Brent Spar Disposal - some fundamental questions
The controversy over the disposal of the Brent Spar oil storage buoy is a clear -cut issue between scientific rationality on one hand and public hysteria on the other. Public hysteria, even superstition, has triumphed over scientific truth, at any rate for the time being.
This is how many commentators have presented the outcome of the contest between Greenpeace and Shell. Nature spoke of a 'needless derelection of rationality'. 'Greenpeace couched the debate, not in scientific terms, but appealed to the public with emotive statements' was the burden of the T.H.E.S. comment. The Royal Society of Chemistry's house magazine, Chemistry in Britain, complained of 'emotive and partial campaigns by single-issue campaigners'. The Prime Minister accused Shell of behaving like wimps. Is the question, in fact, as clear-cut as these quotations suggest? Let us consider the issues involved.
It is characteristic of many of the environmental issues that concern contemporary society that while they have an unquestionable scientific or technical dimension, they also have the potential to touch human lives in many different ways. They share this characteristic with many of the complex challenges that face us - new methods of procreation, genetic engineering, chemical and biological weapons, the applications of information technology, creation and distribution of wealth on a national and a global scale.
Can such issues be resolved simply on the basis of scientific or technical criteria, even if combined with an ecomonic calculus? Surely not. These are multidimensional questions which have moral, æsthetic and cultural aspects. They raise questions of of social justice and of political philosophy as well as of personal values. Because the technical and perhaps the economic dimensions will sometimes yield which appear to be clear, objective criteria, there is a tendency to value these more highly that others which although more nebulous, may actually have more serious implications for humanity.
Science and objectivity
How clear and objective are the scientific criteria? The conclusions of science are widely regarded by the general public as immutable, objective. The perception of science as a system which moves by force of reason closer and closer towards a perfect truth, which progressively gets nearer and nearer to revealing the objective laws of the universe is sometimes called the rationalist view of science. It is one that has been seriously undermined by many developments such as the collapse of the certainties of Newtonian mechanics, the emergence of chaos theory, and of course by the studies of historians and philosophers of science such as Karl Popper and Thomas Khun. An understanding of science has emerged in which scientific conclusions are accepted not so much because they have been 'proved', but because they have withstood attempts to falsify them. Viewed from an historical perspective, the contemporary theoretical framework of a science is seen as the most recent of a succession of such 'paradigms' which have passed away for a variety of reasons, never purely because of the irresistible logic of unchallengable experimental evidence. It would appear naïve to suppose that our paradigms will not at some stage suffer the fate of their predecessors. Thus the conclusions of science are seen as inherently defeasible: they are held provisionally.
It is interesting to note that such a view of science fits with the broader pattern of contemporary intellectual ideas which reject absolute certainties of meta-narratives such as those of Marxism, of fundamentalist religion and of belief in the absolute efficacy of the market forces, and which questions the validity of a single concept of justice or rationality, universal in space and time.
The rationalist view of science is so prevalent in public consciousness because that is largely how we teach the subject. For didactive effectiveness our text books have pruned out the historical ambiguities and present science as a linear, logical progress. They give the impression that scientists always agree. In teaching we give the air of the absolute to what is arbitary convention. We gloss over many of the subtleties and ambiguities in presenting, what are after all, difficult concepts. For the confusion of the real world, we commonly substitute a world of ideals which we construct so that they can be treated exactly. It is not surprising that working scientists who have not had reason to consider the historical and philosophical context of their subject sometimes adopt a rationalist position by default.
Of course, some people still accept the doctrines of Marxism. There are also knowledgable and distinguished scientists who, despite historical and philosophical study, adhere to the rationalist position. This is only to be expected. If temperament, personal psychology, ideological commitment and æsthetic taste, along with experimental results, are among factors by which decision between theories within science is made, there could be no question of a compelling logic which decided between different philosophies of science.
Historical and philosophical considerations apart, there is another level on which all scientists accept the provisional nature of scientific conclusions. Where science is called upon to illuminate complex practical issues judgement has to be exercised in deciding which questions, of a potentially infinite number, have a significant bearing on the issue, and have to be addressed. Experimental uncertainty is always present and we can never be certain that more results will not put a different perspective on a complex problem. It is a question of judgement (over which individual scientists may differ) as to when sufficient results are available to give a conclusion of acceptable probability. Living with this sort of uncertainty is part of a scientist's profession.
