(In Spanish) in:

M. Simon (ed.), La derecha radical desde 1945 a nuestros dias: conceptos, ideologia y movimientos (Tecnos, Madrid, 2008)

Towards a New Model of Right-Wing Charismatic Leadership

Roger Eatwell

Introduction

Charismatic leaders have been seen by many academics as an important aspect of the appeal of both inter-war fascism (e.g. Gentile 1998; Kershaw, 1998) and the more diffuse ‘family’ of post-1945 European ‘extreme right’ parties (e.g. Betz, 1998; Ignazi, 2003). However, there has been remarkably little by way of serious attempt to conceptualise charisma and to relate it to theories as to why such leaders exert an appeal, especially in the context of the contemporary extreme right.[1]

The classic form of explanation relating to the inter-war era derives from the writings of Max Weber, and holds that major socio-economic crises spawned a widespread affective following for messianic leaders such as Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini. In recent years this explanation has often been linked to the claim that fascism was a form of ‘political religion’, offering a new sense of belonging and meaning to the masses (Griffin, 2004). Turning to the definitional question in the contemporary era, charisma is most frequently associated by academics with articulate and confident leaders who have ‘presence’. The most commonly cited right-wing examples include Pim Fortuyn, Jörg Haider, Jean-Marie Le Pen and Vladimir Zhirinovsky - although the term charisma has also been applied to different styles of leader, such as the diffident Umberto Bossi and the reticent and physically unattractive Slobodan Milosevic.

The last point clearly raises the question of what exactly do ‘charismatic’ leaders have in common? Even the inter-war epoch, Hitler’s image was more God-like than Mussolini’s. It is hard to imagine the Führer posing for photographers while cutting corn with peasants or strutting on the beach in swimming trunks, as the Duce did. There seem to be even greater differences between the machismo posturing of Mussolini and the suave and openly gay Fortuyn, or the slight and ungainly Bossi. Perhaps the answer to the conundrum of commonality lies in the nature of the support for charismatic leaders rather than their ideology and image? However, political religion approaches overstate the affective side of support for leaders such as Hitler even in the inter-war era. And the quest for a new secular God is clearly a more marginal phenomenon in today’s relatively stable and more secular European democracies like the Netherlands.

As a result, many academics have been critical of approaches which stress the power of charismatic leadership: some have even suggested dropping the term from the academic lexicon (e.g. Spinrad, 1991, p.310). Certainly the majority of academic analyses of the contemporary extreme right have focused on the primacy of demand rather than supply side explanations of support. Arguably the most important of these demand factors have been: i) the single issue (immigration) thesis; ii) the protest (anti-Establishment) thesis; iii) the social breakdown (anomie) thesis; iv) the reverse post-material (a reaction to the 'new' politics) thesis; and v) the economic interest (the losers in the process of modernisation) thesis (Eatwell, 2003a). Similarly, whilst many historians refer to the power of charismatic leaders, the main explanatory focus on the rise of fascism in the in-war era has been on structuralist causes, such as patterns of economic development or the social impact of the First World War.

In the pages which follow, I seek to show that the classic Weberian approach offers little by way of insight into contemporary movements. Nevertheless, charisma remains a powerful analytical tool if it is reconfigured in two ways, which I term coterie charisma and centripetal charisma.[2] I will set this argument up by delineating how I conceptualise the charismatic personality and the charismatic bond in the two main sections which follow The main examples used in these are taken from the post-1980s’ era, as my main empirical concern is to help explain the success and failure of the contemporary extreme right. However, select examples will be taken from the inter-war epoch, both to highlight differences and similarities - and to illustrate problems with the Weberian approach even in the context of classic fascism.

A final word of introduction concerns the nature of the empirical evidence underpinning this analysis. Whilst this chapter is based on extensive studies of support for the extreme right (e.g. Eatwell, 1998; Eatwell, 2002), it is important to underline that there are major methodological problems involved in testing some key hypotheses relating to charisma. However, constraints on space mean that in this chapter I will only note some problems briefly in passing. I will also not offer detailed evidence about support for specific charismatic leaders. Ultimately this chapter seeks to set out a new post-Weberian model, rather than engage in detailed empirical analysis and hypothesis testing.[3]

Weberian Charisma

The term ‘charisma’ was used by St. Paul to describe the gifts of divine grace, which manifest themselves in forms such as prophecy and healing. In the late nineteenth century, it was picked up by Rudolf Sohm as part of his analysis of the way in which inspired individuals transformed Christianity into the charismatic Catholic Church, bearing the mission of redemption. ‘Charisma’ was secularised and introduced into social science vocabulary by Weber during the early 20th century, forming part of his highly influential tripartite (traditional; legal-rational; charismatic) analysis of the bases of legitimacy.

