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Documents submitted for the Transfer Panel on 15 December 2010 can be found at the bottom of this page.
So-called "weapons of mass destruction" (WMD), and the materials and technologies that contribute to them, have long been the subject of control efforts, many of which take the form of (or contribute to) international regimes. The term "weapons of mass destruction" is commonly understood to encompass biological, chemical and nuclear weapons. In some contexts, including the context of this thesis, the term is also used in its broadest sense to include possible delivery systems for these weapons such as ballistic missiles.
The control of WMD — and the materials and technologies that contribute to them — provides an interesting example of the development of EU policies on human security as well as those more obviously in national security. WMD are, by their very nature, political weapons rather than military ones. In the case of biological and chemical weapons, the utility on the modern battlefield is limited against protected military forces, while the potential for harm against unprotected civilian populations is severe. The control of the proliferation of WMD also forms an interesting case study to help understand how EU policy in this field has developed from declarative policies to practical action. However, in selecting practical actions, how did the Member States and institutions of the European Union decide which actions wold be effective and by what means could such effectiveness be assessed?
Many of the materials and technologies that might contribute to development of WMD programmes also have peaceful uses. This "dual-use" nature can refer to both tangible and intangible features of materials and technologies which enable them to be applied to both hostile and peaceful purposes. An example of a dual-use material is thiodiglycol — a chemical in widespread use in industry, but also a close precursor to sulphur mustard (mustard gas). Dual-use technologies include fermenters and aerosolizers. An example of something intangible is the laboratory skill set a postgraduate microbiology student might acquire. On the nuclear side, this dual-use nature is easier to control as the types of locations that would have peaceful uses of relevant materials is relatively limited.
When the potential to manufacture biological or chemical weapons was limited to military programmes run by governments, international controls had to focus on the activities of governments. Once peaceful civilian activities had advanced — both in scale and in technological development — to the extent that non-state actors could utilize them for hostile purposes, the nature of the problem changed fundamentally. This dual-use nature creates a new frame of reference<$M[frameofreference]> to the security problems of WMD — and in particular of biological and chemical weapons — the issue is no longer just about weapons controlled by states, but also about the control of technologies outside of the ownership of governments that have not only peaceful uses, but also economically significant purposes.
The legitimate global trade in dual-use materials and technologies means that controls cannot be implemented on an ad hoc basis. Without basic agreement on what should be controlled, there is no chance of harmonization of controls — either on a global basis or for a trading bloc like the EU. This is a fundamental lesson from the activities of Iraq in the 1980s, when that country was able to procure a range of significant inputs into its chemical weapons programmes by selecting exporting countries which had not implemented comprehensive controls. Concerns that dual-use materials may be used for hostile purposes by non-state actors have highlighted needs for controls within as well as between states.
The early 21st century policy debate on dual-use issues and related threats have been characterized by certain predominant themes:
Each of these themes created pressures for novel thinking, policies and activities. [The term "activities" rather than "policies" is deliberately chosen in this context as many policies have been simply declaratory. There is an important distinction between actions and words.]
The period in question saw the further rise of the EU as a global power. For 50-odd years, global efforts to control "weapons of mass destruction" had been led by the superpowers, although the UK had a notable role in the negotiation of the BWC. With the remaining superpower no longer interested in traditional arms control and its former adversary now focused on other issues, the stage was set for the EU to play a substantially greater role than before. The emphasis by the EU on "soft power" and its greater responsiveness to issues such as technical cooperation and assistance were seen as particular advantages in securing progress with less developed countries in tackling global problems.
Of the three areas of so-called WMD that are covered by international regimes, biological weapons have pertinent features that make them noteworthy and particularly suitable for a case study. The regimes to control chemical and nuclear weapons both have global inter-governmental organizations connected with them and the EU efforts in these fields went primarily into strengthening these existing bodies, their interaction with states and implementation of the relevant treaties within states. As there is no inter-governmental organization for the BWC, a number of issues had to be reconsidered from first principles by EU governments.
The BWC was in something akin to a crisis in the period following the arrival of the Bush Administration in the US in 2001. In the middle of that year, negotiations that would have strengthened the Convention — through the adoption of a protocol that would have included formal verification arrangements and an international organization — were brought to a halt when the US announced it could not agree to anything that might result from those negotiations. The scheduled five-yearly Review Conference for the Convention at the end of the year had to be suspended as no consensus could be reached – the first time a WMD treaty review had ever been suspended in such a manner. The Review Conference resumed at the end of 2002 and agreed a limited statement focused on a work programme for the following years that became known as the "inter-sessional process".
While the protocol negotiations were on-going, the focus of the potential effectiveness of the regime to control biological weapons was on what might result from the negotiations. With the negotiations halted, how should effectiveness of the regime be assessed?
