

MA30118 - Solution Sheet Two

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1. For a fee of £400, the manager in question 2. of Question Sheet One may call in a consultant. Let I_1 represent the event that the consultant predicts that business will decline, I_2 that the consultant predicts business will remain the same, I_3 that the consultant predicts business will increase moderately, and I_4 that the consultant predicts business will increase rapidly. Table 1 lists the conditional probabilities for predictions made by the consultant.

| | S_1 | S_2 | S_3 | S_4 |
|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| I_1 | 0.80 | 0.10 | 0.20 | 0.10 |
| I_2 | 0.10 | 0.70 | 0.20 | 0.20 |
| I_3 | 0.05 | 0.10 | 0.50 | 0.30 |
| I_4 | 0.05 | 0.10 | 0.10 | 0.40 |

Table 1: Conditional probabilities for the consultant's predictions.

- (a) Find the *EVSI*.

Firstly we find the posterior probabilities. These are given in Table 2 We now calculate the expected monetary value of each action given the prediction of the consultant, that is $EMV(A_i|I_k)$. For I_1 we find:

$$\begin{aligned}EMV(A_1|I_1) &= 1451 \left(\frac{12}{23}\right) + 1840 \left(\frac{5}{46}\right) + 2050 \left(\frac{5}{23}\right) + 2300 \left(\frac{7}{46}\right) \\ &= 1752\frac{16}{23}; \\EMV(A_2|I_1) &= -1091 \left(\frac{12}{23}\right) + 1685 \left(\frac{5}{46}\right) + 2430 \left(\frac{5}{23}\right) + 2900 \left(\frac{7}{46}\right) \\ &= 583\frac{1}{2}; \\EMV(A_3|I_1) &= -2015 \left(\frac{12}{23}\right) + 1100 \left(\frac{5}{46}\right) + 3060 \left(\frac{5}{23}\right) + 3561 \left(\frac{7}{46}\right) \\ &= 275\frac{17}{46}; \\EMV(A_4|I_1) &= -3460 \left(\frac{12}{23}\right) - 1350 \left(\frac{5}{46}\right) + 3340 \left(\frac{5}{23}\right) + 4300 \left(\frac{7}{46}\right) \\ &= -571\frac{12}{23}.\end{aligned}$$

Thus, $EMV(I_1) = \max_i EMV(A_i|I_1) = 1752\frac{16}{23}$ under action A_1 : we lay off two

The table for I_1 :

| j | S_j | $P(S_j)$ | $P(I_1 S_j)$ | $P(I_1 \cap S_j)$ | | $P(S_j I_1)$ | |
|-----|-------|----------|--------------|---------------------|-------|---------------------|-----------------|
| 1 | S_1 | 0.15 | 0.8 | $0.15 \times 0.8 =$ | 0.12 | $0.12 \div 0.23 =$ | $\frac{12}{23}$ |
| 2 | S_2 | 0.25 | 0.1 | $0.25 \times 0.1 =$ | 0.025 | $0.025 \div 0.23 =$ | $\frac{5}{46}$ |
| 3 | S_3 | 0.25 | 0.2 | $0.25 \times 0.2 =$ | 0.05 | $0.05 \div 0.23 =$ | $\frac{5}{23}$ |
| 4 | S_4 | 0.35 | 0.1 | $0.35 \times 0.1 =$ | 0.035 | $0.035 \div 0.23 =$ | $\frac{7}{46}$ |
| | | <u>1</u> | | $P(I_1) =$ | | <u>0.23</u> | <u>1</u> |