However, Weber did not fully set out a model of charisma, combining concept and theory. At times, he was even contradictory. Thus he in one place he argues that ‘as a rule, charisma is a highly individual quality’, whereas in another he states that ‘what is alone important is how the individual is actually regarded by those subject to charismatic authority’ (Weber, 1968, p.242 and p.1113).

Weber’s followers have similarly tended to at times contradict themselves and especially to eschew systematic exposition. To the extent that a pattern can be discerned, much of the early post-Weberian writing on charisma focused on what might be termed the charismatic personality - namely specific traits associated with such leaders, which were sometimes related to psychological explanations concerning the leader’s formative years (Langer, 1972). More recently, the focus has tended to highlight the nature and causes of the charismatic bond - namely the intense, affective nature of support, which allegedly arises as a result of ‘distress’, caused by ‘physical, economic, ethical, religious or political’ factors (Weber, 1968, p.p.1121). Thus one of the most notable disciples of the Weberian approach to charisma lists four key leader-follower traits (Wilner, 1984, p.8):

i) the leader is perceived to be somehow superhuman;

ii) the followers blindly believe the leader's statements;

iii) there is an unconditional compliance with the leader's will (even at the expense of personal sacrifice);

iv) the followers give strong emotional support to the leader (a commitment more typical of religions).

Four Perspectives on the Charismatic Personality

An important argument of this chapter is the claim that there has been excessive focus on the demand rather than the supply side of explanations of charisma (as well as of the rise of extreme right-wing movements more generally). So in this section I seek to build a synoptic characterisation of the charismatic personality based on an analysis of the existing literature and especially on my own study of key leaders. It holds that charismatics are best defined by four main traits.

However, it is important to stress that a full analysis would require a more systematic diachronic and synchronic perspective which highlights both how appeals can change through time and how leaders can target appeals at different groups even at the same time. A major problem with existing analyses of charisma is the tendency to homogenise leaders’ appeals and/or to fail to realise that charisma and political entrepreneurship are not necessarily polar opposite types of leader. Some charismatics can be remarkably shrewd in terms of building support.

1. A special mission

Charismatic leaders embody a special mission and are typically characterised by prophetic visions. Thus the Front National’s (FN) website at the time of the major 2005 riots proclaimed that: ‘Immigration, the Explosion of the Suburbs – Le Pen had already warned us’. Such leaders may at times make compromises, as Hitler showed in the early days of power: However, ultimately true charismatics are driven by some form of mission. They are saviours, not fixers, although this can be tempered by more ambiguous language. Hitler promised the rebirth of Germany - a suitably convenient metaphor, as it could encompass both radical change and a restoration of the old. Le Pen does not openly attack democracy, in the way Hitler did, but he similarly uses a rhetoric which can both subsume radical and more conservative change. Le Pen has also deliberately adopted quasi-religious language and imagery, especially after 1988 when he visited the US and studied both political campaigning and the techniques of the television-evangelist, Billy Graham (Lecouer, 2003, pp.59-61). Le Pen’s mission has not always been accompanied by detailed policies, but the broad programme has been clear since the early 1980s, by which time the FN had established itself as the pre-eminent party on the extreme right - with immigration and related issues as its signature theme. Mission is also often linked to a foundation myth, where leaders are portrayed as the founder of the movement. Bossi is a good example of this trait in relation to the Northern League (LN). Slobodan Milosevic is arguably an even better example in relation to the emergence of Serbian nationalism in his reborn Socialist Party (SPS) during the late 1980s. As part of their strategy, charismatic leaders frequently seek to portray elements of their life as part of a wider narrative which they are trying to develop about mission. For instance, the leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), Vladimir Zhirinovsky, who was brought up in poverty on margins of society in Kazahkstan, sought to restore the borders of a Greater Russia which would pursue a form of ‘National Bolshevism’, rather than the mix of criminality and free markets which he saw as characterising post-communist Russia. Such narratives open the possibility of appealing to far more than those who just admire strong leaders - in this case: ethnic minorities outside Russia who sought a return of some form of ancien régime; the poor even in Russia; the military; and so on.