The arrival of the Bush Administration may be regarded as the start of a "harsh winter" in multilateral NACD issues. At the same time as there was a greater awareness of the threat biological weapons posed — prompted in many cases through fears of terror attacks — there was also no coherent or cohesive thinking internationally on what was the best way to make progress on the subject. Moreover, political hostility from the US froze most multilateral NACD processes as well as there being some hostility towards the US the way it had introduced its new policies.
All research starts from a set of assumptions that frame the work of the researcher. The assumptions outlined below are designed to frame the discussion on theory that is provided in the chapter that follows this one. The assumptions outlined here are not designed to be formal research hypotheses and they do not have a one-to-one relationship to the research questions that are elaborated in the theory chapter. They are instead intended to guide thinking and to bring any underlying assumptions into the open. Indeed, it is important to do this to identify where assumptions may or may not be contested.
The initial assumption underpinning the issues relating to this thesis can be summarized as:
While this might be a perspective held by many, if not the majority, of people of the world in the early years of the twenty-first century, it is clearly not a universal view. Indeed, it can clearly be argued that anyone trying to acquire biological weapons does not hold this view.
The main working assumption relating to this thesis can be elaborated as:
While this might appear at first sight to be a simple assumption, there are complicated aspects. While there was substantial EU activity on issues relating to biological threats, there is also implicit within this assumption a further assumption that there could be other reasons for these activities, such as a desire by some within the EU Member States and institutions to promote collective activity within the EU after the divisions relating to Iraq.
To strengthen the regime means the regime must in some way become more effective, but what does "effective" mean? Indeed, what is understood by "the regime to control biological weapons"?
If an understanding can be reached, in one form or another, on what is meant by the regime and by effectiveness, this then leads to a further assumption:
If no such assessment can be made, what are the guiding influences to policy and how can policy itself be evaluated? In working through this assumption, it would have to be established whether there was a single measure of effectiveness or whether any such assessment would have to be made in more than one dimension.
The events of 2001 and 2002 relating to the regime to control biological weapons caused a reassessment within the EU, its institutions and its Member States of what it was they wanted to see within the regime.
This leads to a further assumption along this chain of assumptions:
If this assumption is incorrect, this would imply that policies were developed without any concept of whether they would have been effective or not. It would not make this assumption incorrect if there was a plurality of understandings amongst these officials.
However, the regime to control biological weapons was not being dealt with by the EU in isolation. There were a number of high level political influences, including responses to the situation in relation to Iraq and perceptions of increasing threats of terrorism, that had an impact on the development of policy. This leads to the final assumption:
These assumptions form the starting point for the examination of theory in the following chapter and the formation of the detailed research questions therein.
This thesis is organized in six chapters.
Chapter 1 Introduction, provides a description of the context and background of the subject matter of the thesis in order to provide a broad illustration of why this area of study is of particular interest and to outline what this work seeks to achieve and where this work will add value to existing understandings.
Chapter 2 Theoretical Framework, Research Questions and Methodology presents the background to the theory relevant to investigating the research problem and related research questions. This chapter includes a review of literature in relation to Regime Theory as well as other theories of international relations and international governance. The concept of regime effectiveness and the different understandings that have been developed in this area are explored.
Chapter 3 The regime to control biological weapons examines the regime and includes a review of how this regime has been understood in the literature. Other documents in relation to the developments within the regime to control biological weapons. The chapter examines components of the regime as well as implementation of the regime. Principles, norms and rules (summarized as obligations) within the regime to control biological weapons are identified and discussed. Further details of some of the regime elements are provided in Appendix I.
Chapter 4 Success and failure ("effectiveness") in NACD regimes develops understandings of aspects of success or failure within the regime which might contribute to or diminish regime effectiveness, including examining whether more than one axis of success/failure should be considered. Identified potential benchmarks or criteria used within assessment of regime effectiveness are examined in relation to principles, norms and rules (i.e., obligations) within the regime to control biological weapons. An understanding of interactions between regimes and other governance systems allows for a more informed understanding of how regimes may be considered to be effective. These understandings also form a benchmark against which the activities of the EU institutions and Member States can be compared.
Chapter 5 The EU and the regime to control biological weapons examines the activities under the umbrella of the EU in the regime to control biological weapons. The chapter starts with a brief overview of the development of policy at a high political level within the EU focusing in particular on the development of the WMD Strategy in the context of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy. The chapter examines the impact of overarching political influences, such as the EU WMD Strategy, on perceptions of and interactions with the regime to control biological weapons. The EU institutions and Member States had to translate broad policy guidance into detailed actions, this chapter examines what decision making mechanisms were used and how these took into account any aspects of perceived effectiveness of the regime to control biological weapons.
Chapter 6 Conclusions draws together the themes developed within the thesis. A key issue examined in this chapter is whether the results of evaluations can be related to the disaggregated regime — that is the co-operative elements of the overall regime without including contributions to the overall regime that would have taken place if the regime had not existed — as well as the overall regime, including all national, sub-national, multinational and supranational contributions, irrespective of the motivation or derivation of the contributions?
People are welcome to read my Transfer Report and Chapters 2 and 3 as submitted to the Transfer Panel.