Against this background I would argue that a simplistic acceptance of the rational view of science incorporates a dangerous delusion which gives a quite false air of authority to a scientific report can be used to silence justifiable misgivings. A more open minded attitude to the immutability of scientific conclusions at the trial of the Maguires might have avoided a tragic miscarriage of justice [NS 9.11.91]. A more sceptical stance towards the claims of the safety of nuclear reactors might have prevented an ecological disaster and human tragedy in the Ukraine [NS 22.10.88].
This public naïvity over scientific claims means that there is much scope for the abuse of 'science'. It is common to see science used as a tool in public relations by both government and industry. It is important to remember that the scientists they employ will rarely be free to distance themselves publically from statements put out by their employers. During the AIDS health education campaign did any government scientist point out that the 'safe sex' rhetoric implied an infinite fracture toughness for thin latex-formed polyisoprene films? When the Meat and Livestock Commission was assuring us in the context of bovine spongiform encephalopathy that 'Beef is safe' we did not hear government scientists insisting on the 'ifs' and 'buts' and 'assumings' that were needed to transform this into a scientifically acceptable statement. Much the same could be said about the oil industry's justification, until recently, of adding lead to petrol.
Scientific independence
What about 'independent' scientific work, for example in universities? Surely this is above suspicion? The traditional structures of universities were designed to protect the independence of the academic research worker, in the words of the Magna Charta of European Universities to ensure research, teaching and publication 'are morally and intellectually independent of all political authority and economic power'. Even in ideal circumstances, it is well to remember that research and scholarship is produced by human beings who may try, but can never hope, completely to isolate themselves from their personal psychology and their cultural and ideologicial milieu.
It is a measure of the importance that government attaches to the control of sensitive research results that the traditional structures of universities in this country have been radically changed to increase government influence over research and even teaching.
In particular there have been moves by both government and industry increase control over the publication of research work they sponsor in universities. The increasing use of contracts which enable research publication to be vetoed has been well documented.
With the expressed wish to make university research better serve the needs of industry, there has been increasing industrial influence in the research councils themselves, originally conceived to fund disinterested fundamental research. This occurs via industrial membership of research council committees and the emphasis on collaborative work. The National Environmental Research Council last year got £6.6m from industry, including £160,000 from Shell and U.K. Off-Shore Operators Association.
Of course, this is not to say that the results of government or industrial research are necessarily unreliable. It is simply to suggest that an element of caution, of criticality, should be exercised when considering what they recommend. The old question 'cui bono?' is always a good one to ask.
Brent Spar - a scientific consensus?
Where does the Brent Spar issue fit into all this? Was there a scientific consensus that it should be sunk in the Atlantic? Certainly Shell presented reports which argued that this would be the 'best practicable environmental option'. Greenpeace put forward a scientifically argued critique of Shell's case. Some support for Shell has come from the National Environmental Research Council's Institute of Oceonography and elsewhere, Greenpeace has also has received informed scientific support from the Scottish Association for Marine Science and other sources outside the organisation.
Greenpeace highlighted uncertainties and questioned assumptions. It pointed out that Shell had only published a fraction of its studies of the problem, so the implications of the material witheld was not available for public scrutiny at the time the diecision on the fate of the buoy was made. This is not the place to engage in the details of these arguments. It is, though, appropriate to point out that the scientific arguments in such a case are very unlikely to be final and conclusive. A concise illustration of this can be seen in two recent letters in Nature. On 29th June, Nisbet and Fowler of Royal Holloway College London argued that the heavy metal content of Brent Spar was insignificant compared with that emitted naturally by deep sea vents, and that the heavy metals released after sinking might actually be beneficial to the bacteria of the ocean floor. Yet three weeks later in the same journal a letter from Harry Elderfield of the Department of Earth Sciences at Cambridge and colleagues from Cambridge, London and Southampton Universities maintained that Nisbet and Fowler's figures for natural heavy metal discharges were too high by three to four orders of magnitude (sic!), but in any case the application of their argument to justify the sinking of Brent Spar was simplistic and unhelpful.