The table for I_2 :

| j | S_j | $P(S_j)$ | $P(I_2 S_j)$ | $P(I_2 \cap S_j)$ | | $P(S_j I_2)$ | |
|-----|-------|----------|--------------|---------------------|-------|---------------------|-----------------|
| 1 | S_1 | 0.15 | 0.1 | $0.15 \times 0.1 =$ | 0.015 | $0.015 \div 0.31 =$ | $\frac{3}{62}$ |
| 2 | S_2 | 0.25 | 0.7 | $0.25 \times 0.7 =$ | 0.175 | $0.175 \div 0.31 =$ | $\frac{35}{62}$ |
| 3 | S_3 | 0.25 | 0.2 | $0.25 \times 0.2 =$ | 0.05 | $0.05 \div 0.31 =$ | $\frac{5}{31}$ |
| 4 | S_4 | 0.35 | 0.2 | $0.35 \times 0.2 =$ | 0.07 | $0.07 \div 0.31 =$ | $\frac{7}{31}$ |
| | | <u>1</u> | | $P(I_2) =$ | | <u>0.31</u> | <u>1</u> |

The table for I_3 :

| j | S_j | $P(S_j)$ | $P(I_3 S_j)$ | $P(I_3 \cap S_j)$ | | $P(S_j I_3)$ | |
|-----|-------|----------|--------------|----------------------|--------|------------------------|-----------------|
| 1 | S_1 | 0.15 | 0.05 | $0.15 \times 0.05 =$ | 0.0075 | $0.0075 \div 0.2625 =$ | $\frac{1}{35}$ |
| 2 | S_2 | 0.25 | 0.10 | $0.25 \times 0.10 =$ | 0.025 | $0.025 \div 0.2625 =$ | $\frac{2}{21}$ |
| 3 | S_3 | 0.25 | 0.50 | $0.25 \times 0.50 =$ | 0.125 | $0.125 \div 0.2625 =$ | $\frac{10}{21}$ |
| 4 | S_4 | 0.35 | 0.30 | $0.35 \times 0.30 =$ | 0.105 | $0.105 \div 0.2625 =$ | $\frac{2}{5}$ |
| | | <u>1</u> | | $P(I_3) =$ | | <u>0.2625</u> | <u>1</u> |

The table for I_4 :

| j | S_j | $P(S_j)$ | $P(I_4 S_j)$ | $P(I_4 \cap S_j)$ | | $P(S_j I_4)$ | |
|-----|-------|----------|--------------|----------------------|--------|------------------------|-----------------|
| 1 | S_1 | 0.15 | 0.05 | $0.15 \times 0.05 =$ | 0.0075 | $0.0075 \div 0.1975 =$ | $\frac{3}{79}$ |
| 2 | S_2 | 0.25 | 0.10 | $0.25 \times 0.10 =$ | 0.025 | $0.025 \div 0.1975 =$ | $\frac{10}{79}$ |
| 3 | S_3 | 0.25 | 0.10 | $0.25 \times 0.10 =$ | 0.025 | $0.025 \div 0.1975 =$ | $\frac{10}{79}$ |
| 4 | S_4 | 0.35 | 0.40 | $0.35 \times 0.40 =$ | 0.14 | $0.14 \div 0.1975 =$ | $\frac{56}{79}$ |
| | | <u>1</u> | | $P(I_4) =$ | | <u>0.1975</u> | <u>1</u> |

Table 2: Calculating the posterior probabilities of the states of nature following the predictions of the consultant.

staff employees. For I_2 we find:

$$\begin{aligned}
EMV(A_1|I_2) &= 1451 \left(\frac{3}{62}\right) + 1840 \left(\frac{35}{62}\right) + 2050 \left(\frac{5}{31}\right) + 2300 \left(\frac{7}{31}\right) \\
&= 1958\frac{57}{62}; \\
EMV(A_2|I_2) &= -1091 \left(\frac{3}{62}\right) + 1685 \left(\frac{35}{62}\right) + 2430 \left(\frac{5}{31}\right) + 2900 \left(\frac{7}{31}\right) \\
&= 1945\frac{6}{31}; \\
EMV(A_3|I_2) &= -2015 \left(\frac{3}{62}\right) + 1100 \left(\frac{35}{62}\right) + 3060 \left(\frac{5}{31}\right) + 3561 \left(\frac{7}{31}\right) \\
&= 1821\frac{7}{62}; \\
EMV(A_4|I_2) &= -3460 \left(\frac{3}{62}\right) - 1350 \left(\frac{35}{62}\right) + 3340 \left(\frac{5}{31}\right) + 4300 \left(\frac{7}{31}\right) \\
&= 580\frac{5}{31}.
\end{aligned}$$