2. Leader-follower identity

Although charismatic leaders seek to portray themselves as the embodiment of a special mission, they can also portray themselves as an ordinary man of the people. Charismatics, therefore, employ a complex discourse and imagery of both obedience and empowerment. Hitler began his first speech to the German people as Chancellor on 19 February 1933 with a populist greeting to his ‘racial comrades’ (‘Volksgenossen’), and then reminded his audience that in 1918 he had been an ordinary soldier like the rest, a point reinforced by his simple military tunic. Le Pen has frequently talked of his humble Breton background: images of his youth have featured prominently on the extensive FN website (see also Le Pen, 1984). One of his most-cited aphorisms holds that Le Pen only says out load what ordinary French people think in private. A common technique in attempting to create a sense of a sense of leader-follower identity is the use of a ‘low’ rather than ‘high’ language. Bossi is a good example of someone who clearly sought to break with the cant and grandiloquence of traditional Italian political discourse. Milosevic similarly turned away from the esoteric style of the communist nomenklatura during the late 1980s as he remodeled himself into a nationalist prophet. At times Bossi has even employed a machismo language of the streets: ‘the Lega has a hard on(e)’ he once infamously told supporters. Zhirinovsky too has often used macho language, and has even used sexual allusion in political television advertisements. However, whilst historically charisma has been a male form of narrative/symbolism associated with action and heroics, the modern tendency to view politics in terms of and economics offers opportunities for females. Margaret Thatcher made great play of coming from a shopkeepers’ background, and initially even stressed her status as a housewife. Recently, Pia Kjaesgaard, the leader of the Danish People’s Party (DFP), has courted the image of an ordinary housewife (-superstar).

3. Friend-enemy (Manichean) categorisations.

An important part in the rhetorical armoury of charismatics is the targeting of enemies - the demonisation of the ‘Other’. In some cases, these can be internal enemies, as Hitler’s targeting of the Weimar Republic’s Jewish elites demonstrates. Today, internal enemies are frequently non-white ‘immigrants’ (a term which for the extreme right typically encompasses ethnic minorities born in a country), who are portrayed as at best alien and at worst as criminal, welfare spongers, etc. Mainstream parties are another major target. For example, a common theme in Bossi’s speeches has been an attack on ‘partitocrazia’ – the corrupt linkages between parties and business interests which had come to alienate many Italians by the turn of the 1990s. Foes can also be external. Anti-US themes have also become common recently in Western Europe, often linked to the theme of conspiracy and hidden power. For example, Le Pen stated on 26 September 1997 at Blue-White-Red Festival that France should refuse to take orders from quasi-secret organisations, ‘either foreign like the B’nai Brith or internal like the Grand Orient’ (Jewish and Masonic groups, with the former often alleged to have been behind the US led attack on Iraq in 2003). Another external enemy, which can linked be to internal threats, is the European Union. Thus Le Pen sought to portray the Maastricht Treaty as ‘one of the keys of this truly global and internationalist plot’ (Présent, 30-1 August 1991). Especially since 9/11, Islam has become key target posing both internal and external threats. Fortuyn, whose eponymous party list in 2002 included non-whites, specifically sought to reject charges of racism by stressing that it was the backward and unassimilable aspects of Islam which were his primary target. The British National Party (BNP) has also sought to defuse charge of racism partly by focusing heavily on Islamaphobia since 9/11 and especially after the July 2005 London terrorist bombings.