It would be difficult to maintain, as some press comment has implied, that Shell's was a 'scientific' case and Greenpeace's was based on prejudice.
The argument of this paper is not just that science rarely (if ever) gives a final answer to a question, it is also that most of the 'scientific' questions that concern society have important non-scientific dimensions to them. What other dimensions apply in the Brent Spar case?
Economics
An obvious one is the economic. From the strict cash flow point of view, it is easy to imagine that for Shell sinking the Spar would be much cheaper than any sort of dismantling on land. The Government too has an economic interest as it appears that the cost of decommissioning the buoy can be set off against tax by Shell. The Government effectively pays 60% of the decommissioning costs, so the more expensive the disposal, the more it costs Shell and the less the Government receives in tax on Shell's profits.
Such considerations yield sharp, 'objective' criteria. The problem with such conventional economic calculations from the wider perspective of society as a whole is what they leave out. For instance disposal on land would provide employment in a country bedevilled by high unemployment. Another major question is that of 'externalities' to the economic system. The cost of the raw materials which the buoy contains are costed as if they were in indefinite supply, and the 'environment' is treated as if it had an infinite capacity to absorb waste. There are increasing numbers of economists who argue that the neglect of these factors distorts the economic system. As we aspire to exponential economic growth in a finite world, the neglect of these externalities becomes increasingly serious. Environmental economists have suggested ways by which some recognition at least, can be taken of such externalities, but these are yet to be generally accepted. It is important then to recognise that economic calculations rest on assumptions which are to a degree arbitary and some of which are certainly of questionable wisdom.
Political philosophy
Politics, even party politics, is an esential part of living in a human society and it would be a mistake to overlook this aspect of the Brent Spar disposal. Greenpeace has a political agenda which, in broad terms is obvious. It wishes much more attention to be given to what it sees as an environmental crisis, and it wishes to convert people to its view. Equally obvious is the agenda of the Conservative Government. It is broadly committed to laissez faire freemarket economics, believing that industry works best making its own decisions with a minimum of governmental regulation. From leaked documents we know that it sees 'the environment' as an area where it is weak, and it strives to keep environmental issues out of the news.
Where does Shell U.K. fit into this? It might be guessed that as a large multinational company it is broadly in sympathy with the aims of the Conservative Government.
There then is a bias derived from political ideology in favour on one side of recycling and on the other of quick, cheap disposal in the depths.
Values
A political ideology is usually related to a view of morality and a set of values. Shell, of necessity, operates in the context of Western industrial capitalism, where, in Milton Friedman's words, the limits of responsibility of a company is confined to making 'as much money for their stockholders as possible' [M. Friedman, Capitalism and freedom, 1962, Chicago Univ. Press, p. 133]. The 'hidden hand', described by Adam Smith, will ensure that everything will be for the best in the end.
Many of us in the West pragmatically adopt an approach which assumes that we have a moral right to do as we will with 'all the earth and every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth'. Such domination of Man over the earth has often been justified by an uncritical exegesis of the first chapter of Genesis. There are many other cultures which do not share this moral position. Indeed in the West itself, the relationship between humanity and the rest of the Earth is one which has received a lot of attention from theologians and moral philosophers in recent years. Increasing emphasis is being placed on our position as stewards of the earth, with a duty, not just to future generations of humanity, but to the wealth and complexity of creation.
Psychological disposition
Another dimension of the Brent Spar issue is one that might be called psychological. It is concerned with the intuition which we employ as part of the process of making decisions. It is influenced by our perceptions of the individuals or institutions involved built up over a period. What factors might influence our perceptions of the three principal players, the British Government, Shell and Greenpeace?
The Government is elected to represent the people and acts responsibly as will be answerable to them in the next election. Its preference for the cheap sinking option can be seen as a step to maximising tax revenue for spending for the public good. On the other hand, when we read of concern over toxic leakage from chemical weapons and from nuclear waste previously dumped at sea to the west of Britain, [Ind. 30.1.95][NS 22.7.95, p 5], and that Britain is still one of the worst polluters of the North Sea [Chem. Brit. Jly 1995, p. 521], we assume that the scientific impact assessments of these activities were accepted by the Government of the day, and we wonder whether the scientific endorsement Shell claims for sinking Brent Spar might not look less satisfactory from a future perspective. We remember that at the time of the installation of oil rigs in the North Sea it was agreed that 'Any installations which are abandoned or disused must be entirely removed' [NS 24th June 1995, p. 14]. We wonder why there is now a change of heart. Looking forward, it is difficult to believe that the fate of the Brent Spar will not to some extent form a precedent for the disposal of the many other oil installations in the North Sea.
