tell and the development of intertextuality in citizenship is more than a mark of the emerging reader; it allows the narratee to become the narrator and to see the intertextual possibilities of his or her life as a citizen rather than a subject. Reader response theory (Freund 1987, Tompkins 1980) and, in particular, transactional theory (Rosenblatt 1978, 1985: 38), has demonstrated that encouraging response to a text so that 'the reader's attention is focussed on what he [sic] is living through during the reading event' is a key process in facilitating personal engagement and boosting motivation (see Pike 2000, 2003a, c). Currently, however, the potential of literature in citizenship education does not appear to be sufficiently appreciated (Pike 2006a, b). Yet, enabling readers to see the relevance of such texts as the citizenship

curriculum itself to their existence outside of the classroom is especially valuable, and is likely to be a prime means of fostering the motivation needed in citizenship learning both inside and outside the classroom.

Recent work in *JCS* on the epistemology of science in relation to citizenship education also points to the validity of such an approach and demonstrates the need for knowledge gained in this area of the curriculum to be 'transformed' into what might be termed 'citizenship-knowledge' and 'published' as 'texts' that are relevant to a learner's life as citizen. Ryder (2002: 2) notes that 'those outside of professional science are finding more and more that issues of concern to them have a scientific dimension' and argues that attention to the 'epistemology of science' can 'support people's engagement with scientific information outside of formal science'. The ability to engage with the social consequences of science and to make reasoned and informed decisions is vital for citizens who need to be able to make ethical choices (Davies 2004, Edmonds 2005, Levinson and Turner 2001, Ratcliffe and Grace 2003). Citizens should possess sufficient scientific literacy to engage with debates concerning which types of power stations should supply energy needs (and whether they should be nuclear) as well as the more local issue of where to site electricity pylons. Citizens should be sufficiently informed to voice opinions about stem-cell research, cloning, genetically-modified foods, gene therapy, in vitro fertilization, screening of unborn babies, or genetic engineering. While science is not capable of resolving ethical issues which arise from the ways in which it is used, it is also impossible to engage in competent moral debate without sufficient understanding of the relevant scientific issues. For Donnelly (2004: 780), 'the place of science' within a liberal educational curriculum 'is always likely to remain problematic, for reasons which are centrally derived from its intellectual authority and power' and it is all the more important for citizens to be able to evaluate the basis on which scientific claims are made. Theories can all too often be passed off, even by science teachers, as facts. If taught appropriately, with due attention to socio-scientific issues, citizenship may contribute to our liberty, a fundamental liberal virtue.

Even areas of the curriculum such as history (often regarded as the most suitable place to teach citizenship) need to experience a 'transformation'. Although in history learners can evaluate the decisions taken by governments, they should also be encouraged to evaluate the aims of the discipline itself. The learner should be helped to compare his or her own beliefs and values with those promoted and endorsed within the subject being followed. For instance, if like Carr (1988: 75) the historian admits to finding it difficult to 'reconcile the integrity of history with belief in some super-historical force on which its meaning and significance depend' many from faith communities will not share this difficulty. For Slater (1992: 45) 'history is not a value-free enterprise', and becoming aware of the prevailing secularism of history is an important aspect of citizenship education for a child who has a religious world-view. If the aim of history, as White suggests (1992: 15), is to foster 'an autonomous person within a liberal democratic community' we should appreciate that certain sections of the population may not be entirely comfortable subscribing to such an aim as the overriding goal of education and may prefer a theonomous alternative. Burtonwood (2000: 269) recognizes that the

liberal state based on propositions about the desirability of individual autonomy is 'bound to be committed to educational programmes which are incompatible with the beliefs and values of parents from non-liberal religious and cultural minorities'; children from such groups should have their views respected if they are not to be made to feel like subjects rather than citizens.

While history can help children to consider the moral consequences of action, so too can subjects such as art and ICT (Information and communication technology) whose relevance to citizenship is sometimes less obvious. The exploration of an artist's social commentary on society, as in Picasso's *Guernica* or Hogarth's *The Harlot's Progress*, where the values of a corrupt society are exposed, provide good examples. It has even been claimed (Hills Potter 2004: 41) that art can bring about 'increased levels of social engagement' and enhanced feelings of empathy which is an 'important quality in the development of active citizenship'. Analogously, ICT should be seen in the context of the lives of citizens and the beliefs and values that determine their behaviour as moral agents. The uses to which new technology is put can reveal the interpretations citizens construct and the values they espouse. When ICT is seen merely as a tool it should be acknowledged that tools are not neutral in human hands:

> embedded in every tool is an ideological bias, a predisposition to construct the world as one thing rather than another, to value one thing over another, to amplify one sense or skill or attitude more loudly than another. (Postman 1992: 13)

Osler and Starkey (2000: 220) have concluded that modern foreign languages and literacy lessons should, for the same reason, embrace citizenship issues as 'language and culture courses may effectively support or challenge political agendas which serve to exclude'. One French course, for example, provided the following sentence which was to be the subject of tense modification: 'On the whole, if immigrant families speak French they will adapt more easily to their new life' (Osler and Starkey 2005: 34). We could, of course, just as easily substitute the word 'English' for 'French' and expect to find the sentence in a citizenship textbook. The statement reveals certain assumptions as the emphasis is upon what the immigrants rather than the host population should do. Implicit within the statement is a deficit model of immigrants because we are told of the adaptations to be made by immigrants rather than by the indigenous population. The fact that many immigrants to France have French as a mother tongue is not emphasized and a very different starting point would be 'If French people are welcoming, immigrant families adapt more easily to their new life' (Osler and Starkey 2005: 34).