Thus, $EMV(I_2) = \max_i EMV(A_i|I_2) = 1958\frac{57}{62}$ under action A_1 : we lay off two staff employees. For I_3 we find:

$$\begin{aligned}
EMV(A_1|I_3) &= 1451 \left(\frac{1}{35}\right) + 1840 \left(\frac{2}{21}\right) + 2050 \left(\frac{10}{21}\right) + 2300 \left(\frac{2}{5}\right) \\
&= 2112\frac{31}{35}; \\
EMV(A_2|I_3) &= -1091 \left(\frac{1}{35}\right) + 1685 \left(\frac{2}{21}\right) + 2430 \left(\frac{10}{21}\right) + 2900 \left(\frac{2}{5}\right) \\
&= 2446\frac{47}{105}; \\
EMV(A_3|I_3) &= -2015 \left(\frac{1}{35}\right) + 1100 \left(\frac{2}{21}\right) + 3060 \left(\frac{10}{21}\right) + 3561 \left(\frac{2}{5}\right) \\
&= 2928\frac{7}{105}; \\
EMV(A_4|I_3) &= -3460 \left(\frac{1}{35}\right) - 1350 \left(\frac{2}{21}\right) + 3340 \left(\frac{10}{21}\right) + 4300 \left(\frac{2}{5}\right) \\
&= 3083\frac{1}{21}.
\end{aligned}$$

Thus, $EMV(I_3) = \max_i EMV(A_i|I_3) = 3083\frac{1}{21}$ under action A_4 : we increase the staff size by two employees. For I_4 we find:

$$\begin{aligned}
EMV(A_1|I_4) &= 1451 \left(\frac{3}{79}\right) + 1840 \left(\frac{10}{79}\right) + 2050 \left(\frac{10}{79}\right) + 2300 \left(\frac{56}{79}\right) \\
&= 2177\frac{70}{79}; \\
EMV(A_2|I_4) &= -1091 \left(\frac{3}{79}\right) + 1685 \left(\frac{10}{79}\right) + 2430 \left(\frac{10}{79}\right) + 2900 \left(\frac{56}{79}\right) \\
&= 2535\frac{12}{79}; \\
EMV(A_3|I_4) &= -2015 \left(\frac{3}{79}\right) + 1100 \left(\frac{10}{79}\right) + 3060 \left(\frac{10}{79}\right) + 3561 \left(\frac{56}{79}\right) \\
&= 2974\frac{25}{79}; \\
EMV(A_4|I_4) &= -3460 \left(\frac{3}{79}\right) - 1350 \left(\frac{10}{79}\right) + 3340 \left(\frac{10}{79}\right) + 4300 \left(\frac{56}{79}\right) \\
&= 3168\frac{48}{79}.
\end{aligned}$$

Thus, $EMV(I_4) = \max_i EMV(A_i|I_4) = 3168\frac{48}{79}$ under action A_4 : we increase the staff size by two employees.

The expected monetary value of the problem considering the consultant's information is

$$\begin{aligned} EMV &= EMV(I_1)P(I_1) + EMV(I_2)P(I_2) + EMV(I_3)P(I_3) \\ &\quad + EMV(I_4)P(I_4) \\ &= 1752\frac{16}{23}(0.23) + 1958\frac{57}{62}(0.31) + 3083\frac{1}{21}(0.2625) + 3168\frac{48}{79}(0.1975) \\ &= 2445.485. \end{aligned}$$