Shell is a long-established multinational corporation which makes a large contribution to the wealth of our economy. As a major petrochemical company it has contributed to the development of hosts of products on which we rely in modern life. Its benevolence is shown by its support of educational activities, such as the Shell Centre for Mathematics Education at Nottingham University. Its environmental record is more ambivalent. Shell gets a significant proportion of its oil from Nigeria where its impact on the population and the environment in Ogoni land in the Niger delta has been the subject of major concern in the media. In Britain too it is known as a major polluter of the Mersey.
Greenpeace might be thought of as a single issue pressure group, quite prepared to engage in civil disobedience and to break the law of the land, if it thinks these will further its aims. It shows scant respect for the authority of democratically elected governments, and is presently engages in trying to prevent one of our close allies from conducting scientific tests on its soverign territory. Alternatively it can be seen as belonging to the campaigning tradition of reformers going back at least to the anti-slavery movement, as a body prepared to challenge vested interest and to uncover what industry and government would rather remained hidden. As such, it plays a vital and difficult rôle protecting our environment in raising public consciousness of serious environmental issues.
Different people will weight such perceptions differently. Because they cannot be quantified does not mean that such psychological factors are irrational or unimportant. In some of the most important decisions we make, they are crucial!
Political philosophy, value position, psychological temperament of course all interact and will colour our attitude to scientific evidence, even where we agree on the evidence. This was nicely illustrated by the contrasting attitudes taken to the Brent Spar dispute by two scientific periodicals with access to the same scientific reports.
Nature often gives a hard, no-nonsense image. The sort of magazine you would expect to have no truck with alarmist predictions of 'limits to growth' or persistent claims by foreign scientists of chemical activity of infinitely dilute solutions. Thus on 29th June Nature's editorial denounced Shell's decision not to sink the Spar as a 'dereliction of rationality'. The Prime Minister deserved better than to be let down by Shell like that. It used to great rhetorical effect Nisbet and Fowler's contention (discussed above) that sinking the buoy would have a beneficial effect on deep sea life. By contrast, the New Scientist has a 'softer', more humanitarian feel. It is more ready to take a radical line, at the expense of the establishment. Its editorial described the 'flawed' decision making process which led to the proposal to sink the buoy. Ministers and oil companies opted for a cosy cabal, and had only themselves to blame for the mess they had got themselves into.
Conclusions
The purpose of this discussion is not to reach a conclusion as to whether Shell and the government were right to decide to sink the Brent Spar or whether Greenpeace was right to urge a reconsideration of the issue. It is to use this example to examine the certainty with which scientific conclusions might be held, and to elucidate some of the complex interaction between scientific and extra scientific criteria which should reasonable be considered when the application of science has social implications.
To assert that science is rational and objective and to relegate other considerations to the status of mere subjective opinion, is to misunderstand science and to be blind to the complexity of human life in the real world. Scientists do the reputation of their subject no good at all to imply an absolute authority and an unrealistic scope for its findings. It produces in the general public a sceptical disillusionment towards all science when 'once certain' scientific conclusions are shown to be false.
It is a mistake to act as if there is one single rationality, free from a priori assumptions, even within science itself. The diversity of informed opinion on so many social and even technical questions implies that there is no one rationality to which all people of good will of necessarity adhere. Any rational system inescapably has an 'historically and socially context-bound character' (Alisdair Macintyre). There are different 'rationalities of traditions' and we should try to understand their different bases, and to explore where areas of convergence might be possible.
In summary: the conclusions of a scientific study are by their nature provisional, and many important extra-scientific facets rationally bear on decisions in issues where the science has social implications. The Brent Spar issue was not a contest between rationality and superstition. It is better regarded as a debate between different rationalities maintaining alternative perceptions of the significance of particular scientific data and holding different underlying value positions.
August 1995
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