4. Presence

Charismatic leaders are typically seen as having great personal presence or ‘magnetism’: indeed, this often lies at the core of contemporary expositions (Lindholm, 1991). Traditionally, this magnetism was seen in terms of speaking ability at mass rallies. More recent studies have tended to stress more the leader's ability to create the correct image especially via television. Partly as a result, many leaders have used image consultants. These have helped push Le Pen towards a softer and more varied appeal. For instance, in an attempt to pursue votes from older females he has issued signed pictures of himself in the style of 1950s’ film idols. After the 2002 presidential elections he clearly used his daughter, Marine, to develop policies which would help further extend his appeal to female voters, for instance on abortion. Although Le Pen at times has retained a sharper edge, most notoriously in his 1987 reference to the Holocaust as a detail of history, some commentators have seen this as part of a wider strategy to appease hard liners as well as courting the more moderate. Such developments have led some to argue that the term 'pseudo-charisma' is analytically helpful – pointing to the essentially contrived nature of the modern party leader’s image. If the focus of analysis is specifically on the leader, then the term 'pseudo charisma' can be useful to help distinguish the true believers from the manufactured messianic. However, it is vital to note that even true believers can employ marketing techniques. An early example is Hitler, who well before coming to power practised rhetorical gestures in front of a mirror and personal photographer, Heinrich Hoffmann. Moreover, if the focus is on audience response, then the concept of 'pseudo-charisma' seems of debatable value. From a theoretical point of view, there is a need to explain why certain leaders' discourse and image appeals, regardless of whether this is essentially contrived.

Four Approaches to Explaining the Charismatic Bond

History is littered with ‘leaders’ characterised by a language of mission, identification with the true people and demonisation of enemies, but who have only a handful of followers – such as Hitler for much of the 1920s. More recently, ‘King’ Carl Hagen led the Norwegian Progress Party (FrP) in a mission against mainstream politicians and immigrants for many years before his party made a major breakthrough in the polls. Conversely, Bert Karlsson and Ian Wachtmeister, the well-known duumvirate leadership of the early Swedish New Democracy (ND) Party, used similar rhetoric to help their party make a sudden leap forward in the early 1990s - but the same programmatic package (although not the same duumvirate, as they fell out) could not halt the dramatic demise of the party shortly afterwards.

A new model of charisma, therefore, needs to consider specifically the charismatic bond with voters, in particular to consider theories as to why specific types of leader might appeal. In this section I will stress four approaches which can be discerned in the historical and political science literature relating both to charisma and more generally to the extreme right. Although these approaches largely correspond with different theoretical ‘schools’ of analysis, they clearly need to form part of an overlapping analysis of the emergence of charismatic support.

Together they unquestionably offer many good reasons as to both why the extreme right has been reviving and more specifically why charismatic leaders may appeal at times. However, all neglect the appeal of charismatics to core activists who run local parties and engage in much of the regular proselytising activity. They also tend to homogenise the nature of the mass support which such leaders attract, rather than point to the possibility of support being built on notably different constituencies.

1. (Social) Crisis

Structruralist crises tend to be seen in terms of their threat to identity more than to economic interests. Thus the appeal of the Hitler during 1929-1933 has been seen in terms of his resolution of a ‘sense making crisis’. A stress on anomie has also been central to mass society theory, a major interpretation of fascism in the 1950s and 1960s. However, it fell from favour in the face of evidence that fascism was often strongest where community remained strong, such as rural areas and small towns, with community leaders like clerics or doctors often leading others into (or against) the fascist movement. Rational choice theories, which stress economic motivations, have further helped to undermine anomic-leader-oriented theories of support.

Nevertheless, variations of mass society theory have revived recently in the contemporary context (as well as in political religion explanations of fascism). One broad contemporary thesis holds that traditional social structures, especially those based on class and religion, are breaking down (Perrineau, 1997). In some countries, like Austria and the Netherlands, which traditionally involved highly ‘pillared’ forms of politics this has allowed the rise of new leaders who appeal across past divisions in the name of the nation. According to psychological research, such appeals increase a sense of self-esteem and efficacy among those suffering from a loss of identity, though anomic individuals may also be attracted to family and other traditional values. Young people who have never experienced a secure milieu seem the most likely to fall victim to this syndrome: they have certainly played a major role in the rise of new parties like the Lega (Gilbert and Bull, 2001).

Another key group affected by socio-economic change is the working class male, who find himself alienated from post-material feminist, green, and middle class agendas which are central to some social democratic parties. Such personal identity crises can spawn a broader concern to achieve a new sense of belonging, often linked to an attraction for strong leader figures. This seems to offer an important insight into why Haider’s FPÖ achieved its greatest national electoral success in 1999, a relatively prosperous time but one characterised by rapidly growing fears about the impact on Austrian society as a result of Überfremdung (over-foreignerisation) following immigration from the Balkans and East Europe and more generally the impact of a globalising economy. It also helps explain why Le Pen and the FN has outpolled the French Socialist Party (PS) among the working class in some elections.