The Bayes' decision rule for this problem is A_1 if I_1 or I_2 and A_4 if I_3 or I_4 . The expected payoff with the sampling information is thus $EVwSI = 2445.485$. From question 2. of Question Sheet One, the expected payoff without the sampling information is $EVwoSI = 1995.15$. Hence,

$$EVSI = EVwSI - EVwoSI = 2445.485 - 1995.15 = 450.335.$$

(b) **What is the net efficiency?**

To calculate the net efficiency we must first find $EVPI$ using $EMVUC$. Note that $\pi^*(S_1) = 1451$, $\pi^*(S_2) = 1840$, $\pi^*(S_3) = 3340$ and $\pi^*(S_4) = 4300$. Thus,

$$EMVUC = 1451(0.15) + 1840(0.25) + 3340(0.25) + 4300(0.35) = 3017.65.$$

Hence,

$$EVPI = EMVUC - EVwoSI = 3017.65 - 1995.15 = 1022.5.$$

The consultant cost £400 so the net expected gain is

$$\text{Net expected gain} = EVSI - C = 450.335 - 400 = 50.335.$$

The net efficiency is thus

$$NE = \frac{\text{Net expected gain}}{EVPI} \times 100 = \frac{50.335}{1022.5} \times 100 = 4.9\%.$$

(c) **Comment on the value of the consultant.**

The benefit of the consultant is almost all absorbed in his fee. It may be better to look for alternative sources of information.

2. **I have been offered two investment opportunities, A and B, which require approximately the same cash outlay. The cash requirements mean that I can only afford to make at most one investment. I thus have three alternatives: make investment A (A_1); make investment B (A_2); or to not invest (A_3). The returns on my investments depends upon what happens to the stock market in the next year. With probability 0.3, the stock market may increase (S_1); with probability 0.5 it may remain stable (S_2) and with probability 0.2, the market may fall (S_3). The possible payoffs, in pounds as profits, are given in Table 3 below.**

| | S_1 | S_2 | S_3 |
|-------|--------|---------|---------|
| A_1 | 45,000 | 30,000 | -75,000 |
| A_2 | 75,000 | -30,000 | -45,000 |
| A_3 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

Table 3: Payoffs for my investment choices in question 2.

- (a) Calculate the *EMV* of the investment decision problem and thus state the optimal decision under this criterion.

We calculate the EMV for each action.

$$\begin{aligned}
 EMV(A_1) &= 45000(0.3) + 30000(0.5) - 75000(0.2) = 13500 \\
 EMV(A_2) &= 75000(0.3) - 30000(0.5) - 45000(0.2) = -1500 \\
 EMV(A_3) &= 0(0.3) + 0(0.5) + 0(0.2) = 0
 \end{aligned}$$

Thus, $EMV = \max_i EMV(A_i) = 13500$ under action A_1 : we make investment A.

- (b) Suppose that it is pointed out to me that both actions A_1 and A_2 could result in losses, so I decide to think about the risk of the investments. I elect to construct a utility function over my possible payoffs. I assign the following indifference probabilities.

| Profit | Indifference probability |
|----------|--------------------------|
| £45,000 | 0.95 |
| £30,000 | 0.90 |
| £0 | 0.75 |
| -£30,000 | 0.55 |
| -£45,000 | 0.40 |

Construct the corresponding utility table and hence find the decision which maximises the expected utility. Comment on this decision.

Setting $U(\text{£}75,000) = 1$ and $U(-\text{£}75,000) = 0$ then the indifference probabilities correspond to our utilities. We may construct the utility table for the investment choice. This is Table 4.

| | S_1 | S_2 | S_3 |
|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| A_1 | 0.95 | 0.90 | 0 |
| A_2 | 1 | 0.55 | 0.4 |
| A_3 | 0.75 | 0.75 | 0.75 |

Table 4: Utilities for my investment choices.

We calculate the expected utility for each action.

$$\begin{aligned}
 EU(A_1) &= 0.95(0.3) + 0.90(0.5) + 0(0.2) = 0.735 \\
 EU(A_2) &= 1(0.3) + 0.55(0.5) + 0.4(0.2) = 0.655 \\
 EU(A_3) &= 0.75(0.3) + 0.75(0.5) + 0.75(0.2) = 0.75
 \end{aligned}$$

Thus, $EU = \max_i EU(A_i) = 0.75$ under action A_3 : we do not invest. Notice that when we consider utilities, our decision changes. We opt for the safe decision of not investing (our utility function is risk averse).