If an Ofsted inspector asked children about lessons in the subjects just discussed they might well say they had been doing French, science, or art, and not citizenship at all. Yet some of the most sophisticated citizenship lessons could have been those where children are not overtly aware they are 'doing citizenship' in any crude way. An overemphasis on knowing children are 'doing citizenship' may betray an all too instrumental mentality that fails to treat children ethically or to respect the subtlety, richness or diversity of their lives as citizens. McLaughlin (1999: 12–13) reminds us of the limitations of 'technical rationality' to govern the practice of teaching,

suggesting that 'the application of "scientific" theory and technique in an instrumental way to solve the problems of practice' arise from 'the inappropriateness of conceiving of teaching as a *techne*'. Other ways of construing teaching (Pike 2003a) have been proposed and Donnelly (1999: 944) questions the extent to which teaching can be called 'an instrumental practice' despite the way it 'seeks to transform children from one state to another'. This is especially relevant to citizenship education that addresses ethics or the way people should be as well as how they are now.

A curriculum for being a citizen

I have argued here that respecting students is a good way in which to begin when 'informed' and 'active' citizens are to be fostered but it is also worth considering what it is to 'be' a citizen or to 'be with' young citizens as a teacher. Being *with* learners rather than seeking to manipulate them ensures they are respected as citizens rather than treated as subjects. I have argued previously (Pike 2003b, 2004b) that instrumental approaches to teaching are often seen as a virtual panacea for all perceived pedagogic ills. Heavy doses of explicit teaching regularly administered (so that children know the exact treatment they are getting and can benefit thereby) are prescribed. As far as citizenship is concerned, the side-effects of such treatment are likely to be damaging. That there should be problems with the implementation and assessment of citizenship is hardly surprising when the curriculum addresses beliefs and values as well as knowledge and skills. This has special implications for 'narratees' and 'narrators' who seek to read not only the citizenship curriculum but their personal story within it. Moral ambiguity (Wringe 1992) surrounds the assessment of active citizenship as it entails far more than the evaluation of specific behaviours and forms of participation. The difficulties surrounding the assessment of citizenship derive in part from the model officially advocated for its implementation (where it is located as a separate curriculum domain rather than integrated throughout citizens' wider learning) but also because dispositions, values and identity (a child's 'being') as well as knowledge and skills, are to be influenced.

Learning in citizenship could be so much richer than is indicated by recent reports and the aims of fostering young citizens who are 'informed' and 'active' seem to miss the point somewhat. The ontology and epistemology of Martin Heidegger, one of the 20th century's greatest philosophers, can helpfully inform discussion at this point for his work on 'being' can be applied to what it is to 'be' a citizen. Heidegger's magnum opus *Being and Time* (1962) addresses the question of the meaning of being and provides a powerful philosophical basis for construing teaching as a form of engagement and 'being-with' students. Teaching that works from the 'outside-in', from curriculum to child, denies what Heidegger would, no doubt, have regarded as the 'primordial' and essentially ontological nature of learning. The existence of citizens cannot be reduced to what they know or can do. To benefit from an education in citizenship is to acknowledge that we live interconnected lives in a society and to appreciate that what we know and do derives, in part, from such involvement.

The citizenship curriculum is concerned, in part, with what children know but for Heidegger (1962: 52–62), knowing is a mode of *Dasein* (givenness, existence or, literally, there-being) and there are two ways of knowing in the everyday world of *Dasein,* which is founded relationally on the involvement he termed '*In-der-Welt-sein'* or 'Being-in-the-world'. The first way of knowing is termed '*Zuhandenheit*' (readiness to hand) and the second is '*Vorhandenheit*' (presence-at-hand). I want to suggest here that there are certain parallels between '*Vorhandenheit*' and the 'informed' citizen and between '*Zuhandenheit*' and the 'active' citizen. If we use Heidegger's famous example of the hammer, '*Vorhandenheit*' indicates that this tool is available for use in the sense that it is somewhere in the house. '*Zuhandenheit*', on the other hand, indicates that the hammer is more immediately accessible, on the bench in front of me and within reach of my grasp. We might be forgiven for assuming that a knowledge of the hammer (or an awareness that it is present within the house) is required before we can put it to any useful task.

Heidegger counters the assumption that experiencing something in its 'readiness-to-hand' is based on having made a discovery of it as something which is 'present-at-hand'. For Heidegger mere 'presence-at-hand' cannot be our primary mode of existence in the world as the 'ready-to-hand' is always and only apprehended 'in terms of a totality of involvements' and 'this is the very mode in which it is the essential foundation for everyday circumspective interpretation' (p. 150). Heidegger believed 'presence-at-hand' was inadequate compared to 'readiness-to-hand' because practical action and engagement 'has its own kind of sight'; he argued that 'the less we just stare at the hammer-Thing and the more we seize hold of it and use it, the more primordial does our relationship to it become' (p. 69). In other words, it is 'when the hammer is encountered most relationally and least thematically' (Glendenning 1998: 51) that it is encountered most truthfully. Keeping the relational at the heart of citizenship provides a basis for engagement with citizens rather than subjects.

For citizenship this means that perceiving and acknowledging the values 'in' assessment practices, curriculum integration, and the learner can provide an authentic form of learning. For Heidegger 'in' denoted engagement and involvement rather than physical location (more like being 'in' love than being 'in' London). On this view, the citizen's 'being-in-the-world' begins with relational 'being' rather than 'knowing' (being informed) or even 'doing' (being active) and can offer a sustainable basis for educational policy and practice with regard to citizenship. While it has been claimed (Crick 2000: 121) that 'to be a good and active citizen is even helpful to the self', activity may actually shift attention away from what it is to 'be' a good citizen; what citizens know or do must not be confused with who they are.

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