These approaches offer fertile insights, but what exactly is the connection between crisis and the rise of extremism? Indeed, what is a ‘crisis’? France undoubtedly underwent serious socio-economic problems shortly before the sudden rise of the FN during 1983-4, but there were no significant changes relating directly to the FN’s main campaign issue, namely immigration. Russia was undoubtedly undergoing major change in the early 1990s, but what exactly was the relationship of ‘crisis’ to Zhirinovsky’s sudden electoral leap forward? There is a crucial structure-agency point here. Crisis is normally portrayed as an objective reality, which unfolds according to structural determinants. But charismatic leaders can heighten, even create a sense of crisis by framing 'objective' reality - crisis can be talked up or down. Structural causes are often less important than the specific unfolding of a crisis, which is in many ways a function of chance or political decisions. For example, Mussolini launched his March on Rome at a time when the post-war crisis in Italy was if anything receding.

2. (Cultural) Legitimation

A second broad approach, often linked to political culture analyses, holds that the rise of charismatic leaders requires some form of historical legitimation. Thus the German tradition before 1945 is typically seen as one which stresses the favourable consequences of strong leadership, for example the great achievements of Frederick the Great of Prussia, or Otto von Bismarck - forerunners who were deliberately evoked by Hitler (Lepsius, 1986).

A major problem in the contemporary era is overcoming the fear of strong leaders, especially any who evoke images of fascism. However, leaders can still employ images which play on historical allusions. The attraction of Boss’s gangling image can be seen not only in terms of a reaction to Mussolinian male posturing, but also in terms of Catholic iconography of the twisted, tortured body on the cross (Barraclough, 1998). Bossi’s frequently shabby image also contrasted sharply with the traditional politicians, and rich newcomers such as the impeccably-dressed Silvio Berlusconi - an image which helps explain poll evidence which shows his appeal by the mid-1990s to those who had formerly been on the left, as well as to Catholics.

Charisma can also emerge in societies lacking a tradition of strong political leadership, as the Netherlands shows. Fortuyn’s neo-liberal ideology and conception of leadership was more commercial than political. ‘Businesslike but with a heart’ according to his website - an important factor in a work-oriented culture within which mainstream politicians were falling into increasing disdain. Fortuyn had been both an academic and media personality before he became a politician, and constructed an image of a man who understood the real problems of society and who was not afraid to speak out against politically correct elites. He used this anti-Establishment politics to create the impression that, in Dutch terms, he was ‘Pimmetje’- one of us, rather than a distant leader. At the same time, Fortuyn cleverly used fact that he was openly gay, linking homosexuality to a defence of traditional Dutch toleration.

The last point raises the issue of whether conceptions of leadership or national identity are more important to explaining the rise of the extreme right. In the case, of the FN a strong case can be made that Le Pen’s greatest success has been in manipulating conceptions of Frenchness. On the one hand, he has sought to create a primordialist sense of French identity, based on deep ethnic links. On the other, he has cleverly exploited a more modernist, assimilationist conception of being French - an ‘open’ invitation to join the nation, but one which requires its new citizens to become truly French. Moreover, Le Pen also cleverly deployed a ‘differencialist’ discourse, initially developed by Nouvelle Droite intellectuals such as Alain De Benoist, which has sought to divert charges of racism (Taguieff, 1984). It is important to add that France has a tradition of strong leaders, but in the inter-war era no significant fascist movement materialised. Tradition, therefore, provides a set of templates but it requires a political leader of skill to deploy them successfully.

3. (Political) Facilitation

The third main theoretical school is linked to institutionalism in the social sciences. One common aspect of this approach holds that the emergence of charismatic leaders is associated with Presidential rather than parliamentary systems and/or with weak party systems. Hitler, for instance, gained considerable publicity during the 1932 Presidential elections, when he was the first politician in Europe to use an aeroplane to fly regularly to major rallies. Another particularly notable aspect of Nazi campaigning at this time was the high level of activism among party members, whereas other parties on the right were essentially cadre-based.