3. A firm has three investment alternatives: A_1 , A_2 , and A_3 . The return of these investments depends upon what happens to the stock market in the next year. With probability 0.4, the stock market may go up (S_1); with probability 0.3 it may remain stable (S_2) and with probability 0.3, the market may go down (S_3). The possible payoffs, in \$1000s as profits, are given in Table 5 below.

| | S_1 | S_2 | S_3 |
|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| A_1 | 100 | 25 | 0 |
| A_2 | 75 | 50 | 25 |
| A_3 | 50 | 50 | 50 |

Table 5: Payoffs for my investment choices in question 3.

- (a) Calculate the *EMV* of the investment decision problem and thus state the optimal decision under this criterion.

We calculate the *EMV* for each action.

$$EMV(A_1) = 100(0.4) + 25(0.3) + 0(0.3) = 47.5 \quad (1)$$

$$EMV(A_2) = 75(0.4) + 50(0.3) + 25(0.3) = 52.5 \quad (2)$$

$$EMV(A_3) = 50(0.4) + 50(0.3) + 50(0.3) = 50 \quad (3)$$

Thus, $EMV = \max_i EMV(A_i) = 52.5$ under action A_2 .

- (b) For the lottery having a payoff of \$100,000 with probability p and \$0 with probability $1 - p$, two decision makers expressed the following indifference probabilities:

| Profit | Indifference probability | |
|-----------|--------------------------|------------------|
| | Decision Maker A | Decision Maker B |
| \$75,000 | 0.80 | 0.60 |
| \$ 50,000 | 0.60 | 0.30 |
| \$ 25,000 | 0.30 | 0.15 |

Find the most preferred decision for each decision maker using the expected utility approach.

For either decision maker, if we set $U(\$100,000) = 1$ and $U(\$0) = 0$ then the indifference probabilities correspond to their utilities. Firstly, we construct the utility table for decision maker A. This is Table 6. We calculate his expected utility for each action.

$$EU(A_1) = 1(0.4) + 0.3(0.3) + 0(0.3) = 0.49 \quad (4)$$

$$EU(A_2) = 0.8(0.4) + 0.6(0.3) + 0.3(0.3) = 0.59 \quad (5)$$

$$EU(A_3) = 0.6(0.4) + 0.6(0.3) + 0.6(0.3) = 0.6 \quad (6)$$

| | S_1 | S_2 | S_3 |
|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| A_1 | 1 | 0.3 | 0 |
| A_2 | 0.8 | 0.6 | 0.3 |
| A_3 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.6 |

Table 6: Utility table for decision maker A.

| | S_1 | S_2 | S_3 |
|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| A_1 | 1 | 0.15 | 0 |
| A_2 | 0.6 | 0.3 | 0.15 |
| A_3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 |

Table 7: Utility table for decision maker B.

Thus, $EU = \max_i EU(A_i) = 0.6$. Decision maker A chooses investment A_3 .

We now construct the utility table for decision maker B. This is Table 7. We calculate his expected utility for each action.

$$EU(A_1) = 1(0.4) + 0.15(0.3) + 0(0.3) = 0.445 \quad (7)$$

$$EU(A_2) = 0.6(0.4) + 0.3(0.3) + 0.15(0.3) = 0.375 \quad (8)$$

$$EU(A_3) = 0.3(0.4) + 0.3(0.3) + 0.3(0.3) = 0.3 \quad (9)$$

Thus, $EU = \max_i EU(A_i) = 0.445$. Decision maker B chooses investment A_1 .

- (c) **Why don't decision makers A and B select the same decision alternative?**

This highlights the subjective nature of the utility function and how it captures the individual's attitude to risk. Decision maker A is fairly risk averse, choosing investment A_3 with its guaranteed return. Decision maker B is less risk averse, choosing investment A_1 as he derives much greater pleasure from the maximum payoff than any other payoff (compare the utility of 0.80 for a payoff of \$75,000 for decision maker A to that of only 0.60 for decision maker B).