Le Pen too has used presidential elections as a powerful platform. This was especially the case in 2002, when his personality seems to have played a notable part in damning the breakaway group led by the technocratic former FN number two, Bruno Mégret. Presidential elections focus on the individual and highlight issues such as political presence. In some cases, presidential systems encourage demonising opponents - much less of a characteristic in proportionally based parliamentary systems which are likely to need some form of coalition government. This in turn can weaken parties, which in general are declining in terms of electoral penetration as a result of a complex set of factors, including changes in civil society, loss of faith in many traditional ideologies (other than nationalism), and corruption among leaders (Dalton & Wattenburg, 2002). Another important factor in the context of charisma is the contradictions in liberal democracy, which promises participation but which delivers a form of competition among increasingly distant elites - an issue exploited by charismatic leaders who promise to represent the true will of the people.

The media is a further factor worth noting. In some newly democratising states, such as Russia, the media are in many ways part of the institutional apparatus of the government, which usually helps the president - although Zhirinovsky was given notable air time when it suited the administration. In contrast, in Western Europe the media can be an actor in their own right. The popular media like to personalise issues, sometimes creating ‘presidential’ contests even in parliamentary systems. They also play an important role in ‘agenda setting’ and ‘framing’ of issues. Can the FN’s sudden rise be separated from Le Pen’s new opportunities in the state media, encouraged by a President keen to split the right, which was accompanied by a doubling of the FN’s poll ratings? (Gerber, 1998). Can the FPÖ’s rise be divorced from the fact that the Neue Kronen Zeitung, which relative to potential readership was the most widely read newspaper in world, strongly supported Haider?

However, it is important not to believe that the media today are necessarily manufacturing a new wave of charismatic leaders. In established democracies the media are pluralistic and ultimately tend to be debunking - critical of both government and leaders. There is also no necessary connection between charisma and presidentialism, as Hagen and Haider demonstrate. Indeed, the connection between charisma, institutions and extreme right success is a complex one. Take the case of Britain. The first past the post system has historically not favoured the extreme right, although in multi-candidate contests it is possible to win with around 30 per cent of the vote, as the British National Party (BNP) has shown during its rise since 2001. Nevertheless, whilst the BNP adopted a more charismatic leader, Nick Griffin, shortly before this take-off, the evidence seems to point to a variety of other factors as the key to explaining growth, including the importance of local party organisation and campaigning on local ‘community politics’ issues (Eatwell 2004b).

4. (Psychological) Personality

Various attempts have been made to explain the appeal of the classic fascist leaders through psychological approaches. Much of the early post-1945 work on fascism was influenced by Adorno’s theory of the authoritarian personality, which depicted strict up bringing within the family, school and other institutions as producing a tendency towards conformism and respect for strong leadership. However, this approach ignores other powerful motives for turning to fascism and is especially weak at explaining the sudden take off electorally in both Italy and Germany.

An interesting psychological approach directly related to charisma has been proposed by Saul Friedlander, who has suggested that there are certain historical conditions in which people in large numbers become ‘charisma hungry’. Pursuing the point further, he distinguishes three forms of distress to which a charismatic leader may minister: i) ‘fear’, as in the fear of the medieval European Jews; ii) ‘anxiety’, especially as experienced by persons in an identity-vacuum; and iii) ‘existential dread’, or the distress that people experience under conditions in which rituals of their existence have broken down (Friedlander, 1978). As noted earlier, leaders such as Fortuyn and Le Pen appear to have especially exploited themes which conform to the first and second of these. Milosevic’s appeal, especially as the situation deteriorated in former Yugolsavia, probably reflected elements of the third type.

Another rare attempt specifically to analyze the psychological appeal of charisma comes from Madsen and Snow (1991). They argue that a person overwhelmed by change may simply not vote, but a charismatic leader helps give people a sense that the leader can change things, whilst at the same time remaining responsive to the followers’ needs. Put another way, people have a need to understand complex events, and often find it easiest to come to terms with complexity through the image of a single person who is held to be special, but in some way accountable. Madsen and Snow call this 'proxy control'. Although the full thesis is difficult to test empirically, it is certainly the case that leaders like Le Pen have exerted a particular appeal to the apolitical, to those most disconnected from mainstream politics (polls in France show that this group [‘le marais’] grew from 19 per cent of the electorate in 1981 to 31 per cent by 2002).

However, whilst Madsen and Snow may offer a reason why people become hungry for leaders, they do not tell us exactly what type of leader appeals - they unduly focus on the magnetisability of followers rather than the magnetism of leader. At this point, specific leader appeals can be added back into the equation. For example, many charismatics use forms of conspiracy theory, which theory has been seen by psychologists as appealing especially to those who not simply seek simplistic explanations for complex events. Theories of identity creation also point to the importance of defining the ‘Other’ as an important part of the process. From a political point of view, focusing on the ‘Other’ also allows for the creation of a wider constituency of support than focusing on specific positive traits. Indeed, as the concluding section will underline, one of the most important aspects of the charismatic leader is his ability to put together support based on notably different factors and motivations.

Conclusion

It seems clear that nothing like Weberian mass-affective charisma has characterised the vast majority of supporters of the contemporary European extreme right. Indeed, many of the arguments presented above seem to point away from the importance of leadership in explaining support. The current academic conventional wisdom holds that its rise has been based heavily on the demand side – especially specific issues such as immigration (for a long time the number one issue among Le Pen’s supporters) and hostility to mainstream parties (which at the peak of FPÖ support in 1999 ranked even above fears of immigration and related issues such as law and order).

Moreover, the general attractiveness of ‘charismatic’ leaders needs considering carefully. In 2004, television viewers in the Netherlands voted Fortuyn the greatest Dutchman of all time, beating into second place William of Orange who founded the modern Dutch state. But it is important to stress that even in the emotional aftermath of his assassination in 2002, Fortuyn’s party list won under 20 per cent of the national vote (a support which collapsed shortly afterwards). Similarly, just over 80 per cent of French voters opposed Le Pen in the second ballot of the 2002 presidential election. Poll evidence further shows that a significant minority of FN voters supported him/the party in spite of its controversial leader and his apparent, such as his 1987 reference to the Holocaust. Whilst there has been growing distrust of mainstream parties and leaders in many countries, for many voters the extreme right still lacks legitimacy (in some cases the problem is also party efficacy, as where the extreme right is weak there is little reason to vote for it no matter how ‘strong’ the leader appears).

Although only touched upon in passing above, it is also important to question the extent to which inter-war fascist support can be understood in affective-charismatic terms. Fascism undoubtedly adopted some of the external trappings of religion and had a far stronger pseudo or quasi-religious side to its support than contemporary extreme right movements. For example, in Germany the Nazis were legitimated by parts of the Protestant church and more generally fascists courted both believers and apostates with a religious style (Eatwell, 2003b). However, in general the evidence points to the fact that voters turned to fascism for many reasons, including specific economic appeals, fear of the left, and protest against the Establishment. Even during the regime phase, the political religion approach unduly focuses on style rather than on the many reasons why people supported or at least tolerated fascism - such as the growing welfare benefits in Germany for those who were part of the Volksgemeinschaft or simply fear of the police state. Last but by no means least, some turned to fascism because they saw it as a continuation of earlier forms of national leadership – a fact which highlights a major problem in Weber’s ideal-type distinction between traditional and charismatic authority.

Another problem with the classic formulation of the charisma thesis which is illustrated both by studies of fascism and the more contemporary extreme right is that it features a binary approach which focuses on macro (societal) or micro (individual) factors. But local and group (meso) perspectives are also crucial to understanding support, especially the role played by opinion leaders. This points to the possibility that charisma may act mainly on a minority, who then recruit - often by using other forms of appeal - a wider constituency. More recently, the rise of the Lega Nord has to be understood in part within the context of local networks, including strong family groups in which the young often socialised the old into new allegiances. The BNP specifically stresses the importance of ‘community politics’, which focus on issues of immediate local concern and which courts local media coverage (e.g. Voice of Freedom, November 2002).

However, I do not want to conclude from these last points that historians and social scientists should banish the term charisma. Rather, I want to argue that the existing evidence plus new evidence from my own researches indicates charisma remains an important approach in two major senses which help explain why often-divided extreme right parties survive, and go on to build extensive electoral success. This involves focusing on the way in which some leaders become the personification of party, a much more specific phenomenon than the general personalisation of politics which has taken place, especially at election times.

Coterie Charisma

First, I want to argue that whilst leaders like Le Pen have failed to attract mass affective charisma, they have unquestionably attracted significant coterie-charisma. In other words, they attracted a hard core of supporters, both in their inner courts and more locally, who have held that the leader was driven by a special mission and/or that the leader was invested by unique powers (Declair, 1999; Mayer, 2002). As a result, they have accorded this leader great loyalty and have been willing to make special efforts on behalf of the cause. Such supporters are especially important in terms of features such as minimising factionalism and holding a party together when there are little or no spoils to distribute, and in the longer term of building national and local organisation.

However, it is important to stress that coterie charisma does not have to be affective. Some core supporters may see the leader more in terms of potential effectiveness in holding a group together, and especially in terms of winning support. Certainly some of those who helped set up the FN in 1972, especially within the fascist Ordre Nouveau, saw Le Pen more as a manager than a charismatic missionary – a man who could both reconcile the party’s different factions (neo-fascists, nostalgics for Algérie française, Catholic fundamentalists, and others) and exert a popular appeal as a prominent right-wing personality since the 1950s. When the FN split in 1998-9, it was largely over the belief that Le Pen’s leadership had served its purpose, and that the party’s support had plateaued around 15 per cent and needed a new leadership, which was more willing to ally with the mainstream right to drive it further forward.

Centripetal Charisma

Secondly, I want to argue that some voters come to see parties like the FN through the matrix of their leaders - a characteristic which I term centripetal charisma. Put another way, such leaders are viewed as immanent, as the embodiment of the party.

The ability of a party to present a united front, epitomised by a single leader who tends to dominate media coverage, has two important consequences. First, voters are offered, to adopt rational choice terminology, a low cost form of signaling, which helps send key policy messages to potential supporters. One of the most striking things about the poll evidence for many extreme right leaders/parties is that voters are not simply protesting. Many may be alienated from the mainstream and have other grievances, but they are attracted by various policies - although they can come from different parts of the ideological spectrum. For example, during the 2002 presidential elections in France, a poll which asked people on what criteria they would choose their candidate found that in first place for Le Pen came programme (62 per cent – the highest score of all the sixteen first ballot candidates), whereas personality ranked fifth (29 per cent).

Second, by becoming the epitome of their parties, leaders like Le Pen have helped to overcome the dissonance which might have been created by the market segmentation politics which they have pursued. The Weberian conception of charisma implies a leader dominated by a single mission, but leaders like Le Pen and Zhirinovsky have gone out of their way to target appeals at different sectors of the electorate. To some extent this even involved potentially contradictory discourses - for example, Le Pen's evocation of Vichyite themes with his attempt to court left-wing voters. Dissonance was partly resolved by developing these discourses most fully through coteries at the local level. But many individual voters, by perceiving politics through the medium of the national leader, appear to have used a form of cognitive dissonance to homogenise their image of leader-party in a way which would have been much less likely had their primary focus been on policies and the party in general.

It is important at this point to return to a point touched upon at the beginning of the first section above – namely, the political entrepreneurial skills of leaders. Certainly some are more capable of constructing a broad constituency of support than others. Bossi, for example, briefly assembled a natural constituency based on small business interests, resentments against Rome, and so on. But his style was monotone, and when he sought to broaden his themes he turned even further to the right rather than to the centre. Where the Lega achieved particular local electoral success outside its ‘natural’ constituency of small industrial towns in the sub-Alpine arch, it was often helped by notables who broadened the party’s appeal - for instance, in Milan where ex-socialist Marco Formentini became Mayor. Mussolini makes an interesting contrast. He was more capable of constructing a broad discourse which appealed to former combatants, peasants, the bourgeoisie, and the ruling class. During the crucial period of his rise to power, he broadened rather than narrowed his themes and style. Predictably, such a centripetal force did not create a charisma of the converted. Rather, it brought together people of notably differing views, who expected different things of fascism - varying from violence to the re-establishment of order, from reaction to revolution.

A final point concern the fact that it is important not to overstate the power of charismatic leaders in this sense. Agenda-setting is a complex issue, involving the media, mainstream parties and Establishment groups as major players. Interestingly in France, the immigration issue was initially politicised in the late 1970s at the local level more by the once powerful Communist Party (PCF), which correctly feared a loss of working class support. A major feature of presidential politics after Le Pen’s breakthrough in the mid-1980s was the way in which leading opponents, even some Socialists, picked up his immigration themes, thus managing to legitimate the concerns whilst at the same time looking only pale imitations. Nevertheless, these points underline the general importance of supply side approaches stressed near the outset of this chapter.

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